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ABSTRACT 
British Foreign Policy and the Hoare-Laval Plan: A Critique 
of the Theory and Practice of Crisis Decision-Makin 
by Michael Anthony Talalay 
Thio thesis investigates the relationship between international 
crises and the process of foreign policy decision-making. It synthesizes 
from the existing literature a theory of crisis decision-making and then 
tests that theory against the detailed evidence of a case study. The 
thesis is divided into three major parts. The first establishes the 
theory and then uses it deductively to derive a number of empirically 
testable propositions relating crisis as the independent variable to 
various aspects of the decision-making process as'dependent ones. The 
propositions add the crucial'operational element to the theory: they 
provide the sole means of testing it against the evidence. The second 
part of the thesis consists of the case study: -. an account of British 
decision-making during the Italo-Ethiopian conflict of 1935, including 
its climax that December during the twelve days of the Hoare-Laval 
0. risis. This case study meets the two essential requirements for testing 
propositions and theory. First, it includes bothcrisis and non-crisis 
situationsp thereby enabling one to compare crisis and non-crisis 
decision-making processes. Second, it provides an example in which very 
great similarities existed between the crisis and non-crisis situations. 
donsequently, one can. isolate and take into account those factors, 
other than the distinction between crisis and non-crisisl which might 
have influenced the decision-making process and produced differences in 
behaviour. Finallyp in the third 
- 
part of the thesis, the propositions 
are tested against the evidence provided by the case study. These raw 
findings are then analyzed in order to ascertain whether it is the 
crisis/non-crisis distinction or some other factor which best explains 
differences between crisis and non-crisis decision-making processes. 
Because of the deductive connection between propositions and theory, 
the results of this analysis can be used to evaluate the validity of 
the theory itself. The ultimate cc 
. 
nclusion reached is that it is very 
doubtful whether any theory of crisis decision-making is, even in 
principler possible. 
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The real death of the League was in December 1935, 
not in 1939 or 1945. One day it was a powerful'body 
imposing sanctions, seemingly more effective than ever 
before; the next day it was an empty sham, everyone 
scuttling from it as quickly as possible. What killed 
the League was the publication of the Hoare-Laval Plan. 
A. J. P. Taylor, 
The Origins of the Second World War 
Men make their own history, but they do not make 
it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circum- 
stances directly encountered, given and transmitted 
from the past. 
Karl Marx 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Napoleon 
I 
NTR0DUCT10N 
International crisis. The very expression evokes drama and 
excitement. It conjures up images of gunboats showing the flag by 
: distant shores, of armies marching off to war, - of foreign offices 
beset by tension and turmoil, and of momentous decisions taken in 
'hiGh places. 
Certainly, those problems commonly referred to as international 
crises appear to produce important consequences for the conduct of 
foreign policy. In the wake of the assassination at Sarajevo of the 
Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the crisis of July of 1914 led 
the great powers of Europe to begin a war which resulted in millionq 
of deaths and irrevocably altered the shape of the modem world. In 
the Cuban missile crisis pushed the government of the United 
States into taking foreign policy-actions which, though courageous 
land ultimately successful, produced a confrontation with the Soviet 
ý Union that brought the world to the brink of nuclear destruction. As 
a result of the international monetary crisis of 1971, the majority of 
ýthe rich trading nations of the-West revised their foreign economic 
-policies and reversed their attitudes towards the hallowed principle 
of fixed exchange rates enshrined in the Bretton Woods agreement of 
1944. Finally, the oil crisis followinig the Yom Kippur war of 1973, 
when the Arab oil-producing states raised both the price of petroleum 
8.. 
products and the spectre of an embargot caused Japan and most of the 
countries of Western Europe. to quickly adopt foreign Policies much more 
pro-Arab than those previously espoused. 
Despite the apparent significance of this relationship between 
international'crises and foreign policy behaviour, the causal link 
connecting the. two is not direct. It is mediated by the decision-making 
process. -Nominallyl the 'state' is the actor in foreign policy. That 
term, however, is an abstractiong useful for intermational law and 
extremely convenient as a short-hand reference. But the real actors in 
foreign policy are the individuals within the government of the state. 
, 
When confronted with a crisisl it is they who gather and interpret 
information about itt identify the goals relevant for dealing with it, 
and combine the two to produce those decisions which actually lead to 
action. It is this decision-making processl conducted by individual 
decision-makers# which provides the connecting link between the emergence 
of a crisis and subsequent foreign policy behaviour. 
The general subject matter of this thesis consists of the relation- 
ship between intermational crises and this process of decision-making. 
An international crisis can, for the time beingg be simply defined as a 
specific type of problem affecting the external relations of a state (a 
more precise definition will follow in the ne? ct chapter). The decision- 
making process is the consequent means by which the decis*on-makers, 
severally and together, formulate that policy or policies intended to 
deal with the crisis. A considerable amount of work has been devoted to 
the formulation of valid generalizations on the link between the two. As 
inust be obviousl however, no two crises are identical. Each involves 
uniqu'e characteristics, different individuals, and a variety Of issueso 
Ifencey any attempt at generalization must rest not upon the substance of 
9. 
crisesp which will vary greatlyg but upon the identification of certain 
generic properties common to all crises. These we can call the structural, 
as opposed to the substantive, characteristics of a crisis. They are 
independent of its specific subject matter. It is these structural 
identities which provide the basis for making systematic comparisons 
among crises and a1low the investigation of their influence as a class 
of phenomena. 
The. existence of such common characteristics permits the construc- 
tion of a general theory of crisis decision-making. Any such theory must 
consist of three basic elements. First, it must provide an account of 
how the decision-making process. works. Second, it must define interna- 
tional crises in terms of their common generic - or structural - charac- 
teristics. Third, it must establish the theoretical connection between 
crisesl so defined, and the decision-making process in order to demon- 
strate that the characteristics of the former will indeed influence the 
conduct of the latter. 
From a theory of this type, it becomes possible to deduce empirical 
propositions relating crisis as the independent variable to various 
aspects of the decision-making process as dependent ones, Such proposi- 
tions add the operational element to any theory: not only do they provide 
the sole means of testing a theory. of crisis decision-making against 
ý-i - 
historical evidence, but also they indicate what will likely happen in 
future crises and consequently serve both as a predictive. tool and as a 
set of guidelines for improying the quality of decision-making. ? or both 
of these reasons, empirical propositions are absolutely indispensable: 
w3efdly if valid, to analysts and statesmen alike. 
Previous studies of crisis decision-making have identified a large 
number of such propositions. Both the subject matters and the methods of 
these investigations have varied considerably. They have ranged from 
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detailed reconstructions of historical examples, to simulations of real 
and imaginary crises, to interviews with decision-makersp to content 
analyses of diplomatic communications, to primarily conceptual work 
designed to clarify-ideas and suggest fruitful lines for further inquiry. 
Despite the disparities of approach of these efforts, most of them share 
the common goal of devising and/or testing propositions linking crises 
and the decision-making process. For example, with respect to American 
decision-making following the North Korean invasion of the South in 1950, 
Glenn Paige hypothesized that 'crisis decisions tend to be reached by ad 
hoc decisional units'. 
2 Charles Hermann used the technique of simulation 
to examine the conjecture that 'in crisis as compared to non-crisis, the 
'number of alternative solutions to the situation identified by the 
de I cision-makers is decreased'. 
3 In an investigation of the attitudes of 
01 fficials in the United States Department of'State, Howard Lentner found 
Ahat 'crises raise tensions among the policy makers involved and heighten 
the stress and anxiety they experiencet. 
4 And Richael Brecher, in his 
study of several Israeli foreign policy decisions, tested the assertion 
'that 'in a crisis as opposed to a non-crisis situation, docislon-malkine 
becomes increasinj; ly centralizeds. 
5 
Existing propositions, however, suffer from one very serious flaw. 
This ist as James Robinson has pointed out, ''the lack of a rich deductive 
theory involving crisis'. 
6 The numerous propositions in the literature 
-tend to be ad hoc: plausible, inferred from empirical evidence, but not 
following logically from any coherent body of theory. Testing them does 
not at the same time te!; t any theory of crisis decision-making. There- 
fore, due to this lack of proven theoretical validity, the propositions 
cannot be applied with any confidence to future crises. The problem lies 
- 
in a failure of synthesis. All the. necessary elements already exist: 
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theories of decision-making, conceptions of crisis, and the propositions 
themselves. But these have not been combined to provide*the propositions 
with an explicit deductive foundation. 
Furthermore, neither propositions nor theory has been adequately 
tested against truly satisfactory evidence. For this to be done, two 
conditions must be met. First, the historical material must consist of 
both crisis and non-crisis situations. Only if significant differences 
.. 
exist between the decision-making processes within these two types of 
situations can one assume that crises mav affect the decision-making 
process. Second, to be certain that crises actually do affect this 
processq there must also exist a great deal of substantive continuity 
between the two*situations. The crisis/non-crisis'distinction is not the 
only factor that will influence the nature of the decision-making process. 
The fewer the differences that exist in other possible factors, the 
easier it becomes to discount their likely effects and the greater the 
-1, 
confidence one can place in the results of testing the propositions. 
Thus, historical evidence with significant substantive continuity between 
crisis ar-d ron-crisis situations is neceseary fo. - determini. ng whcth. cr --. - 
not any theory of crisis decision-making is valid. To my knowledge, no 
case study has properly met these two requirements. 
Consequentlyl the purposes of this thesis are twofold: 
drawing primarily on the existing literaturej 
to synthesize the various elements into a 
theory of crisis decision-makino from which 
empirical propositions can be deductively 
derived, and 
2. to test these propositions, and thus the 
theory itself, against the historical evidence 
of a case study that includes both crisis and 
non-crisis situations between which only 
minimal substantive differences exist. 
12. 
The actual case study to be used consists of the decision-making 
process as conducted by the British Goverment before and during the 
Hoare-Laval crisis of 1935- In the summer of that year, the British 
Government faced the strong likelihood of a war in East Africa between 
Italy and Ethiopia. On 3 October,, this possibility became a reality when 
1-Thassolini's legions invaded Haile Selassie's ancient empire. Both the 
threat of war and war itself confronted the British decision-makers with 
an acute dilemma. Conflicting pressures pushed them simultaneously in 
two incompatible directions. On the one hand, they felt obligated to 
oppose Italy and support Ethiopia and the League of Nations; on the 
--7, r 
other hand, they wished to preserve the Stresa Front, the Anglo-French- 
Italian alliance against Germany. Instead of choosing between these two 
optionsl they attempted to preserve both, precariously balancing one 
against the other. By the end of November of 1935P matters came to a 
head. In Geneva, the members of the League were about to embargo the 
shipment of all oil and petroleum products to Italy. The potentially 
decisive nature of this measure - combined with Mussolini's threat to 
attack the Dr-Itish 'rTediterranean fleet if it was if-plcmontod - 
further prevarication difficult for the British Government: they faced 
the imminent possibility of finding themselves in a situation where they 
would have to abandon their dual policy and choose one option or the 
other. As a result, at the beginning of December of 1935, Sir Samuel 
Hoare, the British Foreign Secretary, journeyed to Paris to meet with 
11. Pierre Lavalf the French Premier and Foreign Minister. Their object 
was to reach an immediate, peaceful solution to the Italo-Ethiopian 
conflictf and they quickly drafted and initialled a set. of peace 
proposals known as the Hoare-Laval Plan. The British Foreign Secretar7 
intended this to serve as a. means of ending the fighting in East Africa 
between Italy and Ethiopia and thereby forestalling the implementation 
13. 
of the oil embargo. In this fashiont Sir Samuel Hoare hoped to solve the 
British dilemma and save both the League and Stresa. Instead, the Hoare- 
Laval Plan precipitated a major international crisis. 
The Hoare-Laval crisis was decisive for the outcome of the Italo- 
Ethiopian conflict and crucial for the future of international politics. 
It guaranteed the success of the Italian conquest. It destroyed the 
League of Nations. It shattered the Stresa Pront and drove Italy into 
the arms of Germany. Arguably, it marked the turning-point of 
international relations during the nineteen thirties and foreshadowed 
all the issues and problems which were to plague British decision-makers 
right up to the outbreak of the Second World War. 
Six reasons underlie the choice of this particular example as 
the case study: 
1. The Hoare-Laval crisis was an historically decisive episode yet 
has not received the careful attention it deserves. 
2. It provides a particularly rich, complex, and unusual instance of 
decision-making against which to test the propositions. Not only 
did internationalg-domesticl organizaticnal, cand 
all affect the behaviour of the British decision-makers; but also 
I. their actions, as we shall see, presented the rare spectacle of a 
major decision made and then quickly reversed. 
While most of the work on crisis has concentrated on the United 
States, this study focuses on Britain. It should help to isolate 
certain influences of cris6s on the decision-makine process which 
have been proposed as having general validity but which might in 
fact stem from peculiarly American circumstances. 
Ample historical material exists and is available for the purpose 
of describing in detail the actual process of decision-making 
within the British Goverment. The Cabinet, Foreign office', and 
0 
%_1 
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Committee of Imperial Defence documents lie readily to hand at the 
Public Record Office in London and provide the essential primary 
sources. Enough bioaraphies and memoirs have appeared that the 
beliefs and motivations of the individual decision-makers may be 
fairly re. liably judged. The general background and overall course 
of eventican be found in Hansardo in the press, in contemporar7 
writings, and in the numerous historical works covering the 
inter-war period. 
The case study encompasses both crisis and non-crisis decision- 
making. As Glenn Paige has recently written, it is an essential 
task for the future 'to reconstruct "normal" decisions and to 
compare them with crisis decisions.... a much better understanding 
of crisis decisions and of foreign policy decision-making in general 
will be achieved when the behaviour of decision -makers can be 
viewed in the context of normal activitiest. 
7 Previous empirical 
studies have tended to neglect such specific comparisons. Yet, they 
are absolutely essential for satisfactorily testing the empirical 
propositions and thus either falsifyir, - or lendinr, support to a: W 
-theory of crisis decision-making. Indeed, as the very possibility 
-making hinges upon the of a distinct theory of crisis decision 
ý, -ý. -, existence of considerable variations 
between crisis and non-crisis 
decision-making processesl the assumption that the two differ 
significantly merits critical investigation. This is-facilitated 
by the nature of the case study. 
6.1 Finally - and most importantly - the Hoare-Laval crisis was 
substantively a continuation of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. 
-_,,,,. The 
decision-makers in the Briýish Government, the general circum- 
stances in which they had to function, and the specific issues with 
which they had to deal were very similar during the two crucial 
15- 
periods covered by the case study: the non-crisis situation from 
the Italian invasion of Ethiopia up to Sir Samuel Hoare's trip to 
Paris and his initialling of the Hoare-Laval Plan, and the crisis 
situation of the following few days which decided the fates of 
Ethiopia, the League of Nations, and the Stresa Front. Such great 
substantive, continuity means that one can identify and take into 
account those factors, other than the distinction between crisis 
and non-crisist which might have influenced the process of decision- 
making and prodilced differences in behaviour. It is this substantive 
continuity that enables the propositions and the theor7 to be 
fairly rigorously and confidently tested and that consequently 
makes this example a particularly apt one for the purposes of 
'this work. 
Given the two purposes of this thesis, it divides logically into 
Ahree sections. The first synthesizes a theory of crisis decision-making 
and then uses that theory to derive a number of empirically testable 
propositionT and to help provide an analytical fr2mewor. k. for conducting, 
the case study. The second section presents the case study itself: a 
detailed narrative describine the decision-making process within the 
British Goverment prior to and during the Hoare-Laval crisis. The final 
section tests the propositions against this body of historical evidence; 
the results will indicate how valid the propositions and thus the theor7 
of crisis deoision-making itself are. Whatever the specific findines, 
, 
the aim of this thesis is to make a further contribution to the 
understanding and explanation of the influence of international crises 
upon the process of foreign Policy decision-making* 
16. 
Notes to the Introduction 
The explanation of foreign policy can rest on different units and 
-levels of analysis. For discussions of this problemt see Kenneth 
Waltz, Man, the State and War; J. D. Singer, 'The Level-of-Analysis 
Problem in International Relations'; and Arnold Wolfers, 'The Actors 
in International Politics'. For the similar but more fundamental 
problem of whether men mould the course of history or are prisoners 
of fate entwined in the mesh of great historical forces, see Sidney 
Hook, The Hero in History; Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace; and Sir 
Isaiah Berlin's brilliant commentary on Tolstoy, The Hedgehog and 
the Fox. (Full references to all works mentioned in the notes may 
be found in the Bibliography. ) 
, 2. Glenn Paigel The Korean Decision, p. 281. 
3. Charles Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy, p. 161. 
4. Howard Lentner, 'The Concept of Crisis as Viewed by the United 
States Department of State', p. 133. 
5- Michael Brecherl Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, P- 565- 
. 6. James Robinson, 'Crisis Decision-Making: An Inventory and Appraisal 
of Concepts, Theories, Hypotheses and Techniques of Analysis', p. 122. 
7- Glenn Paige, 'Comparative Case Analysis of Crisis Decisions: Korea 
and Cuba', P- 54. 
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Chapter One 
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Crisis Decision-Makir. g: 
Theory, Propositions, and Framework 
C: 
i 
I -. A TheoEy_2Lgrisis Decision-Making 
A decision is 'an explicit act of choice' taken in response to a 
problem. 
1 The specific nature of foreign policy decisions can reflect 
a myriad of influences. In general, however, two broad classes of factors 
combine to produce any decision: information and goals. The information 
available to the decision-makers provides them with a basis for under- 
standing their present situation, formulating their alter-native courses 
of action, and predicting the probable consequences. of each. The goals 
hold by the decision-makers provide them with a basis for determining 
what'future state of affairs they would most prefer. With respect to any 
given problem, the combination of these two factors results in a specific 
-'choice of policy. This selection and combination of information and goals 
constitutes the decision-making process. 
The Decision-Making, System 
The conduct of this decision-making process taker. place within the 
government 
2. 
of the state: within what can be for-mally*called the 
decision-makina system. This has two elements. On the one hand, there 
are the decision-makers themselves: those individuals who hold official 
3 
roles in the government. Ultimately, it is their Perceptions, their 
2o. 
goals, and their decisions which determine the nature of foreign policy. 
On the other hand, the decision-makers do not act alone or as private 
citizens. Not only do they hold official positions in government - and 
consequently derive some of their goals and beliefs from their offices - 
but also their various roles are connected by a hierarchy of authority 
and by formaLand customary patterns of communication and interaction, 
all, of which can also influence the makine of foreign policy. The 
decision-making system has both an organizational and an individual 
component. In practice, the entire government does not participate in 
determining foreign policy, and those elements of it that do will vary 
from one issue to the next. However, the decision-making system as a 
whole defines the universe of potential decision-makers and the totality 
of the organizational structure which joins them together and within 
which they function. 
The Environment 
, -- The concerns of 
the decision-making system are both foreign and 
.. 
tic. It exists and functions within an external onvironmcnt a. -. d C, orpeis 14 U 
5 
internal environment. The former consists of everything beyond the 
territorial boundaries of the state: the physical world, the inter- 
national system, and the foreign policies and domestic natures of other 
states. The latter consists of everything within the state except the 
decision-making system itself: the physical characteristics of the state, 
its political and economic structures and processes, and its Society and 
culture. 
6 
While by definition foreign policy is concerned with the 
external environment, the internal environment can exert an equally 
7 
important influence. Itl tool may function as the source Of problems 
and the focus towards which action. is directed. Both aspects of the 
environment provide a wide range of influences over foreign policy: from 
21. 
each come information on which to base behaviour and constraints which 
limit the freedom of that behaviour, and with respect to each the 
8 
decision-makers hold various goals and values. In general, the 
environment as a whole forms 'a set of potentially relevant factors and 
conditions which may affect the action of any state'09 
Furthermore, both aspects of the environment have a psy hological 
0 
and an operational component. 
10 The former refers to the environment as 
the decision-maker views it. His behaviour rests upon his perceptions 
and interpretations and not upon some absolutel objective reality: 
'what matters in policy-making is how the milieu appears to the policy- 
maker, not how it appears to some sideline analyst or how it might 
appear to a hypothetical-omniscient observer'. 
11 The latter, the 
operational environment, refers to the setting in which decisions are 
executed and actions produce consequences. Decision-makers act on the 
basis of their psychological environments, but it is the discrepancy 
b etween these and their operational environments that places them in 
constant uncertainty about their present situation and the future 
consequences of their actions* To understand how and why the 
ment influences foreign policy, it is necessary to take into account 
both its psychological and its operational aspects. 
The Occasion for Decision 
The environment functions as the source of input into the decision- 
mýking system and as the focus of output from that system. But it is 
wi thin the decision-making system itself that the actual process of 
decision-making takes place. In one sense, this process is continuous. 
The government must constantly contend with issues requiring dOcisions 
and actions. For any particular issuet however, what begins the process 
is an occasion for decision. This is the recognition Somewhere within 
22. 
the decision-making system of a problem that cannot be ignored and 
must be dealt with. The decision-making process then commences with 
respeot to that problem. 
The Decision Situation 
The occasion for decision also fulfils a second function. It. 
provides the starting-point of the decision situation. A situation 
consists of 'the boundaries, the stops and starts, that humans impose 
on continuous reality'. 
12 Any decision situation is bounded in two 
ways. on the one handq it has a beginning and an ending; on the other 
hand, through the decision-making process itself, the decision-makers 
impose limits of relevance on it: they define the nature of the situation 
and focus their attention on what they consider to be important for 
dealing with the problem that started it. Upon the recognition of*an 
occasion for decision, 'some aspect of the situation is no longer taken 
for granted; it becomes problematical in the decision-makers' frame of 
reference'. 
13 The situation must be redefined. Consequentlyq the 
u -for at; im. 111 a-- initialviný; th-c 
process - provides the beginning of a new decision situation. 
The Decision-Making Process 
In broad terms, the decision-making process has already been defined 
as the selection and combination of information and goals. It provides 
the connecting link between the recognition of a problem (an occasion 
for decision) and the policy decisions eventually made by the decision- 
makers on how to deal with that problem. More specifically, the decision- 
making process can be conceived as consisting of four operations: the 
definition of the situation, the f. omulation of alternatives, the choice 
of alternatives, and the consideration of feedback. 
14 While in practice 
23. 
these operations will tend to overlap somewhat, nevertheless they 
are analytically distinct and can be treated as such. 
a) the definition of the situation 
In response to an occasion for decision, the initial step under- 
taken by the decision-makers consists of their defining the decision 
situation. They place boundaries upon what they consider is salient to 
the problem. They search for information about it and interpret that 
information in such a fashion as to produce for themselves a coherent 
picture of reality. At the same time, they attempt to identify those 
goals that are relevant to the occasion for decision and which will 
serve to guide their behaviour. 
b) theformulation of alternatives I 
f Having recognized a problem and defined for themselves the situation 
produced by it, the decision-makers then formulate the alternatives 
available to them. On'the basis of the picture of reality they have 
crcated (their psychological env4ronment), they look for po----ible 
courses of action. 
c) the choice of altermatives 
The. third analytical operation of the decision-making process is 
the choice of alternatives. Fi-om the universe ot possible options they 
have found, the decision-makers choose that alternative (including the 
option of doing nothinG15)_which they feel will best achieve the goal 
or goals which they deem most important. 
24o 
d) the consideration of feedback 
The fourth operation is the consideration of feedback. In a 
complex decision situation, initial, decisions will either prove not to 
solve the problem or will be designed as tentative, not intended to do 
so. The three operations of definition, formulationt and choice are 
likely to be repeated over more than one decision sta, -, e. In response 
to the implementation of a decision, the decision-makers will receive 
'some response from the environment about their actions. Because the 
discrepancy between psychological and operational environments will 
probably lead to unintended or unforeseen consequences, the next decision 
I stage will likely proceed on a somewhat different basis. As a result of 
I this feedback, decision-makers might alter their conception of and 
approach to the original problem. They may redefine the situation, 
reformulate alternatives, and perhaps choose a ver7different course 
of action. 
16 
Problems Complicating the Analytical Operations 
Co., nplicalling these waalytic--a operaLiviis of deciSion-M: lk4ng are 
17 
three major probletse First, because the environment is complext 
individuals must act under conditions of uncertainty. No decision- 
maker can be confident about the completeness or correctness of his 
information, nor can he accurately foresee all the possible consequences 
of his decisions. Second, each decision-maker will likely*hold multiple 
j; oals. His personality and his several roles in society and government 
will lead him to hold a number of goals not all of which will necessarily 
be-compatible. With respect to a given problem, various goals will 
r, uggest different and conflicting choices and provide competing guide- 
lines for behaviour. Thirdt the power of decision is dispersed within 
the decision-making system. Because many individuals participate in the 
25- 
/ 
decision-making process, conflicts will exist among them. Definitions 
of the situation, suggested alternatives, preferred choices, and even 
evaluations of feedback will vary, differing from one individual to 
the next and thereby complicating matters considerably. 
To explain fully the four analytical operations of decision-making, 
any theory has to be able to account for how they work under conditions 
of uncertainty, multiple goals and dispersion of the power of decision. 
.I 
The answer lies in the combination of a) the psychological or cognitive 
processes carried on within the minds of individual decision-makers, 
and b) the bureaucratic or organizational processes carried on among 
decision-makers within the decision-making system as a whole. As 
Steinbruner points out, fit is cognitive operations of the human mind 
working in interaction with the organizational structure of the govern- 
18 
ment which set workable limits on highly diffuse decision problems'. 
Cognitive Decision-Makin 
Cognitive aspects of decision-making explain how the individual 
compensates for uncertainty and multiple goals. 
19 With rcsp--ot to 
former, the decision-maker cannot always afford to wait upon events to 
clarify matters for him. As has been noted with respect to economic 
decision-making: 
Ever7thing that happens# happens in a short-period 
situation, under the influence of current conditions 
and expectations about the future. Today is a moment 
in historical time, between an irrecoverable past and 
an uncertain future. Decisions must be taken todayl 
things must be done, it is not possible to wait for 
certainty. 20 
Similarlyl it is not possible to avoid action because of value conflicts. 
Even if a decision entails high costs in terms of sacrificed goals, it 
must still be made. It is, of course, possible that 'the decir-ion-maker 
will accept the necessity to choose among the conflicting values and 
26. 
interests engaged by the policy problem and attempt to live with the 
unpleasant consequences stoically and philosophically'. 
21 However, 
when the psychological stress and tension of having to sacrifice a 
highly cherished goal become too great, thq decision-maker will attempt 
cognitively to alleviate this stress. 
If the decision-maker possessed perfect information and a coherent 
utility function in which his goals were hierarchically and unambiguously 
ordered, then his response to a problem - assuming he acted rationally - 
would be simply to follow that course of action which maximized his 
highest ranked Goal. Such a situation, however, does not exist. Thus, to 
handle uncertainty and multiple Goals, the decision-maker must rely on 
one or more of all of the following cognitive techniques: 
. 1. He can narrow 
his focus of attention with respect to both time 
and space. He can minimize complexity and avoid the problem of 
competing goals by restricting that area which he defines as being 
relevant to the occasion for decision. On the pne hand, he does 
this by limiting those aspects of the environment to which he pays 
attenvion; on the other hard, by concentrating on the present and 
the immediate future and discounting the long run. 
The decision-maker can compensate for uncertainty and complexity 
by relying upon prior experiencel historical parallelsp and his 
theories of how the world works. In this veiny Robert Jervis has 
stated that: 
The evidence from both-psychology and history 
ovenihelmingly supports the view... that decision- 
makers tend to fit incoming information into their 
existing-theories and images. Indeed, their theories 
and images play a large part in what they notice. In 
other words, actors tend to perceive what they expect. 
Turthermore... a theory will have greater impact upon 
an actor's interpretation of data (a) the greater the 
ambiguity of the data and (b) the Higher the degree of 
confidence with which the actor holds the theory. 22 
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Furthermore, the decision-maker will not only interpret his 
environment in terms of his beliefs and his experience, but he can 
also interpret it in su ch a fashion as to reconcile conflicting 
goals. He can reduce stress and facilitate the making of a decision 
by (mis)perceiving incoming data so as to remove incompatibilities 
among his various goals and thereby give himself unambiguous 
guidelines for behaviour. 
The decision-maker can alter the salience of one or more of his 
I 
goals. My defining away confliots among goals, he provides himself 
with a clear criterion for choice and thereby reduces the stress 
he feels. 
The decision-maker cant when unable. to reconcile or define away 
conflicting goalso attempt to find an alternative which satisfies 
all of them. He reduces stress by tryingto keep his options open 
and 'hedging his bets I. 
Finally, all of the above may prove unsatisfactory for enabling the 
decision-maker to cope with uncertainty and conflicting Goals. In 
such circumstances, he can, of course, flip a coin, panc tha 
Iýý, 
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responsibility-on to someone else, or, like Stalin upon the German 
invasion of Russiat withdraw into seclusion. However, it is also 
likelyt when he must actj that he will resort to emotional 
responses -Igut reaotions'. 
Conditions Enhancing the Importance of Cognitive Decision-Makin 
The influence that cognitive processes have upon the analytical 
operations of decision-making will vary. among decision situations. To 
a large extent this influence depends upon the personality of the 
individual decision-maker and his tolerance for the stress induced by 
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uncertainty and multiple goals. However, any given deciBiOn-maker 
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is likely to depend most heavily upon cognitive decision-making 
in the following combination of circumstances: 
the more he feels that the occasion for decision 
is characterized by complexity and uncertainty; 
2. when he perceives the occasion for decision as 
involving multiple goals, and the greater he feels 
the cost of action to be in terms of goals 
sacrificed; 
3. the more he believes that the time available for 
response before events foreclose his options is 
both short and too insufficient for him to resolve 
uncertainty, unravel complexity, and decide among 
conflicting goals by intensively examining the 
environment; and 
4- the more he feels thatv despite these difficulties, 
he must take some action rather than merely wait 
to see what develops. 
-Under this combination of circumstances, when uncertainty and stress 
are high, time is short and inadequate, and action is felt to be both 
essential and potentially costlyq the. cognitive processes of the 
individual will have their greatest influence upon the four analytical 
operations of decision-making. 
Organizational Decision-Mak 
Further complicating these four analytical operations is the fact 
that the power of decision is dispersed within the government. A large 
number of decision-makers are involved in the making of foreign policy. 
Each will perceive and interpret information in a unique fashion; each 
will hold goals and values distinct from and often conflicting with 
those of the others; and consequently each will come to prefer different 
policies for dealing with any problem. Despite these differences, 
decisions will be made and actions will be taken. The problems inherent 
in this dispersion of power will be dealt with through organizational 
processes. Specifically, complex organizations handle the dispersion of 
decision-making power in four distinct fashions: through departmental 
29. 
autonomy and bureaucratic politics, through group decision-making, 
through a hierarchical structure of authority, and through routine 
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procedures. The organizational processes of decision-making, like 
the cognitive ones, are likely to influence the definition of the 
situationg the formulation of alternatives, the choice of alternativest 
and the consideration of feedback. 
a) departmental autonomy and bureaucratic politics 
Any complex organization will have to cope with vast amounts of 
infomation and a wide range of tasks and responsibilities. The 
il, avitable rusult is organizational fragmentation: tho govez=,, cnt viill 
be divided into several departmentsv each with its own various sub- 
sectionsv all of which are charged with performing specified and 
specialized functions. Because each department of government has its 
own particular area of concern, each one not only will pay attention 
to different channels and types of information but also will place 
different interpretations upon the same information. Similarlyl each 
department will hold its own particular goals and valuee'with respect 
to the environment. As a result, if any Given-occasion for decision 
presents a problem that involves more than one government department, 
each will have its own definition of the situation, its distinctive 
alternatives, its preferred choicesp and its own evaluation of feedback. 
If government departments simply follow their own preferences without 
any co-ordination or central direction, the result is departmental 
autonomy:, instead of a state's havinj; one coherent foreign policy, it 
has several strands of policyl some complementary, some conflicting, 
others unrelated. Cne step further comes competition among departments. 
They vie for power and prestige, for larger shares of the. budget, and, 
in the process of decision-making, for the choice of their POlicies. 
Thusl the dispersion of power within an organization can in part be 
handled by compartmentalization and competition: by departmental 
autonomy and bureaucratic politics* 
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group decision-makin 
Because of complexity in the environment and the organizational 
-fragmentation inherent in governments, no single individual possesses 
both theexpertise and the authority, let alone the time, to deal with 
. every problem and make every decision. Moreover, issues often cut across 
the functional divisions of government. The result is group decision- 
making. All governments are characterized by a large number of'such 
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groups. At the very highest levell there is the Cabinet or its ecruiva- 
lent, but even at much lower levels there exist interdepartmental 
committees and various other bodies of collective decision. 
The first major influence of the group upon the decision-making 
process is throush the nature of its membership. 'The significance of 
the nature of the decisional unit immediately becomes a focus of 
attention because of the fur. dnmentall azsumpticn of decision-mnkine 
analysis that decisions tend to vary with the composition of the 
decisional unit-' 
26 As every decision group is composed of a unique 
set of individualsl different groups would likely reach different 
decisions and implement different policies. Furthermore, while many 
groups exist prior to the recognition of a given problem, -it always 
remains a possibility that an occasion for decision will lead to the 
formation of an ad hoc group. Such groups are more likely to be task 
. oriented than to be dominated by the parochial interests of their 
members; they are more likely to be. based on expertise; and they may be 
stacked: engineered in advance to include or exclude specific individuals 
and thereby produce pre-determined results. 
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Howeverg 'a group is not merely the sum of its members; therefore 
decisions emerging from a group context are likely to be different than 
what a simple aggregation of individual preferences and abilities might 
suggest'. 
27 For examplep in identical circumstances, a unit that 
resolves conflicts on-the basis Of unanimity will likely adopt a 
different policy from one in which the majority rules. In general, ? the 
dynamics of croup interaction are likely to have a significant effect on 
both the decision-making processes Fthe authors are referring to what 
have been. called here the analytical operations of decision-making] and 
the substance and quality of the policy output'. 
28 The internal dynamic 
of any group has at least three major aspects. The first pertains to its 
frequency of interaction. While group decision-making is not the sole 
method for. handling the dispersion of power within the organization, it 
is a potentially important one. The group provides the major forum for 
discussion and. decision. The more often a Croup meets, and the more 
intense and prolonged the interactions of its members arel then the 
greater is the likelihood of centralized co-ordination of policy. The 
group will play a more important role in authorizinS the separate 
I policies of its members, resolving disputes among them, and generally 
functioning as a co-ordinating body. Moreover, and this is the second 
aspect of Group dYnamicsi the group may initiate and formulate policy 
rather than merely approve or arbitrate. Particularly as the frequency 
of interaction of the group rises, it may create its own reality 
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distinctive from the separate realities of its members. The group 
can be more than a foram for reconciline differences. The definition of 
the situation, the formulation and choice of alternatives, and even the 
consideration and interpretation of feedback can emerge from group 
interactions. The group does not necessarily merely decide from amonG 
competing viewpoints; it can also create its own policy based on group 
I 
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processes. The third aspect of group dynamics is group cohesion. Each 
group has-its own internal goals and values -shared by all its members 
by virtue-of their belonging to the group. These refer to its prestige, 
its power, and even its preservation - to its functioning and efficiency 
and not to any specific policy. -As cohesion and group solidarity increase, 
then the greater is the possibility that these group goals and values 
will take on a superordinate role in the decision-making process and 
that decisions may be based upon them and not upon the particular goals 
evoked by any substantive issue or problem. 
Thus, the dispersion of power can be handled by group decision- 
making. -And both the composition of 
the group and its internal dynamic 
can influence the analytical operations of decision-making and the 
decisions actually made. 
c) the hierarchical structure of authority 
The third method evolved by organizations for handling the problems 
inherent in a dispersion of the power of decision is the creation of a 
hierarchical --tractur-- of authority. 1,. T, --n a dcoicicn cannot be made at 
a particular level, it gets passed up the ladder - either to a superior. 
individual or a higher-ranking group. Two general causes can produce this 
effect. on the one hand, uncertainty and complexity in the environment 
or the existence of multiple goals in a problem can lead decision-makers 
to feel that responsibility must be pushed upwards; for various reasons, 
they 'pass the bucki. On the other hando conflicts of opinion among 
decision-makers can often only be settled by referring the matter up to 
a higher level. (For exactly the same reasons, a very similar phenomenon 
can occur within decision-making Groups: in conditions of uncertainty 
and disagreementy members of the Group Will tend to turn to the Group 
leader for guidance and arbitration* )30 At higher levels of 
33. 
responsibility, decision-makers are freer to take authoritative actions 
committingthe state, are less bound by the dictates of organizational 
routinev and are less constrained by parochial departmental values. 
Consequently, the level of decision within the hierarchy will have an 
effect on the analytical operations of decision-making and on the 
actual decisions made. 
d) routine procedures 
Finally, a great deal of organizational decision-mal-dng proceeds . 
according to routine. In response to an occasion for decision, even in 
the absence of a-specifio plan for dealing with that precise problem, 
the decision-making system works according to pre-determined general 
rules. Standard operating procedures govern what department has 
jurisdiction over an issue, at what level in the hierarchy the problem 
will be dealt with, how information about it is'processed, what j; roup 
will consider the problem, and how the internal dynamic of that group 
normally operates. The establishment of routine is the fourth v; ay in 
V., ',, Iich -- decisicn-m-ching cy:; tcr, h=, alles- t*l-- prolblcm of a dicpc-zion 
of power. 
Conditions Affecting Organizational-Decision-1,16kin 
il"ý The conditions which will enhance the importance of cognitive 
.. processes have already been identified. They are, from the point of 
view of the decision-makers, where uncertainty and stress are high, time 
, is short and 
inadequate for task complexity, and action is felt to be 
both necessary and potentially costly in terms of goals sacrificed. 
These conditions will be hiGhly unsettling'upon the decision-makers. 
, They are consequentlyýlikely to have the following pronounced effects 
upon Organizational processes: 
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Organizational routine will be disrupted and be replaced by 
extra-ordinary and ad hoc procedures. The felt necessity for 
acting quickly in conditions of uncertainty and conflicting goals 
is likely to produce this result. 
2. The level of decision will rise in the hierarchical structure of 
the organization - in terms of boýh individuals and groups. 
Authority becomes more centralized. The above combination of 
conditions will lead lower-level decision-makers to feel that 
they must pass-responsibility upwards and higher-level ones to 
feel that the problem is sufficiently urgent and serious for them 
to intervene and take charge. 
: 3- Similarly, within the decision group, the importance of the leader 
will be enhanced. In the face of the necessity of action under 
conditions of uncertainty and goal conflict, he will be more 
likely to accept responsibility and followers will be more likely 
to expect and accept this. 
4- The frequency of interaction of the group will increase. Its 
members will feel a greater iieed for face-to-face proximity. TMey 
will meet more often than normal to alleviate stress, to provide 
themselves with reassurance in the face of uncertainty and the 
potentially high cost of action, and to facilitate a quick decision. 
Group processes are likely to rise in importance. Particularly as 
the frequency of interaction of thegroup I increases, a group 
reality is likely to dominate the separate reality of each of its 
members. The definition of the situation, the formulation of 
alternatives, the choice of alternativest and the consideration 
and interpretation of feedback are likely to be joint group 
ventures. The group ir. more likely to function as the initiator 
of policy rather than merely to be the authorizer or co-ordinator 
35- 
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of it and the foram for settling disputes. 
Group cohesion will increase. To reduce stress$ members are likely 
to stifle dissent and turn to each other for reassurance. Moreoverl 
uncertain about what is happening and what to do, yet needing to 
make a quick decision, they will tend to focus upon group goals 
and values to provide clear guidelines for behaviour. 
Ad hoc groups are more likely to be formed. The disruption of 
routine, the necessity for fast actiong and the uncertainty which 
puts a premium on expert knowledgel are all conducive to this 
result. Moreoverl ad hoc groups can be designed to exclude 
dissenters and thereby minimize stress. 
Both departmental autonomy and bureaucratic politics are likely 
to decline in importance. The increased salience of the various 
aspects of Croup decision-making is likely to lessen departmental 
independencep heighten centralized control, and result in a Croup 
reality that dominates the parochial realities of its members. 
Furthermorej as the level of decision rises in the organizational 
hierarchyt decision-r. nal-cers are more iýblv to icnore o. - tranc-cond 
parochial interests. 
The Determinants of the Decision-Making Process 
In response to an occasion for decision, cognitive and organizational 
processes combine to influence the analytical operations of decision- 
making. Underlying this overall process and giving it the specific shape 
it actually adopts are five fundamental determining factors. These are 
the personalities and beliefs of the individual decioion-makers, the 
structure of the decision-making systemp the nature of the environment, 
and both the substance and the structure of the occasion for decision 
itself - 
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a). the -individual 
The character of any individual will influence his conduct of 
the'analytical, cognitive, and organizational aspects of decision-making. 
Individuals search for and then interpret information about their 
environments in the light of their o= belief systems: teach of us 
constructs his' own reality,. 
31 In similar circumstances, different 
individuals will arrive at different conclusions and definitions of 
the situationv prefer different alternatives, and evaluate feedback 
differently. Moreover, the specific personality of the decision-maker 
will influence his ability to tolerate ambiguity and stress and how he 
deals-with uncertainty and multiple coals. Similarly, his personality 
will also lead,, him to interpret his official role(s) in government in 
his oim idiosyncratic manner. Finally, his personality will influence 
the way in which he conducts organizational decision-making: how willing 
he is to dispense with routine and accept responsibilityt and how 
capable he is in group situations of putting his point of view across 
and getting his preferences adopted. In response to-any problem, the 
personalities and beliefs of the deoision-makers will- provide onc of the 
determinants of how the decision-making process functions and what 
decisions and actions actually emerge from it. 
b) the structure of the decision-making system 
The structure of the decision-making system will likewise affect 
the decision-making process. It accounts for the existence of particular 
Groupsl the hierarchy of authorityv the patterns of routine behaviour, 
and the manner in which the organization is fragmented into departments. 
11oreover, 'where you st-bnd depends upon where you sits. 
32 By determining 
what roles are available, the structure of the decision-making system 
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provides goals and beliefs to the individual and thus influences both 
the nature of his cognitive processes and how he conducts the analytical 
operations of decision-making. 
c) the environment 
Neither aspect of, the environment neither its internal nor its 
external component - directly affects the decision-making process. 
Ratherv the environment influences the Coals and beliefs of the decision- 
makers, can lead to alterations in the structure of the decision-making 
system and of the individuals who fill its roles, and gives birth to 
problems which function as occasions for decision. The analyst who 
studies an-examýle of foreign policy decision-makine should be able to 
recognize alterations in the decision-makinS system and novel occasions 
for decision. However, it is not always possible to perceive directly 
any changes in -the beliefs or Coals of individuals. By looking at 
changes in the environment, he can infer, that these might have occurred. 
Thusp while the environment is in a sense a second-order determinant of 
the dPnjqi. nr-mn. T. 7ing process9 it is necnssary to include it. 
the substance of the-occasion for decision 
The fourth determinant of the decision-making process is the 
substance of the occasion for decision. Every occasion for decision is 
sorrounded by its ovm unique issues and circumstances. These in them- 
selves are likely to influence the. cognitive, organizational, and 
I., 
analytical aspects of decision-makine. A covernment will respond to the 
bi-ennial renewal of a non-controversial fishing treaty with a friendly 
nation in a fashion distinctly different from tho demand of a hostile 
neighbour for the immediate resolution of a border dispute. In the 
United States government, the decision-makers who dealt with the Yom 
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Kippur war were not identical to those who immediately thereafter had to 
handle the oil embargo. In Britain, the decision-making process 
following ITasserts nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956t which 
by"passed the formal machinery of the Foreign Office, differed 
considerably from that produced by the Rhodesian unilateral declaration 
of independence. The process varies with the specific substance of any 
particular problem. 
e)_ the structural characteristics of the occasion for decision 
Any occasion for decision also contains what can be called a 
structural element which will influence. the decision-making process 
regardless of its substance. Occasions for decision can be defined in 
terms of three structural or generic characteristics: 
1. 'the existence of threat. 
2. the degree of anticipation, and * 
. 3- the time available for response. 
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Threat consists of 'a potential hindrance or obstruction to somo object 
or state of affairs that a decision-makina unit is motivated to aehievel. 
34 
Threat depends upon the decision-makers' themselves recognizing its 
existence: it lis not merely an attribute of the stimulus; it depends 
upon the subject's appraisal of the implications of the situation'. 
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All occasions for decision entail.. a choice in the pursuit of some 
objective; threatl howeverv occurs when the decision-makers view the 
problem as bringing the achievment of that object into question. ' 
Anticipation may be defined as the degree to which the decision-makers 
expected the problem. It can range from the routine and completely fore- 
seen to totally unexpected events that come as a surprise. As with threat, 
anticipation is judged from the Po. int of view of the actors not. that of 
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an outside observer. The third characteristic of an occasion for 
39. 
decision is. response time. It may, again in the eyes of the participants, 
be either short or long. It may also be closed-ended: carrying a deadline 
for response after which events foreclose the options available. For the 
decision-makers, the crucial aspect of response time is not its absolute 
measure but rather its perceived adequacy for the performance of the 
tasks inherent in the . substance of the problem. 
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Any particular combination of these three characteristics is likely 
to prove to have different effects upon the decision-making process. For 
example, an occasion for decision which presents no threatj has been 
well anticipatedl and allows for a lengthy response time adequate for the 
degree of complexity is much more likely to be handled by routine 
procedures and to involve less reliance on thp theories of the decision- 
makers to resolve uncertainty than is one where threat is presentf 
anticipation negligible, and response time minimal. 
Each of the three structural characteristics of the occasion for 
decision has distinct implications for the behaviour of the decision- 
makers and their conduct of the decision-making process. Firstg while 
; al or .. s f= -casio- - 
decisioq by dnfinitic.., providc a choica 'retwcon 
alternative possibilities, the presence of threat to one or more goals 
actually produces an impetus to action; and, the more severe the nature 
of that threat, the more the decision-mak-ers will feel that they must 
take action on the problem rather than merely consider it. Secondq the 
greater the degree of anticipation, the greater are the opportunities 
to accumulate information and formulate plans in advance; conversely, 
surprise produces uncertainty about what is happening, what can be done 
about it, and what ought to be done about it. Third, response time 
dictates how quickly a decision must be made, and the more adequate it 
is-for task complexity the more possible it is for organizational 
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decision-making to proceed in a routine fashion and the less necessary 
it is for decision-makers to have to compensate for uncertainty, 
complexity, and goal conflicts by undue reliance on cognitive techniques. 
Particular combinations of threatv anticipation, and reaction time 
will have different effects on the nature of the decision-making process. 
This point is of the utmost importance. because an international crisis 
can be defined in terms of these three structural characteristics of the 
occasion for decision which make up the fifth determinant of the 
decision-making process. 
A Definition of International Crisis 
In the introduction to this work, crises were provisionally defined 
as a type of problem facing the state. As we have seen, such problems 
are occasions for decision for the decision-makers of that state. And, 
from the point of view of the decision-makers, all occasions for 
decision can be categorized in terms of their three structural or 
generic characteristics: threat, anticipation, and reaction time. What 
maves international crises a class of plinnom enal comparable 'even when 
their issues are very differentp is that they all exhibit an identical 
-combination of 
these characteristics. For any state, a crisis occurs 
when the decision-makers of that state recognize the emergence of a 
. problem and define that problem as 
threat: presehting a severe thrdat to an important 
national objectiveg* 
2. anticipation: coming as a surprise, and 
3. reaction time: allowing for a very short ani 
closed-ended reaction time insufficient for 
task complexity. 
A national objective is onet such as peace, concerning the state as 
a whole, not some section of the government or some private individuals, 
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What makes a crisis international is the further perception on the part 
of the decision-makers that the problem involves the external relations 
of the state and that the decisions they make and the actions they take 
will have an effect on their international environment. 
An international crisis, then, is a specific type of occasion for 
39 decision as defined bý the decision-makers themselves. In the process 
of decision-makino, any occasion for. decision performs two functions. 
I- It begins'the decision-making process with respect to that problem and 
it provides the starting-point of the consequent decision situation. 
Th erefore, when an occasion for decision fits the definition of 
international crisis, the decision-making process which it commences 
can be called crisis decision-makingg and the situation which it begins 
can be called a crisis situation. 
It is this definition which provides the critical connecting link 
between international crises and the process of foreign policy decision- 
making. In the first place, a structural definition of the sort proposed 
here is the necessary type of definition. On the most general level, there 
exlet two possible views cf crisis: ans a tu--ning-point or as -- probl--- 
characterized by certain traits. The former comes from the science of 
pathology: 'the point in the progress of a disease where an important 
development or change takes place which is decisive of recovery or 
deathl. 40 Applied to international relations, this conception serves as 
a useful and evocative description, indicatinf; that a particular event 
-or period of time threatened or actually marked the transition from one 
state of affairs to another. In this sense, the Thirty Years' War can be 
The term crisis can be'applied to both a problem and its consequent 
situation. While each use is correct, it is important not to confuse the 
two. As a probleml a crisis influences the decision-making process* This 
process takes place within-the crisis situationt but the definition of 
that situation is part of the process and not an exogenous influence 
upon it. 
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considered a crisis in the development of modern Europet decisive for 
the ascendancy of the nation state and the secularization of inter- 
national politics. The Treaty of Westphalia which ended that war 
laid the formal basis of a new international order. 
It provided a watershed in at least three senses 0 
Firstj it terminated the wars of religion occasioned 
by the Reformation; second, it finally reduced pope 
and emperor to the status of mere princes on a footing 
of equality; and, third, it legitimised an international 
order based on the existence of independent, sovereign 
states. 41 
In addition to this descriptive use# the turning-point definition can 
also be employed for analytical purposes. Charles McClelland is one 
notable proponent of this approach as an explanation of international 
relations. His focus, however, lies on the interactions among states 
not on the formulation of policy within them. He explicitly igpores all 
but systemic factors: 'no attention'is given to the process of making 
decisions within governments under crisis conditionst. 
42 Moreover, a 
turning-point is often recoonizable only ex post facto. In generall this 
approach is not directly and immediately useful in explaining how crises 
affect foreign policy through their influence on the decision-makina 
process. 
0 The second broad approach to international crises views them in 
terms of their inherent characteristics. Two variants exist to this I 
conception:. the substantive and the structural. Substantive definitions 
'identify the content of a particular policyl problem or situationi. 
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This approach severely restricts the scope of any definition. By defining 
crises in terms of specific issues, it provides no general basis 
for 
taking international crises as a class of phenomena, making comparisons 
among a wide number of examplesp and then formulating a general theory 
of crisis decision-making. A substantive approach, then, does not fit 
with the purposes of this thesis. On the other hand, structural 
definitions 'emphasize generic characteristics of crisis 1.44 This 
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approach is far broader in its scope and divorces the definition of 
crisis from the specific issues involved. Of all the possibilities, a 
definition of crisis in terms of its structural characteristics is the 
most suitable for this thesis: unlike turning-point conceptions, it is 
compatibl*e with a decision-making approach; and, unlike substantive 
definitions, it is independent of the issues involved in a crisis and 
allows international crises to be compared as a general class of 
phenomena. 
Of course, various different structural definitions of crisis are 
possible. The particular one used here has been adopted for five cood 
reasons. 
First of all, it provides a clear theoretical connection between 
international crises and the process of decision-making as described 
above. We have seen how the structural characteristics of an occasion 
for decision provide one of the determinants of the decision-making 
process. By defining international crises in terms of these same 
structural characteristics, we have established a logical connection 
between crisis and the deeision-makina proceý-s. In the next ccctic. -. of 
this chapters this logical connection will be used as the basis from 
which to derive those empirical propositions relating crisis to the 
decision-making process. 
The second reason for choosing this particular definition of crisis 
is that it is restrictive. It excludes a number of problems whichl while 
'important' for foreigm policy, are not actually crises. The two terms 
are not synonomous and to use them as such only reduces the value of the 
concept of-international crisis to a merely evocative one* For example, 
the Russian acquisition of atomic weapons did not present the I-lest with 
a crisis. Certainly, Soviet Possession of a nuclear capability was 
viewed as a severe threat in western Europe and the United States; but 
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there was no immediate response required, and the development had been 
anticipated - if not quite so soon, at least in the not too distant 
future. -Consequentlyl the definition provides reasonably clear criteria 
for distinguishing crises from other kinds of serious and potentially 
momentous problems and situations. 
Thirdo this definition is from the point of view of the decision- 
makers themselves. The recognition of what constitutes a crisis rests 
in the hands of the participants. While posing problems, this require- 
ment is absolutely essential. The decisions and actions of individuals 
reflect the information and goals they possess - not what an outside 
observer feels they ought to have possessed'or has imposed upon the 
, situation. To an e'xtent, this approach is still objective: the definition 
of crisis has been established'from without. However, it is subjective in 
that the identification of an occasion for decision as a crisis depends 
upon the actors' believing the necessar7 characteristics to be present. 
This imposes a considerable burden on the Good judgement of the analyst 
and upon his ability to find enough information and to interpret it 
properly in such a fashion as to accuratply Capee the feelir, -, s of the 
decision-makers. However, the altermative of some totally 'objective, 
definition is unacceptable because it ignores the fundamental determinant 
of behaviour: the actor's own b eliefs. 
The fourth reason for adopting this definition is its relative 
simplicity. Other conceptions of crisis include as many as twelve 
structural characteristics not all of which are independent. 
45 The 
three dimensions of threat, time, and surprise, however, are easily 
-remembered, fairly straightforward, and independent of each other. In 
practical termst this approach is manageable. 
The final reason for choosing this definition of crisis is that it 
has already been fairly widely used. It is fundamentally the one 
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developed by Charles Hermann and employed by him and by various other 
anaa: ys_ts. Glenn Paige used this definition. for his study of the American 
decision to resist aggression in Korea in 1950 and also for a shorter 
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comparison of Yorea and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Ole Holsti 
adopted it in order to compare Cuba and the outbreak of the First World 
War; 47 he also utilized it in an article he co-a. uthored with Alexander 
George on the effects of stress on 
. decision-making. 48 Thomas Wiegele 
made use of it to look at the relationship of certain biological factors 
to crisis decision-making. 
49 Hermann himself based a simulation on his 
own defi nition. 
50 Howard Lentner derived a very similar conception as 
a resul. t of his questioning officials of the United States Department 
of State; 
51 
and Edward Morse took a parallel approach for his examina- 
tion of French foreign economic policy and the politics of interdepen- 
52 dence. Thomas Milburn availed himself of Hermann's definition for 
his analysis of crisis management, 
53 
and Michael Brecher chose it for 
his comparison of various decisions in Israeli foreign policy. 
54 Based 
on an a ccumulation of work using this definition, a large number of 
empirical propositions relatine crisis to foreign policy decision- 
making have already been developed and tested. Consequently, as this 
definition meets all the other requirements, it seems pointless to 
introduce a new one and thereby lose the advantages of comparability 
with previous work. Continuing with the same definition helps to 
contribute to the cumulative study of cri. sis deoision-making. 
A Summary of the Theory of Crisis Decision-leakin 
Five determinants of the decision-making process have been 
identified.. These are the personalities and beliefs of the decision- 
maker'st the structure of the decision-making system, the conditions 
prevailing in the environment, the substantive nature of the occasion 
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for decision, and the structural or generic characteristics of the 
occasion for decision. All of these factors can influence the four 
analytical 9perations of decision-making: both directly and indirectly 
through their effects on the cognitive and organizational aspects of 
decision-making. If, between two occasions for decisiono the first four 
determinants of behaviour remain primarily the same, then any variations 
in the subsequent decision-making processes can be attributed to 
differences in the remaining determinant - the structural characteristics 
of the occasion for decision. The great importance of this point lies in 
the fact that international crises form a specific sub-set of occasions 
for decision, defined in terms of a unique'combination of these three 
characteristics. Consequently, if the only distinction between two 
occasions for decision is that one is a crisis and one not, then 
differences in the decision-making processes following from them can 
be explained in terms of this distinction. This theory of crisis 
decision-making enables us, in the next section of this chapter, to 
deductively derive a number of empirical propositions relating crisis 
as the independent variable to v=riuuu aepects of the decil-, ion-Makint"; P 
process as dependent ones. 
Some Dnpirical Propositions 
0 
An international crisis is an occasion for decision which concerns 
the external relations of a state and which, in the eyes of the decision- 
makersp severely threatens important national objectives, comes as a 
surprise, and allows only a very short and closed-ended reaction time 
insufficient for task complexity. As has already been indicated above 
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(pages 38-39), an occasion for decision which has been defined in this 
manner will have certain 1; eneral influences upon the decision-makers: 
the intense nature of the threat will push 
them into wanting to take some action to 
defuse that threat; 
2. the surprise will create great uncertainty 
concerning what is happening and what can 
and ought to be done about it; 
the short, closed-ended and inadequate 
reaction time will mean that a decision 
must be made quickly, before uncertainty 
can be properly resolved through an intensive 
examination of the environment; 
the necessity of fast action under conditions 
of uncertainty will produce the belief that 
the cost of action in term&r of goals sacrificed 
-is high, and this apprehension is likely to be 
correct because the severe threat will probably 
require meastires that will in fact impose real 
costs on other cherished Goals; and 
5. as a result of all of these effects, the decision- 
makers are likely to feel under intense stress. 55 
Such are the general consequences that a crisisp as an occasion for 
decision, will have. On the basis of these consequences and the specific 
nature of the decision-making process as outlined above, it is now 
possible to derive the empirical propositions. These fall into four 
categories: 
those pertaining to cognitiye processes, 
B- those pertaining to organizational processes, 
C- those pertaining to the lour analytical operationsq and 
D- one final proposition concerning the effects of crisis 
on the overall quality of decision-makino. . 
In most cases, the propositions which follow are very similar to, if 
not identical with, ones which already exist in the literature. Thus, 
each will be accompanied by references to its appearances in other 
studies which have used the same definition of crisis and which have 
employed a comparable decision-making approach. 
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Therefore, testing'the propositions actually achieves two purposes. 
The major one is to provide evidence either for or against the theory of 
crisis decision-making. At the same timet however, the results of other 
studies will be retested in the light of different and fresh historical 
material. 
A- The Cognitive Aspects of Decision-Makin 
Cognitive processes enable the individual to cope with and to 
compensate for uncertainty and complexity in the environment, and 
conflicting goals and values. The theory of crisis decision-making 
has already shown that a decision-maker will rely most heavily on 
cognitive processes when he feels that 
1. action is necessary, 
2. complexity and uncertainty are high, 
the cost of action in terms of goals 
sacrificed is great, 
reaction time is short and insufficient 
for task complexity, and, 
as a result, stress is intense. 
These conditions have also been identified as those produced by - 
international crises. Consequentlyl in crisis situations as opposed 
to non-crisis situations, those cognitive aspects of decision-making 
described above (pages 26-27) should inýrease in importance. The 
following propositions, therefore, derive deductively from the 
theory of crisis decision-making: 
I 
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Proposition 1. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the decision-maker narrows his focus of attention in terms 
of space: the boundaries of releýance he places upon his 
situation are much more restrictivep and he concentrates 
on a smaller section of the environment. 
References: Ole Holsti and Alexander George, 'The Effects of Stress on 
the Performance-of Foreign Policy-Makers', p. 279.56 
Proposition 2. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the decision-maker narrows his focus of attention in terms 
of time: he concentrates much more on the short ran and 
places a higher discount on the future. . 
References: Itichael Brechert Decisions in Israel's Foreign Polic 
[Hjypothesis 23bg PP- 552-554. 
Ole Holsti (H), 'Time, Alternatives, and Communications: 
The 1914 and Cuban Missile Crises', H47, p. 63. 
(The (H) after the author's name in this and other 
references indicates that the article and the numbering 
of the hypotheses come from Charles (H)ermann, editor, 
International Crises. ) 
Thomas Milburn (H), 'The Management of Crises$, H296, p. 274. 
Holsti and George, p. 280. 
Proposition 3. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the decision-maker is much more likely to rely upon his 
experience, his theories, and his knowledge of historical 
parallels. 
References: 'Brecher, H311 PP- 559-560. 
Glenn Paige, The Korean Decisioný H1-51v PP- 289-290, and 
H2.3 and 2.4, pp. 294-295. 
Glenn Paige (H), 'Comparative Case Analysis of Crisis 
Decisions: Korea and Cuba', H15, P- 48. 
Milburn (H), H272 and 2739 p. 265- 
Holsti and George, p. 279- 
I 
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Proposition 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the decision-maker is more likely to misperceive and 
misinterpret his environment in order to reconcile 
conflicting goals. 
References: Milburn (H), H292, p. 273- 
Proposition 5. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the decision-maker is much more likely to alter the 
salience of his goals: by thereby reducing value 
conflicts, he provides himself with psychological- 
reassurance and minimizes stress. 
References: Holsti and George, p. 282. 
Proposition 6. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-makine, 
the decision-maker is much more likely to try to find an 
alternative which satisfies all his goals even if it is 
not optimal for any particular one. 
References: Holsti and George, pp. 281-282* 
Pronosition. 7. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the decision-maker is much more likely to rely upon 
emotional responses and 'gut reactionst. 
References: Milburn (H), H274,275, and 276l p. 265- 
Holsti and Georgel p. 280. 
B- The Organizational Aspects of Decision-Makin 
Organizational behaviour explains how the deoision-making process 
functions when the power of decision is dispersed among a number of 
individuals. The same conditions which emphasized the importance of 
cognitive processes have already been shown (pages 34-35) to produce 
certain dibtinct effects upon organizzational ones. These conditions 
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having also been identified as identical to those produced by 
international crises, a number of propositions follow deductively 
from the theory of crisis decision-making: 
Proposition 8. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
organizational routine will be disrupted and be replaced 
by extraordinary and ad hoc procedures. 
References: Brecher, H31, P- 565- 
Howard Lentner (H), 'The Concept of Crisis as Viewed by the 
United States Department of State', H71, p. 120. 
James Robinson, 'Crisis Decision-Making: An Inventory and 
Appraisal of Concepts, Theories, Hypotheses, and 
Techniques of Analysis', p. 137. 
Holsti and George, p. 296. 
Proposition 9. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-makine, 
the level of decision rises in the organizational hierarchy: 
authority becomes more centralized. 
References: Brecher, H42, PP- 565-566.57 
James Robinson (H), 'Crisis: An Appraisal of Concepts and 
Theories', H99 P. 34- 
Lentner (H), H84f p. 130. 
Milburn (H), H279, p. 266. 
Holsti and George, p. 296. 
Proposition 10. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
group processes rise in importance: the four analytical 
operations are conducted more by groups and less by 
departments or individuals, and the group is more likely 
to initiate policy. 
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Proposition 11. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
ad hoc groups are more likely to be formed. 
References: Brecher, H25P P- 555- 
Paij; ej H1.1j pp. 281-285- 
Paige (H)l H109 P. 45- 
Holsti and Georgeq p. 296. ' 
Proposition 12. 
1ý crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the frequency of interaction among the members of the group 
increases: a much greater need is felt for face-to-face 
proximity. 
References: Brecher, H279 PP- 556-557. 
Paige, H1.3, p. 288. 
Holsti and George, p. 289. 
Proposition 13. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
group cohesion is much greater: with the result that 
dissent tends to be stifled and Group goals and values 
take on ý superordinate role. 
References: Pai6e, H1-4, pp. 288-289. 
Holsti and Georgeq pp. 289-290. 
Proposition 14. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the group leader is more likely to accept responsibility, 
and followers are more 1% ikely to expect and accept this. 
Refere7nces: Brecher, H28, P- 557- 
Paige, H1-5, P. 289. 
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Proposition 15. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
departmental autonomy and bureaucratic politics are likely 
to decline in importance. 
References: Paige, H1-7t p. 290. 
Holati and Georgel p. 299. 
C- The Analytical Operations of Decision-Makin 
-The theory of crisis decision-making has divided the actual 
process of decision-making into four analytically distinct operations: 
a) the definition of the situation, 
b) the formulation of alternativesl 
c) the choice of alternatives, and 
d) the consideration of feedback. 
Crisis will affect the conduct of each of these operations both directly 
and indirectly through its influence upon cognitive and organizational 
processes. 
a the del'inli tion of the si-4 1--i 
The definition of the situation consists of the decision-makers' 
attempts to gather and interpret informationj and to identify those 
goals and values which will serve to guide their behaviour. Where the 
occasion for decision provides the startine-point of the decision 
situation, the definition of the situation establishes the boundaries 
of relevance and defines the nature of reality. Crises should have the 
following effects upon this operation: 
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Proposition 16. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the search for information will be greatly intensified. 
Uncertainty, combined with the felt necessity for action and extreme 
time pressures should lead to an increased scanning of the environment. 
The decision-makers may narrow their focus of attention, but within 
these restricted limits they will intensify their search for information. 
References: Brecher, H30, PP- 558-559- 
Paige, H2.1, p. 292, and H5-1j pp. 309-310. 
Paige (H), H13v P. 47. 
Holsti and Georgeq pp. 280 and 298. 
Proposition 17. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-makinig, 
decision-makers will tend to simplify the complexity of 
the environment. 
r1his follows not only directly from the nature of crises but also from 
the combined effects of the narrowing of the focus of attention in both 
time and space (propositions 1 and 2) and from the likely attempts, in 
one way or another, to reduce goal conflicts (propositions 4,5, and 6). 
References: Brecher, H22a, PP- 551-552. 
Robinson (H), II6v P- 33- 
Holsti and George, pp. 2799 281, and 291. 
ýroposition 18. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
information moves with greater speed to the top of the 
organizational hierarchy. 
In'part, this is a consequence of the increased activity in searching 
for'information (proposition 16); * in parto it follows from the 
disruption of organizational routine (proposition 8), from the rise 
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in the level of decision-making (proposition 9)v and from the formation 
of ad hoc groups likely to be based on expertise (proposition 
References: Brecher, H36l P- 563. 
Paige, H2.2, p. 294- 
Paige (H), H14, P. 47. 
Holsti and George, pp. 296-297. 
Proposition 19. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the reliability of the source of information is of greater 
importance for judging the validity of its content. 
This follows directly from the lack of time in which to resolve 
uncertainty and to act. It is also a consequence of greater reliance 
on theories, experience, and historical parallels*(proposition 3) and 
emotional responses (proposition 7); and it very likely will be 
encouraged by increased group cohesion (proposition 13) in so far as 
, 
the source of information is a member of the,, group. 
References: Paiae, H2.11, pp. 292-293. 
Proposition 20. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-makingj 
greater variance is likely between the operational and 
psychological environments of the decision-makers. 
On balance, despite the increased search for information, this is a 
likely result of a narrowing of the focus of attention (propositions 1 
and 2), an increased reliance on theories (proposition 3) and emotions 
(proposition 7), the possibility of misperceiving the environment in 
order to resolve value conflicts (proposition 4)t the increase in group 
cohesion and lesser tolerance of dissenting opinions (proposition 13), 
and. a similar decrease in the number of opinions as a result of the 
reduced importance of bureaucratic politics (proposition 15)- 
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I 
References: Milburn (H), H299, p. 275- 
l-'I Holsti and George, pp. 279-280. 
I Proposition 21. 
4 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis deoision-making, 
even where substantive issues are similar, the goals and 
values which are defined as relevant are likely to differ 
considerably. 
This follows from the possibility of the altered salience of goals 
(proposition 5), from a greater reliance on theories and emotions 
(propositions 3 and 7)9 from a rise in the level of decision-making 
. 
(proposition 9), from an increased reliance on group*processes 
(proposition 10)l from the possible formation of an ad hoc group 
(proposition 11), from a greater'rrequency of interaction among members 
of the group (proposition 12), from the likelihood of increased group 
cohesion (proposition 13), and from the enhanced importance of the 
group leader (proposition 14). 
References: Lentner (H), H67, P. 117. 
Paige, H3.1, pp. 296-297. 
Paige (H), H17, P. 49. 
bl_'_the formulation of altermatives 
On the basis of their definition of the situation, decision-makers 
-' -, will formulate a number of alternative courses of action for dealing 
with the problem. 
Proposition 22. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
decision-makers are likely to formulate fewer alternatives. 
In part, this follows directly from the extreme time pressures inherent 
in crises combined with the uncertainty of the situation. Any reasonable 
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policy is liable to be grasped, because action must be quick and because 
uncertainty makes it difficult to formulate other alternatives likely 
to be visibly better. This result also stems from the narrowing of the 
focus of attention (propositions 1 and 2), from the tendency for group 
processes to result in a single group reality (proposition 10), from 
increased group cohesion which can minimize dissent and lead to 
'groupthink' (proposition 13), from-increased reliance on the group 
leader (p'roposition 14), and from the decline in bureaucratic politics 
(proposition 15)- 
References: Charles Hermann, Crises in Foreign Polic H211 p. 161. 
Charles Hermann (H), 'Threatp Time, and Surprise: A 
Simulation of International Crisis', H138, p. 198. 
Milbum (H), H291, P. ' 273- 
Holsti and Georgep pp. 279 and 290. 
Brecherl H22b, PP- 531-532.58 
c) the choice of alternatives 
From the alternatives they have formulated, the decision-makers 
choose that one which they feel will best achieve their goals. 
Proposition 23. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the choice of alternatives is less likely to be based on 
a rational, objective, and dispassionate means-ends 
analysis and more likely to be based on emotional and 
secondar7 considerations. 
This result is a consequence of the simplification of the environment 
(proposition 17)t greater variance between psychological and operational 
environments (proposition 21)9 greater reliance 'on emotional responses 
(proposition 7), and greater group cohesion 'which may also become a 
superordinate rather than an*instrumental valuel thereby creating 
58. 
/* 
greater pressures for conformity to group goals and normsp reducing 
tolerance for critical analysis and dissenting viewpoints, and eroding 
judgment' (proposition 13). 59 
References: Brecher, H22cl PP- 551-552. 
Holsti and George, pp. 281 and 291.60 
d) the consideration of feedback 
On all but the simplest of problems, decision-making is likely to 
take place over several decision stages. The tentative or unsatisfactory 
decisions of one stage will produce certain consequences which then feed 
back into the decision-making system and provide a potential source of 
new information on the basis of which the decision-makers may reconsider 
their definition of the situation, their alternatives, and their choices. 
Proposition 24. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-makingg 
sensitivity to and learning from negative feedback are 
decreased: it tends either not to be noticed or to be 
discounted. 
This proposition follows directly from the necessity for speedy action. 
Decisions must be taken and implemented before feedback can have a 
chance to build and make itself felt. Furthermore, this proposition 
also follows as a likely consequence of the narrowing of the focus of 
attention (propositions 1 and 2); increased reliance on theories and 
emotions, neither of which is as susceptible to modification by 
feedback as is direct information (propositions 3 and 7); increased 
-Group cohesion, which is likely to stifle dissent (proposition 13); and 
increased reliance on group processes as opposed to departmental autonomy 
or bureaucratic politics - both of which developments, by encOuraging 
the formation of a single group reality, are likely to provide 
59. 
d. ecision-makers with reassurance for their actions and thus make it 
much easier for them to discount negative feedback (propositions 10 
and 15)- 
References: Milburn (H), H271, p. 265, and H293 and 294, p. 274. 
Holsti and George, pp. 279,282-283, and 291. 
D'- The Qualitv of the Decision-Makim- Process 
-The quality of the deoision-making process refers to whether it 
helped or hindered the reaching of a good decision. On balance, it 
appears likely that the effects of crises will be debilitating rather 
than beneficial. 
Pro2osition 25. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the overall quality of decision-making tends to be lower. 
The felt necessity of having to act quickly while under stress to a 
problem shrouded in obscurity is not likely to be conducive to effective 
decision-making. This conclusion is buttressed by the likely increase 
in the variance between psychological and operational environments 
(proposition 20), the formulation of fewer alternatives (proposition 22), 
and the less rational basis for choosing an alternative (proposition 23). 
******* 
These 25 propositions will, in the final section of this study, be 
tested against the evidence of British decision-making before and during 
the Roare-Laval crisis. The results will be indicativel but unfortunately 
they cannot be wholeheartedly conclusive for the validity of the theory. 
The reason is not, as it might be in the physical sciencesq the possi- 
bility of injecting ad hoc qualifications. Rather the tentative nature 
6o. 
of -the findings is an unavoidable consecruence of the self-awareness of 
the participants. Thus, during deliberations on the Cuban missile crisis, 
President Kennedy specifically absented himself from discussions in 
order to avoid stifling dissent and to encourage the formulation of a 
wider range of alternatives. Knowing the problems of crisis decision- 
making, decision-makers may take deliberate steps to counteract them. 
Nevertheless, the results of testind the propositions should be strongly 
suggestive for the validity not only of the propositions themselves 
but also, and ultimately more importantlyt of the theory of crisis 
decision-making. 
A Pramework for Analysis 
The framework for analysis functions as a double set of. instruc- 
tions on how to conduct the case study. It tells the analyst both what 
to'look for and how to organize his findings. The framework indicates 
.. what historical evidence must be included in order to describe and 
explain the decision-making process and to test the propositionsq and 
it provides a format for presenting this material. 
The Historical Evidence 
The nature of the evidence that must be included in the case study 
, ý'is given in the first place by the theory of crisis decision-making. 
For each occasion for decision and its consequent situationj the 
deciQion-makini; process itself and the nature of its determinants 
must be described. The cognitivel organizational, and analytical aspects 
of decision-making and the stages in which they occur must be noted, 
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and in order to explain why this process took the form it did the five 
determinants of behaviour must be set out, The first of these is the 
environment. Its internal and external aspects must be presented in 
both. psychological and operational terms. Decision-makers act on the 
basis of the former, but the latter is equally essential in order to 
account for feedback and to evaluate the quality of decision-making. 
The second and third determinants are the structure of the decision- 
making system and the personalities of the individual decision-makers. 
The fourth is the substantive nature of the occasion for decision, and 
the. fifth consists of the structural characteristics of the occasion 
for decision. 
In the second place, the nature of the historical evidence follows 
from the basic purpose of this thesis. The case study must include two 
or more decision situations. One of these must be a crisis situation: 
In other words following from an occasion for decision that was a crisis 
problem in terms of its structural characteristics. The other situations 
must be non-crisis ones. By comparing differences in the decision-mak-ing 
processes and differences in the deter. mine-nts of 1-ýýhw: icur in each 
situation, one can test the empirical propositions and thus the theor7 
itself. 
Organizing the Case Study 
The second task of the framework isýto provide a basis for orga- 
nizing the historical material. Two guiding principles are operative 
here. The first is to facilitate the testing of the propositions. The 
second is to present an interestine and readily intelligible account 
Of what happened and why. This can be best-done in three stages. The 
first consists of a brief overview of the case study. This places it 
in its wider context, outlines the fundamental issues involved, and 
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identifies the relevant occasions for decision and their consequent 
decision situations. Next, the domestic and international backgrounds 
are sketched in sufficient detail that the general influences operating 
on the decision-makers are clear. Finally, an account of the decision- 
making process and its determinants is provided for each decision 
situation. For the sake of readability, this takes the form of a 
chronological narrative and is not merely an itemized breakdown of the 
elements of decision-making. In this fashion, the evidence of the case 
study should tell a coherent and interesting story while at the same 
time being emminently suitable for testing the propositions. 
On the basis of this analytical framework, the next section of 
týe thesis presents the case study. 
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Notes to Chapter One 
---------- 
1. Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreip,? i Policy, p. 2. 
The meaning of the word 'government' is somewhat vague. As used 
here, it corresponds roughly to what in the United States is meant 
by the executive branch as opposed to the legislative or the 
judicial. In Britain, then, the government includes the various 
depýtrtmentsj agencies, and committees which are ultimately respon- 
sible to and controlled by the Cabinet, the'individuals within 
these units, the members of the Cabinet, and other members of 
Parliament holding Ministerial rank. 
3. In comparison, Richard Snyder, II. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin 
(Foreign Policy Decision-Makin , p. 65) have defined the decision- 
makers as 'those whose authoritative acts are to all intents and 
purposes the acts of the statet, and Brecher (P. 3) has defined 
them as 'the individuals or groups with the authority to decide in 
the sphere of external behaviour'. I prefer a definition in terms 
of official roles because these are much easier to identify than is 
the concept of authority. For example, Robert Kennedyj as Attorney 
General of the United States, would not normally have exerted any 
authority over foreign policy decisions. Nevertheless, he was one 
of the most important decision-makers during the Cuban missile 
crisis. The definition used in this thesis would have included him 
in advance as a potentially relevant participant. 
A large number of individuals can influence the nature of foreign 
policy. Inter alia, union leaders, -businessmenl. lobbyists, and 
editorial writers all may exert some pressure. However, while they 
may have 'access' to the system, they do not actually make the 
decisions (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p. 100). ' 
. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, pp. 67 and 100-103. 
This list is intended to be indicative not definitive. 
7. For example, see Henry Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign 
Policy'. 
8. A goal is a value made specific. Thus, liberty is a general value 
and freedom of the press is a particular goal following from it. In 
this work, the two terms are used fairly interchangeably. 
9. 
. 
Snyder, Bruckj and Sapin, p. 67 (emphasis in original). 
10. Harold and Margaret Sprout, 'Man-Milieu Relationship 11ypotheses in 
the Context of International Politics' and 'Environmental Factors 
in the Study of International Politics?. In the latter (p. 319) 
they distinguish between 'the psychological environment (with 
reference to which an individual defines choices and takes decisions) 
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Chapter Jý, jo 
An Overview 
By the summer of 1935, on the eve of the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia, the British Government faced a hostile and dangerous inter- 
national environment. Japan and Germany both posed severe threats to 
peace and security, and the Government felt that the resources available 
to them in reply were grossly inadequate. To begin with, they knew that 
their own military capability was unsatisfactory. BY 1935, though they 
were well aware of the necessity of rearming and had taken tentative 
steps in that direction, the actual measures implemented were hesitant 
and only in their initial stages. Similarly, the Government were equally 
unhappy with the intevnativnal cc-operation likely to be forthcominG. In 
the Far East, Britain stood alone. Neither the Soviet Union nor the 
United States, the only other gýeat powers with significant interests 
and capabilities in the Pacificl was willing to take any concrete 
measures against Japanese expansion. In Europe, the situation, while 
somewhat betterg was also unsatisfactory. The Americans and the Russians 
were only slowly emerging from their post-war isolation. As yet, neither 
counted for much against Germany. Britain's major ally on the continent 
was France; but, despite their underlying common interests, each held a 
very different attitude on how to deal with the German problem. 
Relations between the two countries were troubled. 
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Consequently, worried by their own military weakness and concerned 
with the lack of international co-operation, the British Government 
placed a high value on maintaining good relations with Italy, the 
remaining major power in Europe. This attitude rested on three bases. 
First, Italy sat perched on top of the imperial lifeline through Suez to 
India and the Pacific. Secondj'as of January of 1935# Italy and France 
had settled all their outstanding differences and agreed to a programme 
of military co-operation against Germany which freed a large number of 
French troops for redeployment on the German border. Third, three months 
later, in April, the two Latin nations had joined with Britain in forming 
the Str. esa Front: aimed at guaranteeing Austrian independence by 
preventing the Anschluss. Italy, with her forces on the Brenner Pass 
through the Alps, played a crucial role in this alliance. Only she was 
in the position to take immediately effective action in the event of a 
-. German threat to Austria. In these circumstances, the British Government 
felt that a breach in Anglo-Italian relations might result in very 
unfortunate consequences. It could endanger Britain's main line of 
communicatiCn to the East and further strain her already overextencied 
military capacity. It was likely to confront the French with an unplea- 
sant conflict between two of their principal allies and thus aggravate 
. the tensions 
in Anglo-French relations. Finallyl it would probably 
shatter the Stresa Front and drastically weaken the anti-nazi forces. 
In sum, the British Government believed that incurring Italian el; mity 
and losing her support would senselessly impose an extra burden on their 
weak military and diplomatic resources., They wanted to preserve the 
Stresa Front and avoid any clash with Italy which would have debilitating 
effects on Britain's defences and gravely injure the course of Anglo- 
French co-operation. 
71. 
At the same time, the Goverment felt that it was essential for 
them to support the League of Nations. Public opinion strongly favoured 
a foreign policy based on Geneva, and the Government believed not only 
that they had to respect the wishes of the country but also that they 
needed to bow to those sentiments in order to remain in office and 
proceed with their programme of rearmament. Furthermore, they hoped that 
upholding the League might motivate the rest of Europe to co-operate 
against Germany and encourage the United States, with its strong 
legalistic-moralistic orientation to international relationsl'to emerge 
from isolation. Thus, partly in order to gain more international support 
and partly in order to maintain their domestic position and. proceed with 
rearmament, the Government committed themselves to support the League of 
Nations. 
My the summer of 1935, the alliance with France and Italy in the 
Stresa Front and support for the League of Nations were two ke,,, r strands 
of British foreign policy. Unfortunateiy, the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia in October of 1935 made them incompatible. The British Govern- 
mc. nt confronted a grave dilemma-. Opposition to Italy in Cupport Cf the 
League and the principle of collective security threatened to destroy 
the Stresa Front - with severe 
ýttendant costs. Yet allowing Italy to 
proceed unhindered threatened to shatter the League of Nations - with 
similarly unpleasant results. 
The story of British foreign policy during the Italo-Ethiopian 
conflict of 1935 is the story of how the Government attempted first 
to prevent and then to resolve this acute dilemma. 
The story ýegan in December of 1934 at the obscure watering hole 
of Vial Wal in the wastes of Ethiop'ials Ogaden desert. At the beginning 
of that month, a skirmish took place between Ethiopian and Italian 
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military detachments. As a result, the two countries exchanged protests. 
Italy demanded apologies, compensation, and cession to her of sovereignty 
over part of the Ogaden. Ethiopia requested arbitration and appealed to 
the League of Nations to settle the dispute. For the next few months, 
while the League dithered and took no effective actiong Italy and 
Ethiopia prepared for war. 
For the British Government, the Wal Wal incident started a new 
decision situation. By raising the possibility that friendship with 
Italy might prove incompatible with support for the League of Nationst 
the Wal Wal incident confronted the Government with a new and major 
problem. As the summer of 1935 came and went, two simultaneous develop- 
ments deeply troubled them. On the one hand, the likelihood of an 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia became a virtual certainty. On the other 
hand, domestic opinion overwhelmingly came to believe that Britain must 
support Ethiopia and the League in the event of Italian aggression. As 
a result, this first decision situation of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict 
was characterized by attempts on the part of the British Government to 
prevent a war in East Africa and thereby to avoid having to confront the 
unpalatable choice between the Stresa Front and the League of Nations. 
They failed. On 3 October, the Italian invasion began. This 
I presented 
the British Government with another crucial occasion for 
deoision and started for them the seoond deoision situation of the 
Italo-Ethiopian conflict. They now faced an actual rather than merely 
a potential clash between their two strands of policy. Nonetheless, they 
still hoped to avoid having to choose between them. Instead, they 
pursued a policy of dualism. At Geneva, they led the League in imple- 
menting sanctions against Italy; at the same time, together with the 
French, they searched for a compromise settlement satisfactory to 
. 
_-Yiussolini, 
acceptable to Haile Selassie and the League, and capable of 
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ending the fighting. Then, towards the middle of November, the imminent 
possibility of an extension of sanctions to include all oil and petroleum 
products loomed critically. This measure was felt to be potentially 
decisive, and the League was scheduled to discuss and probably approve 
it on 12 December. In an attempt to forestall this oil embargo, a flurry 
of Italian diplomatic activity let it be known that it would meet with 
grave displeasure and be interpreted as an. unfriendly act; and rumours, 
encouraged by the Italian governmentl suggested that 1-fussolini would 
view it as a casus belli and launch a 'mad dog' attack on the British 
Mediterranean fleet. In consequence, this impending widening of sanctions 
threatened to destroy the Stresa Front. At the same time, the British 
Government knew that they could not, without good reason, reject the oil 
embargo: doing so would be tantamount to writing off the League of 
Nations. 
In the light of this critical situation, Sir Samuel Hoarej the 
I 
British Foreign Secretary, went to Paris on Saturday 7 December 1935 to 
discuss the problem with I. I. Pierre Lavalp French Premier and Foreign 
Minister. The following day, the two men initialled a set of peace 
proposals for a compromise solution to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. 
This was the Hoare-Laval Plan: in return for considerable territorial 
and economic concessions to Italyt-Ethiopia was to receive sovereignty 
over a port on the Red Sea and a corridor of access to it. Hoare and 
Laval were confident that they could persuade Mussolini, Haile Selassie, 
and the League to accept these proposals and end the war. The Foreign 
I ýý 
Secretary felt that he had extricated Britain from her dilemma. 
Back in London, the rest of the Government felt otherwise. In their 
view, the Hoare-Laval Plan presente4 a problem whi ch began the third 
decision situation of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. They believed that 
the Plang rather than solving their dilemma, aggravated it by placing 
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them in a position where they could no longer continue to pursue their 
dual line of policy. They felt that rejecting the Plan would shatter the 
Stresa Front. However, unlike the Foreign Secretaryt they believed that 
the Plan was unlikely to succeed and that accepting it would probably 
destroy the League of Nations. 'Faced with this highly unpleasant 
quandaryt the British Cabinet met on Monday 9 December. They knew that 
they had to make an immediate decision. The scheduled meeting of the 
League in two days time, on Wednesdayt imposed an absolute deadline. 
Moreover, the Foreign Secretary had publically committed himself to the 
proposals in a communiqu6 released in Paris on Sunday night. Any delay 
in deciding would in itself undermine his authority'and force his resig- 
nation. In these circumstances, the Govermment approved the Hoare-Laval 
Plan: not on any merit in the proposals themselves but primarily out of 
loyalty to and respect for Sir Samuel Hoare. This decision produced 
-disastrous consequences. Public reaction to the Governmentts decisiont 
both at home and abroad, took the form pf an immediate howl of execra- 
tion. The_Labour Party put down a motion of censure in the House of 
Commons, and the Government's own backbenchers threatened to vote against 
_- 
them. As a resultf believing that their initial decision had been a 
mistake and frightened for their own survival# the Government reversed 
their position. They reneged on their support for the Hoare-Laval Plan 
and forced the Foreign Secretary to resign -a sacrificial lamb thrown 
to the wolves. These two ployý succeeded. *On Thýrsday 19 December# ten 
days after their original decision to approve the Paris peace proposals, 
I. the Government defeated the motion of censure and ensured their 
continued tenure of office. 
With the resignation of the Foreign Secretary and the survival of 
the Government, the Hoare-Laval crisis ended. The situation, however, 
was not restored to its prior state. The death throes of the Plan 
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permanently killed off the oil embargo and the chance of any effective 
League action against Italy. At the same time, with the continuation of 
-fighting, the possibility of preserving the Anglo-French-Italian alliance 
against Germany also collapsed. The end result of this episode was that 
the Goverment lost each of their strands of policy. Stresa and the 
League both lay in ruins. By trying to. preserve the two, the Government 
had ended uP with neither. 
From the point of view of the British Government, the Italo- 
Ethiopian conflict from December of 1934 to December of 1935 divided 
into three decision situations. Of these, only the final one was a 
crisis in terms of the definition proposed above. Thus, by comparing 
the decision-making process during the Hoare-Laval crisis with the 
processes during the two prior sitUationsp we can test the empirical 
propositions derived in the first section of this work. The next two 
chapters will fill in the international and domestic backgrounds behind 
the dilemma facing the British Government. The following chapters will 
then precent a detailed account- of the decision-making process within 
the-Government from the Wal Wal incident to the end of the Hoare-Laval 
crisis. 
Chapter Three 
The British Dilemma: 
I. The International Background 
The first of the two major causes of the dilemma facing the British 
Government was the nature of the intermational environment. The First 
World War finally destroyed the old order of the nineteenth century and 
, swept away all the guiding principles of international conduct. The 
post-war settlement failed to solve the problems which had caused the 
war and was equally unsuccessful in creating a new, stable international 
order. As Marshall Foch so presciently observed upon hearing of the 
signing of the Treaty of Versailles, it was not peace but an armistice 
for twenty years. 
1 By the summer of 1935, the optimistic hope that the 
1914-1915 ccnflict had bccn Ith-c -.., = to end all uarcl -.. as dying. In an 
increasingly dangerous and disordered world, the British Goverment 
faced two clear threats to the peac6 and security of the 1hpire: from 
Japan and from Germany. 
Japan emerged from the w. ýr the strongest siate in the Far East. 
Nationalist sentiment and economic pressures ensured an outward 
orientation to her foreign policy, and the Twentyý-One Demands on China 
indicated the form and direction it would take. The Washington Naval 
Conference, held during the winter of 1921-1922, temporarily checked 
Japanese expansion and appeared to unite Japan with the United States, 
Britain, and France in a four-power guarantee of the status quo in the 
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Pacific. However, the conference also ended the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
, and gave 
Japan, already in possession of the world's third largest navy, 
a local military supremacy in the Far East. The post-war arrangements 
papered over but failed to solve the latent clash of interests between 
Japan and the Anglo-Saxon powers* 
During the twentiesp with a liberal government in office in Japan, 
any overt conflict was deferred, but in September of 1931 a new govern- 
ment took power. The rising tide of nationalism and the growing influence 
of the military in politics led to the pursuit of a much more aggressive 
foreign policy. That same month, Japan invaded Manchuria and a year later 
established her puppet state of Planchuko. China protested to the League 
of Nations which, in October of 1932, condemned the Japanose invaoion 
and rec'ommended the creation of an independent Chinese state in 
l4anchuria. Japan rejected these findings and 1-; ave notice in February of 
-1933 of her 
intention to withdraw from the LeaCue. That body took no 
further action. )I- 
The I-Tanchurian episode weakened the reputation of the League and 
deprived it of yet anothcr of the grc---. powcro. It also wamcd tho 
British Government of the Japanese threat in the Pacific. BY 19351 they 
were very concerned with this situationg and in January of that year 
their Ambassador in Tokyo reported'that: 
Japari unquestionably believes in her destinyl and 
that is to be, and to remainj the dominant Power 
in the East. If the world is prepared to accept 
Japan at her own valuation peace will be preserved. 
Otherwise, Japan accepts no responsibility for any 
breach that may occur. The business world, the 
Court, the civilian departments most certainly do 
not want war, but it would be self-deception to 
suppose that they would constitute a determined 
opposition to the militarists if the ordered 
course of Japanese destiny were in danger. 2 
IV 1935, however, Germany and not Japan presented the major danger 
to Britain. Neither the war nor the subsequent peace treaties solved the 
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I 
German problem. The military results were inconclusive - Germany won in 
the east and lost in the west - and the post-war distribution of power 
shiftqd in her favour. The Turkish, Austrian, and Czarist empires were 
swept away, and to her east Germany faced only a large number of weak 
6tates; and the potential might of Soviet Russia was separated from 
Germany by a Poland thatj while perhaps anti-Germant was at least 
1 
equally hostile to Moscow. Germany's strength towards the West was no 
longer automatically halved, and she remained potentially the strongest 
military power on the continent. Her population and store of natural 
resources were creator than those of her nearest rival, France; and she 
suffered virtually no direct war damace. By simply behavine as an 
independent state normally does, she could undermine the restrictions 
placed upon her and eventually emerge dominant in Europe. 
3 Domestic 
feelings ensured that such would be the case. The war-Guilt clause of 
the Treaty of Versailles, 
4 the 'stab-in-the-back' myth, the festering 
sore of reparations, the humiliation of Danzig and the Polish corridor, 
the French occupation of the Ruhr, and the destruction of the middle 
class in the hyperinflaticn of the earl-, y tw-anties, all contributcd to 
the intense dissatisfaction of the German nation. This was directed at 
the peace settlement and the western powers and ensured that Germany 
would take advantage of her naturally strong position to re-emerge as 
the most powerful state in Europe and to assert this strenoth in a new 
attempt at heeemony. 
Almost immediately after Versaillesp Germany started to ream and 
contravene the provisions of the Treaty. These violations were systema- 
tically directed from the top offices of the Reichswehr with the 
5 
complicity and approval of the highqst-ranking politicians.. Hitler did 
not originate these measures, but he certainly stepped up their pace and 
scope. In November of 1934, a new law gave priority to rearmament and 
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- directed that all other policies either be co-ordinated with or 
6 
subordinated to that goal. Defence expenditures increased rapidly. By 
agreement with the leadership of the army, Hitler initially remained 
reticent about these, developments, but all such restraint ended in March 
of 1935 when he officially proclaimed the existence of the Luftwaffe, 
repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, announced the reintroduction of 
compulsory militax7 servicel and ordered that the standing army be 
7 increased toýthirty-six divisions-of rouchlY 550tOOO. men. 
By the summer of 1935, although Germany was still to weak to start 
a war or embark on a progr amme of territorial expansion, 
8 
she was 
. rearming quickly and her intentions were clear. The domestic barbarism 
of the nazis was, or at least ought to have been, obvious to even the 
casual reader of The Times. 
9 In October of 1933, Gemany left both the 
Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations; and her external aims 
were explicitly laid out in the programme of the nazi party: the aboli- 
tion of Versailles, the establishment of greater Germany, and the 
10 
conquest of lebensraum to the east. Hitler's announcements of March 
+ý ,,, e not more rhetoric. BY 1935, although 1915 hoce aims, -,. 
Germany did not quite yet possess the power to dominate the continent, 
she undoubtedly did have and did demonstrate that such were her plans. 
I 
Moreoverl a hundred years of German history did not give cause for 
optimism. 
Certainly, the British Government were aware of the danger. In 
March of 1934, Sir John Simon, the Foreif; n Secretar7f circulated to his 
colleagues a Cabinet Paper outlining the ominous progress of German 
rearmament. The following month, he distributed another Cabinet Pap6r 
by Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign 
office, on 'The Future of Germany'. 
12 In a detailed physical and 
psycholoCical dissection 
. 
of Germany, Vansittart stressed the comine 
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danger, described the nazis' preparations for war, and emphasized that 
they were fostering to the extreme the German militar7 spirit; he 
cautioned that HitlL: srts peace propaganda belied his true intentions. The 
General Staff agreed, warning at the beginning of 1934 that Germany might 
be ready for war in 1938 or 1939.13 The Government were also aware of a 
continual increase in the rate of production of the German aircraft 
industry, 14 and the Cabinet Committee on German Rearmament recommended 
that immediate action must be taken. 
15 In March of 1935, the Government 
issued a White Paper on Defence in an attempt to make the situation 
clear to the public; it concluded that increased expenditure on defence 
was absolutely necessary. 
16 The following December, just before he went 
to Paris to deal with the Italo-Ethiopian conflictq Sir Samuel Hoare, 
who had replaced Simon as Foreign Secretary the previous June, circulated 
to'his colleagues three recent despatches from Berlin on German reazra- 
ment and expansionist aims. 
17 In his covering note, he stressed the 
tremendous efforts and sacrifices being made for the sake of those aimsl 
and he warned that. * 
The peace which GermRny desires is a German 
peace.... the present imbroelio in Abyssinia 
is mere child's play compared to the problems 
with which these German claims will in some 
not very distant future confront His Majesty's 
Government. 18 
To counter the German and Japanese threatst Britain had only her 
own military resources and such international support as might 
be 
forthcominG. 
The Government were not very happy with the state of Britain's 
defences. From the post-war demobilization until the mid-thirties, 
British armaments existed at a dangerously low level. 
19 The war 
ended with retrenchment and the curtailment of the militar7 establishment 
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to beneath even a satisfactory peacetime condition, 
20 
and the ten year 
rule, instituted in 1919 by Lloyd George and made automatically renewable 
annually by Churchill in 1928p directed the Chiefs of. Staffp in their 
strategic planning, to assume that no major threat would arise within 
ten years. The Royal Air Force was expanded after the war; but, by the 
spring of 1932, Only 42 of the 52 squadrons authorized in 1923 were in 
existence, and the other aspects of-air defence fared even worse. The 
Admiralty, at the London Naval Conference of 1930, were forced to accept 
a limit of fifty cruisers rather than the seventy which they felt were 
the minimum necessary to protect Britain's imperial lifeline. Construc- 
tion of the Sinj; apore naval base was progressing slowly (it was not to 
be completed until 1938); and, in 1933, a Cabinet Committee under 
Stanley Baldwin reported that 'the whole of the coast defences of the 
Empire at home and abroad are obsolete and outranged by the guns of a 
21 
modern cruiser armed with 6-inch ordnance'. The army, at the beginning 
of the thirties, was smaller than it had been in 1913 and was not orea- 
nized for war in Europe; instead of being able to mobilize six infantry 
and one cavalry division in lecs than six wocke, the War Office could 
22 
only put one of each in the field. Military appropriations, which had 
been z116 million in 1926-1927, declined to E110 million in 1930-1931 
and to Z102-7 in 1932-1933.23 
In 1932, galvanized into action by the Manchurian invasion and the, 
decided to reconsider the Shanghai incident, the Government finally 
24 
state of Britaints defences. In response to urgent appeals from the 
Chiefs of Staffj they abolished the ten year rule and authorized certain 
temporary measures of air and naval rearmament. 
25 The following year, ' 
the Chiefs of Staff indicated their. extreme alarm over the growine 
danger and warned that the armed forces, given their existing strength 
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and armaments, could no longer be responsible for national and imperial 
defence. 26 In response, the Cabinet appointed the Defence Requirements 
Committee (DIZC) in November of 1933 to review the entire state of 
British defences. Their first reportl considered by the Cabinet on 
7 March 1934, identified Japan as the immediate. threat but placed 
Germany as 'the ultimate potential enemy.... in her case we have time, 
though not too much time, to make defensive preparations'. The DRC 
recommended f; reatly enlarged appropriations for the three services: a 
total of E71 million over the next five years. 
27 Aware of the necessity 
to rearmg but worried about public opinion and the nation's finances, 
the Govemment decided to reduce the amount suggested and to concentrate 
the remainder upon the RAP. 
indeed, of all the concerns troubling the Government, none aroused 
more disquiet than the situation in the air. The power of the bomber was 
vastly overrated, and, though the army anc! navy dissented, #both tho 
Cabinet and the country as a whole saw in the air attack the greatest 
threat to Britain'. 
28 The DRC warned that: 
In vicw of thc enormously incrcascd outl7at 
capacity of Germany, there is the possibility 
of attack so continuous and concentrated and 
on such a scale that a few weeks of such an 
experience might so undermine the morale of 
any civilian population as to make it diffi- 
cult for the Government to continue the war. 29 
I 
Having witnessed the failure of strategic bombing campaigna to achieve 
much of anything either in World War Two or in Vietnam, wo have trouble 
understanding these sentiments; but Baldwin's remarks that the bomber 
would always get through and that the frontier of Britain waI3 now at the 
Rhine indicate how potent air power was considered to be and how feared 
mass bombing was. 
30 Un judging thý politiCS of these years we should 
never leave out of mind the paralysing fear of being bombed, even at 
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i. mpossible ranges, by what we should now dismiss as a small scale 
attack by mere "conventional" weapons.., 
31 
In 1935, defence and rearmament were vital concerns of the 
Goverment. In 1.1arch, the White Paper on Defence publically began to 
mark the reorientation of policy from disarmament and collective 
security to deterrence and increased defensive measures: 
events in various parts of the world have shown 
that nations are still prepared to use or threaten 
force under the impulse of what they conceive to 
be a national necessity; and it has been found 
that once action has been taken the existing 
international machinery for the maintenance of 
peace cannot be relied upon as a protection 
against an aggressor. 
The White Paper concluded that: 
an additional expenditure on the armaments of 
the three Defence Services canv therefore no 
longer be safely postponed. 32 
In the second half of the year, the Goverment cQntinued to worry about 
the weak condition of Britain's defences. Cabinet debates on the subject 
of Ethiopia were replete with references to the overstretched and 
inadequate resources of the armed forces. At the end of November, just 
before the climax of the Italo--ýEthiopian conflict, the DRC reported in 
the gloomiest terms. 
33 
Painting an extremely bleak picture of the 
international situation, they concluded that Britain's defences were 
inadequate for their purposes and responsibilities: 
From the above observations one fact 
stands out pre-eminently. Whatever means we 
adopt to forward our main policy of preserving 
peace, there is no alternative to our raising 
our armaments to a far more effective standard 
than they will attain when existing, approved 
programmes are completed. 34 
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As well as being aware of the deficiencies in their own defences, 
the Goverment were also dissatisfied with the international support 
available. They felt i. t to be insufficient and unreliable. 
In the Par Eastj Britain stood alone against Japan. None of the 
other European powers was either willing or able to be a factor in the 
Pacific. Only the United States and the Soviet Union had compelling 
interests there, and neither wished to enmesh herself in a conflict with 
Japan. The Russians, though they had stationed their best troops in the 
East, had no navy to speak of, only wanted Japan to leave them alone, 
. and had very mixed attitudes towards the entire China question - beinG 
interested in turmoil and revolution. The Americans equally shared this 
attitude of non-involvembnt over the Manchurian issue. From the 
beginning, they were opposed to any action, confining themselves to 
35 
moral condemnation and the doctrine of non-recognition. Against 
Japan, Britain could count on support from no one. 
In Europe, the Government could also not rely on any help from 
either the United States or the Soviet Union. Immediately after the end 
of Warld Var Cnq 'both withdrew into icolation. Q 1935, the Democrats 
had returned to the White House, and the new administration wanted to 
adopt a less isolationist policy; but the ravages of the depression, the 
climate of public opinion, and the neutrality legislation passed by 
Congress ensured that steps in that direction would be slow and tenta- 
tive. As late as January of 1935, the Senate refused to ratify the 
protocol of adherence to the Permanent Court at the Hague. 
36 By the 
same date, the Kremlin had taken greater strides back onto tho stage of 
world affairs. In 1934, Russia finally joined the League of Vations and 
assumed, under the nominal guidance of Maxim Litvinov, Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs, a pro-western, anti-fascist stance; but her arms were 
an unknown and not very highly regarded ciuantitY; her communist 
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f; overnment was at best disliked and at worst actively distrusted; and 
geography, in the guise of Poland, reduced her potential effectiveness 
against Germany. 
Of no more practical value against the German threat was the League 
of Nations. Born in the aftermath of-the war as a brave attempt at 
creating a new international order, it was virtually condemned to 
failure from the outset. The United States was never a member; and, 
though the Soviet Union joined in 1934, by that same date Japan and 
Germany had withdrawn. Moreover, the major powers that occupied perma- 
nent seats on the League Council disagreed fundamentally on the shape of 
the post-war world. With four of them (the USSR, Germany, Japant and 
Italy) having revisionist outlooks and being interested in overturning 
rather than maintaining the status quo, the League had little chance for 
success. Nevertheless, in the relatively tranquil decade of the twenties, 
it appeared to be working. Howeverg while the predominantly Conservative 
British Governments of the period gave the impression Of supporting it, 
they took good care to ensure its lack of teeth. 
37 BY 1935j both the 
Foreien office and the services actively disliked and distrusted the 
League of Nations, and many members of the Cabinet shared thi s attitude. 
While some Ministers, notably Anthony Edeng actually supported it out of 
principlel the majority of them placed little faith in it. Ratherl they 
felt constrained to support it mainly because of domestic preasures but 
also because they hoped by doing so to demonstrate Britain's willingness 
to oppose aggressiong thereby further encouraging the United States out 
of her isolation and motivating the rest of Europe to unite against 
Germany rather than seek accomodation with her. Por the British Covern.: - 
ment as a whole, the League of Nations wasImportant for domestic 
reasons and for mobilizing international co-operation. But it had, in the 
eyes of most decision-makers little tangible worth against Germany. 
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I Of far more potential importance to Britain was French support. 
With the strongest army in Europe in 1935 and having already fought 
beside the British against Germany in the last warp France was Britain's 
most important ally. Unfortunately, the Anglo-French entente was shaky. 
At Versailles and after, the two countries took fundamentally different 
approaches to the future. The French wanted security against a revanchist 
Germany. Their overriding goal was 'never again'; it was to ensure that 
Germany would not be able, for the third time since 1870v to invade 
France. The British wanted only to prosper in a world restored to its 
pre-war state. The initial disparities between the two, first demon- 
strated at the peace conference itself, continued over the Chanak crisis 
of 1922, over the French occupation of the Ruhr the following yeart over 
the entire question of reparations and war debts, over French endeavours 
to reconstitute the Dual Entente through a network of eastern alliances 
in which the British placed little faith and towards which they did not 
wish to become committed, and over British attempts such as the Anglo- 
German naval agreement of 1935 at rapprochement with Germany. 
38 In any 
future war, France would be Britain's most. important Diroj, %-azi 9.11y; but 
in 1935 relations between the two, despite their common interests, wore 
strained. bloreoverl the British Government considered France to be an 
unreliable ally because of the latter's domestic political instability. 
39 
In Europe, the only other potential support of major sienificance 
available to 3ritain against Germany was from Italy. She emerged from tho 
war free of all major problems; she needed tranquility, restj and 
economic prosperity. 
40 Insteadl she got Mussolini and the feeling, 
especially pronounced in conservative and nationalist circles, that shý 
was cheated at Versailles out of 
her just spoils of war. 
41 Nevertheless, 
Italy's dissatisfaction and revisionism posed no threat to Britain; and, 
after the sorting out of the immediate Post-war Problemst relations 
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. between the two countries remained untroubled. 
42 Mussolini and Sir 
Austen Chamberlain were on good personal terms and even, in 1925, 
contemplated carvine up Ethiopia. In 1933, the British Government went 
so far as to direct the services not to consider Italy as a potential 
enemy. 
43 
In tact, Italyl Britain, and France were drawn together on the 
issue of Austrian independence. No other problem in Europe (except the 
extremely remote possibility of a Franco-German alliance) presented the 
slightest danger to Italy. Austro-German unification, howeverg threatened 
both to pose a military mbnace to Italy and to deprive her of a client 
state. Consequently, from as early as 19319 Italy co-operated with 
France and ]Britain in opposition to the Anschluss. Although this was 
forbidden by Versailles and by the Treaty of Saint Germain ýetween the 
allied powers and Austria, nevertheless, in March of 1931 under the 
pressures of the economic crisis, Austria and Germany proposed to form 
a customs union. Italyj France, and Czechoslovakia immediately protested, I 
and the project was dropped. A year laterg in May of 1932p Dollfus 
Chancallor of Austria as the leador of a coalition ;f olericalm 
and fascists and, supported by Mussolini, opposed the Anschluss. In 
February of 1934, Britain, Francel and Italy jointly declared their 
support for the maintenance of Austrian independence. The followinC 
July, the Austrian nazis attempted a putsch in which Dollfus was murdered. 
The coup faileds and Mussolini sent four extra divisions to the Brenner 
and wired to the Austrian Vice-Chancellor that the independence of his 
country was 'a principle that has been defended and will be defended 
even more strenuously by Italy j. 
44 The Italian press followed this 
declaration with an anti-Geman campaign, and a few days later Mussolini 
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. expressed his disgust at the 'night of the long knives'. Two months 
later, in Septemberl Britain, France, and Italy repeated their 
declaration on the preservation of Austrian integrity. 
In January of 1935, Franco-Italian relations, based on their common 
anti-German interestsp were placed on a solid footing. Laval and 
Mussolini met in Rome and concluded a qeries of agreements settling all 
the outstanding differences between the two - including their conflict 
in North Africa resulting from Mussolini's empire building attempts. The 
two crucial points concerned Ethiopia and military consultations. With 
respect to the formerl Laval ceded Mussolini a free hand economically; 
except for the Addis Ababa-Djibuti railway, France abjured all economic 
interests in Ethiopia. Whatever else Laval might or might not have said, 
the Duce interpreted this concession to extend to the political sphere 
and to mean a green light for invasion. For the French, the militar7 
aspects of the agreements were the important ones. Talks begant and in 
June Gamelin and Badoglio, the two Chiefs of Staffo. reached agreement on 
joint action in the event of a German attack on either France or Austria. 
woillid, 10f, a French army corps in the Italian order of battle, an 
Italian corps on the Franco-Swiss frontiert and Italian air bases in 
45 
southern France. This agreement released from the Italian border an 
46 
extra 200vOOO soldiers which the French could redeploy against Germany. 
Thenj in April of 1935, Anglo-French-Italian co-operation reached 
its peak with the establishmezit of the Stresa Ffont. After Hitler's 
declarations of March (the denunciation of Versailles, tho imposition 
of conscriptionv the'admission of the existence of the Luftwaffe, and 
the expansion of the Gennan army), the League Council scheduled an 
emergency meeting. At Mussolini Is invitation, British and French leaders 
and officials first met with their Italian counterparts at the resort of 
Stresa on the shore of Lago Maggiore. This meeting produced a United 
go. 
. ariti-Geman front and the reaffirmation'of previous pledges on Austrian 
independence. The three powers drew up a resolution condemning Germany's 
unilateral denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles. On . 17 April,, the 
Council unanimously appr oved it. 
47 Stresa marked the zenith of Anglo- 
French-Italian co-operation against the nazi menace. 
In the light of their view of the international environment, the 
British Government feared that any action which turned Italy hostile 
- was liable to produce very undesirable results. It would endayleer the 
imperial lifeline to the East, thereby stretching even more Britain's 
already inadequate military resources and reducing their effectiveness. 
48 
It would shatter the Stresa Front and drastically weaken the anti-German 
forces. Finally, it would exacerbate t he strains in Anglo-French rela- 
#ons and jeopardize co-operation between the two countries: the British 
Government were aware of the importance that the French placed on their 
alliance with Mussolini and felt that any conflict between Britain and 
Italy would alienate the French# who mij; ht then leave the British totally 
unsupported in the event of an &r. zlo-jtaýlian naval clash in the 
Mediterranean. 
Thusp when the Government realized the serious nature of Italian 
designs on Ethiopia, they*were vex7 hesitant to take any steps that 
might irretrievably alienate. the Italians or, even worse, lead to active 
conflict between Britain and Italy. This reluctance to oppose Mussolini 
- threatened to jeopardize the future of the League of Nationsp because a 
second failure on its part - after its previous ineffectiveness over 
14anchuria - would undoubtedly have spelled its demise. Nevertheless, ' 
pressure from the external environment convinced most of the British 
Government of the importance of preserving the Stresa, Front and AnClo- 
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French and Anglo-Italian co-operation. Unfortunately for the Governmenty 
domestic pressure was simultaneously pushing them in the. very opposite 
direction: in support of Ethiopia and the League of Nations against 
Italian aggression. 
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'Chapter Four 
The British Dilemma: 
II. The Domestic Background 
----------- 
The second major cause'of the dilemma facing the British Government 
was the nature of their domestic environment. They felt that economic 
conditionsl public opinion, and the electoral situation necessitated 
that they proceed very slowly and cautiously with rearmament and that 
they fully support the League of Nations. 
Economic Conditions 
By the mid-thirties, though aware of the urgency of rebuilding their 
defences, the British Government felt that economic conditions placed a 
severe braho on the rate at which they could do so. Darine the years 
following the First World liar, economic issues were a major factor in 
every election and one of the principal problems troublimg all successive 
Governments. Despite certain individual and regional gains, the economy 
as'a whole was not healthy. 
2. Exports stagnated and the traditional 
industries declined, giving rise to the horribld depressed areas and to 
massive, lon&-term unemployment. In the slump of 1920, the number out of 
work reached ten per cent and was never to fall below that level until 
World War Two. 
3 Moreover, Britain was no longer the world's leading 
industrial power, and the war had swept away thi sterling standard and 
the City's unrivalled control of international finance. After the 
98. 
depression, Britain could no longer pay her own way in the world and 
had to exist on her overseas capital. 
4 
In August of 1931, the intermational monetaz7 crisis, which had 
started in Austria in May and spread to Germany in July, finally crossed 
the Channel. The Labour Goverment, unable to decide what to do, 'split 
into two, the majority of the Cabinet resigning and the remainder 
following Ramsay MacDonald into a coalition with the Liberals and 
Conservatives. Almost immediately, this new National Government, still 
nominally led by MacDonald though dominated by Baldwin and the Tories, 
took the country off the gold standard and effectively devalued the 
pound, thereby doing precisely what they had been formed to avoid. 
Otherwisel the Government responded to this crisis, as to the depression 
as a whole, in a strictly orthodox manner. They cut spending and 
balanced th-- budget. A few voices, notably those of Keynes, Lloyd George, 
and Sir Oswald MosleYl cried out for deficit finance and the reflating 
of-the economy. They were ignored. 
4 This financial conservatism at the Treasury and within the Cabinet, 
Cornbi. nea wituh the E: cneral do-clina of the British economy, slowed the 
pace and narrowed the scope of rearmament. In his budget of 1932, 
Neville Chamberlain brought in an arms estimate of Z102-7 million, an 
amount smaller than that proposed by any Labour Government and the 
lowest of the entire interwar period. 
5 Two years later, when the 
I)efence Requirements Committee recommended massive rearmament, the 
Exchequer declared that such rearmament was impossible to carr7 out, 
and the Govermment drastically slashed the suggested increase in 
spending7 Similarlyl in 1935, financial considerations led them to cut' 
back on the implementation of proposed defensive measures of air 
warfare. 
8 
By the summer of that year, despite the recommendations of 
the Defence Requirements Committee and the publication of tho White 
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Paper on Defence, rearmament was progressine only ver7 slowly. In part, 
this was due to the ill health of the economy and the orthodox financial 
thinking of the Government. As a result, the British Government could 
not rely on their own'defences to meet threats from Japan and Germany. 
They needed international support. 
Public Opinion 
c 
Even. more influential in determining the Govermment's foreign 
policy was the pressure of public opinion. The First World War did 
not in 33ritainy as it did in Francet produce a lasting and general 
anti-German climate. Insteadt because a large number of people felt 
that French fears for the future were greatly exaggerated and German 
resentment of Versailles justified, and because France and not Germany 
had for years been Britain's traditional enemyq much pro-German, anti- 
French sentiment existed. It remained strong even after the nazis 
seized power and their barbarism and repression were noted in the press. 
Perhaps many agreed with Lord Rothermere's 
ýaily Mail, which welcomed 
aC I itin, vs nlc-tion nuccess- in the fall of 1931 a-- -- . -cinforcc. nn-nt aCm. in t 
bolshevismv9 or with. The Times, which in July of 1934 could opine that 
#in the years that are coming, there is more reason to fear for Germany 
than to fear Germany'. 
10 Even on 4 April 19351 just after Hitler had 
denounced Versaillest imposed conscription, announced the existence of 
the Luftwaffe, and ordered the expansion of the German army, The Times 
could state in an editorial that too much stress had been laid on the 
negati. ve side of Hitler's statements and not enough on the positive 
side. 
11 These illusions were shared by the Archbishop of Canterbur7, 
who, on 5 June 1935 at the opening of the convocation of the Church of 
bjejand, announced that 'the true'way is to regard what Hitler said as 
sincere', 
12 
and by the Prince of Wales, who, in an address a few days 
100* 
later to the British Legion, proposed that a deputation be sent to 
0 13 Germany 'to stretch forth the hand of. friendship'. These pro-Gernan 
feelings extended to circles even closer to the seat of powert to the 
Cliveden Setj later to become one of the centres of support for Neville 
14 
Chamberlaints policy of appeasement, to the backbenches of the 
Conservative Party915 and even to a small degree into the Cabinet 
16 itself. Both Sir Samuel Hoare and Anthony Eden, the two Cabinet 
Ministers at the Foreign Office during the Hoare-Laval crisis, noted and 
objected to these pro-German trends which, while rarely reaching the 
very highest levels of the Governmentl were widespread in the country as 
a whole. By failing to understand the threat from Germany and by viewing 
the international situation with relative equanimity, public opinion 
made it much more difficult for the Government to ream and to follow 
policies directed towards what they knew to be the severe German menace. 
Parthermorep the horrors of war aroused within Britain the feeling 
of 'never again t. The 
British people refused even to ýonsider the 
possibility of another war. The last war had been 
so terri])le in its devestations9 that it was 
'unthinkable' that this degrading and humiliating 
internecine strife between civilized countries 
could be repeated. War was not only intolerable, 
it was incredible. 17 
Thus# in the aftermath of the carnage of World War Onep the majority of 
the public supported disarmament and the League of Nations. This 
attitude, understandable in t6 relatively tranquil twenties, persisted 
unabated into the much more dangerous decade of the thirties. The Labour 
Party, at their annual conference in October of 1933, urged the Govern- 
ment to abolish the private manufacture of armaments in Britaing to 
disarm completely in the air, and to do away with all weapons which were 
forbidden to Germany. 
18 Eighteen months later, during the debate on the 
White Paper on Defencet Labour proposed a motion of censure accusing the 
101. 
Government of abandoning the League, prejudicing the chances of any 
future disarmament conferencep and inaugurating a new arms race which 
would ultimately lead to war. 
19 Throughout the country, and not just 
within the ranks of the Labour Party, armaments were condemned for them- 
selves and because they were thought unnecessary due to the League of 
Wations and the principles for which it stood. 
The League itself commanded a great deal of faith in the twenties 
and early thirties and was the repository of the hope that never again 
would the better part of a generation be struck down by war. Support for 
the League of Nations Union, arguably the single most important and 
influential pressure group, affecting British foreign policy during the 
interwar period, reached its peak in 1935 and united people from every 
walk of life and from all across the political spectrum, from George 
Lansbury to Sir Austen Chamberlain. 
20 What public opinion did not, 
however, fully grasp was that there was a possible contradiction between 
collective security and disarmament, that an unarmed League - or a League 
the members of which had little military strength - would prove 
ineffective against an armed aggressor. Thus, the League of Nations 
Union had once denounced the Manchester Guardian for pointing out that 
in the last resort support for the League implied war, a rather unplea- 
sant but perfectly correct conclusion. 
21 Similarly, moot Labour 
supporters failed to see the illogic, in the autumn of 1935, of 
clamouring for maximum collective action against Italy while still 
adamantly opposing any and all measures of rearmament. 
That a position is illogical, however# does not mean that it will 
not be held. And support for both disamament and collective security - 
through the League was at its height during the summer of 1935 with the 
publication of the results of the Peace Ballot. 
22 This referendum was 
set afoot in the spring of 1934 by the League of Nations Union and was 
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eventually conducted by an ad hoc committee consisting of representatives 
from the Union-itself and from thirty-eight other sponsoring bodies, 
including the Labour and Liberal Parties, the Trades Union Congress, the 
co-operative movement, churches, peace societies, and women's groups. 
The Conservatives, long having been divided on the question of support 
for the League, declined, at the national level, an invitation to be a 
sponsor, but local organizations were left free to decide their own 
attitudes. In the event, a minority of Conservative backbenchers 
supported-the Ballot, while others (notably Sir John Simon, the Foreigm 
Secretary) criticized it severely. As it E; ained in popularity, and 
became almost a crusadev Conservative attitudes softened considerably, 
and many leadinj; Tories eventually did become supporters. 
The Peace Ballot itself consisted of five questions. The first 
asked whether Britain should continue as a member of the League. The 
next three canvassed support for disarmament. The fifth question was the 
crucial one: 
Do you consider thatp if a nation insists on 
attacking another, the other nations should 
combine to compel it to stop 'by 
a) Economic and non-military measures? 
b) If necessar7l militar7 measures? 
The press were not favourable. Only the Manchester Guardian and 
News Chronicle, both Liberalf and the Daily Heraldl Labour, supported 
the Ballot. All the other major papers either ignored it as far as 
possible, as did The Timesland the Daily Telegraph, or opposed itj 
generally because the questions put complicated issues in too simple a 
form., 
23. 
Certainlyt the Ballot left itself open to much criticism. While it 
had been intended as a test of opinion on collective security and inter- 
national disarmament and not as a simple. referendum on war and peace, it 
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tended to take on this latter overtone. It alsop as Sir Samuel Hoare 
noted in his memoirs, ignored the possibility that the posse. ssion of 
armaments might have a deterrent value and thereby help to preserve 
peace; 
24 but the principal flawt as a high-ranking Conservative 
publically pointed out at the time, lay in the fifth question, which 
gave the impression that a nation could impose an economic blockade 
with the certainty that it would not lead to war. This was simply 
untrue. It would be impossible to vote 'yes I in part (a) without being 
ready to do the same in part (b)f but this point was not emphasized by 
the Ballot. 
25 
Despite these criticisms, the results of the referendum, announced 
-in June of 1935, were reasonably clear. The responses to the first four 
questions demonstrated almost unanimous support for the League of 
Nations and for general disarmament - but not necessarily for unilatoral 
British disarmament, a possibility not explicitly covered. The results 
for question 5 showed, on the one hand, an equally overwhelming endorse- 
ment of collective security by all means short of war (part (a) received 
10,027,608 yos votes, 635tO75 no votosl-and 855007 abstentionn)l and, 
on the other hand, more limited but still majority approval for military 
sanctions themselves (part (b) received 6#784,368 yes votesg 2,3519981 
no voteav and 2,364,441 abstentions). 
If the Peace Ball. ot indicated anything, it was that the countr7 
clearly favoured universal disarmament and a foreign policy based on 
collective security through the League of Nations. The results of the 
voting were not such as to encourage the Government to proceed full 
speed with a massive rearmament programme. Instead, they felt 
constrained to pledge their firm loyalty to Geneva. On 23 Jul. V 1'9ý5, a 
deputation headed by Lord Robert Cecil, President of the League of 
Nations Union and chairman of the ad hoc committee running the Peace 
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Ballotq spoke about it to Baldwin, Hoaret and Eden. He emphasized the 
scope and importance of the Ballot and said that it very accurately 
represented the position in the country. Baldwin replied that 
the Government intend to persist in the policy 
that they have hitherto pursued, and that the 
League of Nations remains... 'the sheet anchor 
of British policy'. 26 
The Electoral Situation 
In the autumn of 1931, immediately after the financial crisis had 
been eased, the National Government called a general election. They 
fought it as a three-way coalition of Conservatives, National Labour, 
and National Liberal against Labour and Liberal opposition. The 
Conservatives, their poll increasing by some three million votes, gained 
the most; Labour representation dropped considerably; and the Liberals 
emerged as the biggest losers. The Conservatives. ended up with 473 
seats, giving the National Government a combined majority of 427- 
27 
The election had been held in a crisis atmosphere, and the tremendous 
Tory showing was anomalous and hardly represented long-term feeling in 
the country. It should not have been surprising, thent that over the 
next four years the Government were consistently defeated at by-elections. 
In October of 1933, they lost at East Fulham; andl of the eleven 
following contests up to the summer of 1934v they were beaten in ten, the 
swings against them ranging from 16 to 25.2 per cent. Only at Portsmouth 
were they saved, but even there the swing was 8.8 per cent. Another 
exception was Twickenham, over the summer; but, from October of 1934 to 
the following Marchq the movements against the Government averaged 23.4 
per cent. 
28 They managed to preserve two seats in March and April but 
: Lost another one in July when a Conservative majority of 5#500 gave way 
to a Labour one almost equally large, 
29 
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Of all these results, it was East Fulham which affected the 
Government the most. A 26-5 per cent. swinig turned a seemingly impreg- 
30 
nable Tory majority of 14,521 into a Labour victor7 of 4,840. Stanley 
Baldwin's closest friend has left an account of the campaigm: 
It was at this moment that East Fulham overtook 
all our calculations. It had been a Conservative-held 
borough throughout my political career, and in the 
1931 election Kenyon Vauehn-Morgan had pushed up his 
majority to 14,000. When he died in the autumn of 
1933 the local Conservatives chose Alderman Waldron 
to replace him. He was well known locally, had been 
Mayor of Fulham several times, and was an honorary 
freeman of the Borough. His opponent was John Wilmot 
of the ILP, who campaigned chiefly on housing and 
disarmament. An old friend of minel Arthur Baker, 
covered the campaign for The Times and wrote on 
polling day: tIt would come as no surprise if 
Labour polled nearly 15tOOO, so popular have Mr. 
Wilmot and his peace propaganda proved. ' He did 
rather better than that and won the seat by nearly 
5,000 votes. He regarded his victor7 as 'a message 
of hope for all who are working for peace. # Poor 
Waldron was accused of demanding 'armaments and war' 
and George Lansbury in his message to the electors 
said, 'I would close ever7 recruiting station, 
disband the army and dismiss the air force. I would 
abolish the whole dreadful equipment of war and say 
-to the world "Do your worst". ' I have quoted enough 
I think to show the manner in which the election was 
fought. Stanley Baldwin was appalled at*the result 
and when Vansittart came to Eee him to ur, - ., e 
the c-:: -: 
for speedy rearmamentt he told him that he could not 
afford to take risks. The British public, he knewt 
would., have to be educated to accept that it was 
necessar7. To press on with it at that moment, he 
thought, would be fatal. It would alienate support 
from the National Government, and cause it to lose 
the next election. He knew that the Socialist 
Government that replaced it would not ream at all, 
and he was not prepared to gamble with the security 
of the country. 
Stanley Baldwin was kept well informed of the 
state of public opinion by Central Officet but the 
result of East Fulham stunned him so much that he 
asked for a special report on it to be prepared. 
Patrick Gowerg to whom the task was entrustedl 
approached Baker and asked him to draft it. It made 
gloomy reading. East Fulham had been lost purely on 
the pacifist issue, Baker reported, and I am sure 
it was these words that were in Stanley Baldwin's 
mind when, in November 1936, he tried to explain 
the course of his policy in the years since 1933. 31 
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From a considerably different political position, Hugh Dalton, 
the Labour M. P., gave an alternate and more convincing explanation of 
the result at East Fulham. 
32 Wilmot was neither a pacifist nor an 
advocate of unilateral disarmament. He owed his victory to four factors: 
I 
to his support of collective defence through a strong League and a 
general qisarmament treaty; to his exposure of bad housing and his 
demand for slum clearance and new building; to the superiority of his 
electoral organization; and to his own personality and 
ýutstanding 
political ability. Wilmot, according to Dalton, was a much more gifted 
Parliamentary candidate than his opponent. 
. 
Dalton's account stands up-to reality better than Davidson's. 
]Domestic conditions, not foreign policy, usually determine election 
results, and mid-term by-elections gpnerally tend to favour the party 
out of power. Moreovert there was a natural swing back to Labour after 
the freakish results of 1931. A few days after Eiist Fulham, Labour 
gained control of 200 boroughs at local elections and-the following 
March captured London County Council - two results presumably unrolated 
to foreign Policy. 
33 In fact, one Conservative Rizileter tiuspected that 
the major issue at East Fulham had been not pacifism or disarmament but 
the means test. 
34 
Davidson's interpretation, however wrong, was noneth6less widely 
held among Conservatives and influenced their future behaviour. Certainly, 
the result had a serious effect on Stanley Baldwin. He explained his 
feelings to the House of Commons on 12 November 1936: 
You will remember the election at Fulham in the 
autumn of 19339 when a seat which the National 
Government held was lost by about 7,000 vote" 
on no issue but the pacifist. You will remember 
perhaps that the National Government candidate 
who made a most guarded reference to the question 
of defence was mobbed for it. 
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That was the feeling in the country in 1933 
My position as the leader of a great party was nýt 
altogether a comfortable one. I asked myself what 
chance was there - when that feeling that was 
given expression to in Fulham was common throughout 
the country - what chance was there within the next 
year or two of that feeling being so changed that 
the country would give a mandate for rearmament? 
Supposing I had gone to the country and said that 
Germany was rearming and that we must rearm, does 
anybody think that this pacific democracy would 
have rallied to that cz7 at that moment? I cannot 
think of anything that would have made the loss of 
the election from my point of view more certain. 35 
Thus, in 1935 as the Italo-Ethiopian conflict unfoldedt the Government's 
perception of the political situation placed yet another brake on 
rearmament. -They 
knew that it was essential and that its pace must be 
_increased. 
They also knew that if the Labour Party were to win the neXt 
election they would definitely not rearm at all, but they feared that 
either large scale rearmament or a campaign based on that platform might 
cost them the election and be a self-defeating move. To ensure their 
victory at the polls# they not only de-emphasized rearmament but also 
repeated their pledges of support for collective security and the 
League of Nations. 
Following the collapse of Lloyd Georgel. s coalition, all Governments 
in the twenties 
tended 
' 
to follow rather than to lead public opinion 
in foreign affairs, to satisfy the immediato desires 
of the electorate rather than the ultimate interests 
of the nationg to make foreign policy the prisoner 
of domestic politics rather than to seek to pursue 
a farsighted independent course and to carry the 
public with them step by step. 36 
The attitude of the politicians in power remained the same in the firsý 
half of the thirties. They felt their freedom of action to be severely 
circumscribed by the tenor of public opinion and the climate of 
electoral politics. The British Government preferred to bow to the 
log. 
public's wishes rather than to tx7 to lead and re-educate opinion. As a 
resultt when the Italian threat to Ethiopia became manifest, the 
Government pledged that the League of Nations remained the foundation 
on which their foreign policy rested. 
The Government's Dilemma 
3br the summer of 19359 the British Government confronted a 
difficult and unpleasant choice. Aware of the dangers from Japan and 
Germanys worried by the inadequacies of their own defences which for 
domestic reasons they felt they could not repair far or fast enough, 
and perturbed by the lack of international aid available to them, they 
placed a very high value on Italian friendship and the preservation of 
the Stresa Front. At the same timel they felt that domestic pressures 
and the cause of international co-operation necessitated that they 
fully support the League of Nations and the principle of collective 
security. The Italian threat to Ethiopia brought to the surface the 
latent incompatibility between the alliance with a revisionist Italy 
=d c2legiance to the status quo Leag 0 gue. 
The intcx-natic. =ý =ituaticn 
and their own militar7 weakness tended to make the Government prefer 
the former; but domestic factors and their unwillingness to risk 
alienating opinion at home and abroad pushed them towards the latter. 
The Italo-Ethiopian conflict presented the Government with a dilemma. 
Their attempts to escape from this dilemma and somehow preserve both 
Stresa and the League provide the key to understanding and explaining 
their behaviour during 1935- 
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Chapter Five 
The First Decision Situation: 
From the Wal Wal Incident to the Italian Invasion of Ethiopia 
---------------------- 
I 
At the beginning of 1935, Ethiopia was one of the ver7 few 
independent nations left in Africa. 
I It was poor and backward. It 
2 
possessed little mineral wealth, and the Population of roughly seven 
and a half million scratched out. a bare living on the land. 
3 Although, 
the first constitution had been promulgated in 1931 and attempts at 
modernization had been made, the country remained a-feudal kingdom, with 
government and society elementary and inchoatef and with slaver-j rifev 
despite attempts by the Emperor and a relatively progressive minority to 
stamp it out. 
4 Landlockedf Ethiopia was completely surrounded by terri- 
tory under tho control'off France, and Italy, and hor mairi 
connection to the outside world was by the railway from Addis Ababa to 
the'port of Djibuti in French Somaliland. Much of the periphery of the 
country, especially in the south ahd east, was inhospitable scrub and 
desert inimical to*European colonization. The much more temperate and 
fertile highlands of the north and the centre - Ethiopia Proper - were 
honeycombed by mountains and valleys which provided a formidable 
obstacle to transportation and communication and thus to centralized 
political control. All told, the effort required to invade and subjugate 
Haile Selassie's domains could hardly be worth the end result. 
Nevertheless, Ethiopia had in the past aroused a certain amount of 
great power interest. The events of 1935 were neither the first Italian 
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invasion of that country nor the first attempts of Britainv France, and 
Italy to unilaterally decide its fate. In the 188os, the Italians began 
to push inland from their Red Sea territory of Eritrea into parts of the 
Tigr6 in northern Ethiopia. Unsuccessful in attempts to achieve a 
protectorate by treaty, they tried to Cain one by conquest. They failed, 
Ethiopia preserved her independence by completely and humiliatingly 
routing an Italian army at the battle of Adowa in 1896. Nevertheless, 
encroachments upon her sovereignty continued. In 1906, Britain, France, 
and Italy, the three limitrophe powers, concluded the Tripartite 
Agreement whichv although the preamble declared their common interest in 
safeguarding the integrity of Ethiopial had the effect 
;f delimiting 
5 their special interests and spheres of influence. During the First 
World War, Italy demanded a protectorate over all of Ethiopia as a 
6 
reward for joining'the-Ententep and the British Foreign Office 
actually drafted a plan which would have partitioned that countr7 and 
. given the non-Amharic portions to Italy. 
7 Nothing came of these claims 
and plans. Instead, Italy reversed her position and joined with France 
in' 1,02.3 to sponsor Ethiopian memýbership ill the Leag , ue of 
Despite British objections on the grounds that 'Ethiopia had not reached 
a state of civilization and internal security sufficient to warrant her 
admissionig 
8 
she became a member'subject to certain conditions 
regarding the control of slavery and the arms traffic, Two years later,, 
Italy's policy seemed to revert to its original linel when she and 
Britain exchanged notes reaffirming their spheres of influence and 
agreeing to support each otherts requests for economic concessions. In 
November of 1925, while on a Mediterranean cruise on his private yacht, 
Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British-Foreign Secretary, put in at Rapallo 
and renewed his friendship with Mussolini. The following month saw an 
Anglo-Italian economic agreement on Ethiopia. Britain wished to control 
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the headwaters of the Blue Nile at its source in Lake Tsana. Italy 
wanted to construct a railway across Ethiopia which would connect her 
two East African colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, and also 
wanted to have economic privileges in the area west of Addis Ababa, Iný 
an exchance, of notes, Britain and Italy agreed to support each, other's 
claims. 
9 The "two countries dropped the matterl however, when the French 
refused to accede to the agreement, -and when the Regent, the future 
Haile Selassie, protested to the League. In 1928t Italian policy seemed 
to reverse itself once more with the conclusion of a Treaty of 
Friendship and Arbitration with Ethiopia, which bound the two govern- 
ments to submit any dispute that could not be settled by normal diplo- 
matic means to a tprocedure of conciliation 
'crr 
arbitrationt, 
10 
In the spring of 1933t however, the Italian government again turned 
seriously to the idea of annexing Ethiopia. ErAlio de Bono, Minister of 
Colonies and the future head of the Italian war effort in East Africa, 
organized a committee within his ministry to StudY'ways and means of' 
asserting Italian influence. 
11 He urged Massolini to'act. In the autumn, 
a- press campaign acculged-rithiopia of obctiii(Aing, Italian. ecor. -omia pene- 
trationy- and Italian diplomats attacked her at the League. 
12 In 19349 
Mussolini adopted proposals for'a militar7 build up in Eritrea, and he 
told Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, that he expected war in the 
near future. American officials in Paris and Addis Ababa believed the 
samej and the United States ambassador in Rome predicted that I taly 
would either conquer or gain a protectorate over Ethiopia. 
13 
Neverthelesst invasion was by no means decided upon at the end of 
1934- It appears that MLxssolini was contemplating a campaign to begin 
in August Of 1936 at the end of the-rainy season. Moreover, there was 
significant pressure within Italy against any attempt at annexing 
Ethiopia. Both Marshall Badoglioq chief of the general staffj and the 
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King counselled against the project. The formerl after having visited 
the area, was, sceptical about the possibility of a successful campaign 
and reported that conquest might take seven years. He disliked de Bono 
and distrusted his military judgemento and he opposed the idea of with- 
drawing troops from the Brenner in the face of German expansion. To 
these objections the King added that any Italian force in East Africa 
would be entirely at the mercy of the British, who could easily isolate 
and destroy it by closing the Suez Canal. 
14 
Thus, the Italian-position was far from certain when, by chancet 
the Wal Wal incident intervened. Wal Wal was a watering hole located 
in the Ogaden desert in southeast Ethiopia and clearly marked on most 
maps, including Italian ones, as being within that country. 
15 However, 
in 1930, a small, but permanent Italian military post had been estab- 
lished there. The Ethiopians never protested to Rome, but neither did 
they accept the situation. 
16 Towards the end of. 'November of 1934, an 
boundar7 co. mmission, with a relativelylarge escort of 
I about 
600 Ethiopian soldiers arrived on the spot. A confrontation ensued, 
s3ld the cornmission withdrew-somewhat. The Ethiopinn troapa did note 
Fighting broke out on 5 December and resulted in the death of 107 of the 
Ethiopians and 45 of the Italian native levy. 
17 
Protests were immediately exchanged. An Ethiopian note of - 
9 December invoked the 1928 Treaty of Friendship and asked for arbitra- 
tiong a request which Italy rejected five days later*on the grounds that 
Ethiopian responsibility was abundantly obvious. Instead, Italy demanded 
apologies, reparations, and a salute by an Ethiopian delegation to the 
Italian flag at Wal Wall in effect recognition of Italian sovereignty. 
In response, on 14 December, Ethiopia appealed for the first of many 
times to the League of Nations. 
18. 
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During the next several months, while the League dithered and 
accomplished nothing, -Italy prepared for war. Reserves were mobilized, 
and-a steady stream of men and materiel was shipped to the two Italian 
colonies in East Africa. Between the end of January and the middle'of 
July, 82,000 soldiers moved through Suez, 
19 
and during the first six 
months of the year 102 Italian naval vessele sailed through the canal - 
as compared with three for the corresponding period in 1934.20 These 
preparations placed a heavy strain on the Italian economy. Already by 
the end of April# the cost of 'exigencies' in East Africa amounted to 
z1o million, 
21 
and at-the end'of July Italy's economic condition was 
extremely depressed. The state of the public finances was bad; the lira 
had been de facto devalued; and Italian stocks were everywhere falling 
in value. 
22 Nevertheless, preparations for war continued. At the same 
time, the officially controlled press waged intensive propaganda 
campaigns with the object of rallying domestic opinion in support of 
this*adventure, which was far from being generally popular. 
23 
While these military preparations were being made, * Mussolini was 
also attempting to clear the way dip1om;.: kV; e. t-,. 1y. In January, the Laval- 
Massolini talks settled all outstanding issues between France and Italyt 
and the French leader ceded Massolini a free hand economically in 
Ethiopia. The latter claimed, however, that the accords reached at that 
time, as well as the abortive 1925 Anglo-Italian agreement, conceded him 
complete freedom, political in addition to economic: a blank cheque for 
turning Ethiopia into an Italian colony. 
24 At the e. nd of the month, the 
Italian government conveyed their version of the Laval-Mussolini conver- 
sations to the British and suggested that they would like to exchange 
views 'on the respective interests of both Governments in Ethiopia and 
to explore the possibility of the development of such interests in a 
mutually harmonious manner'. 
25 Sir John Simong Foreign Secretary at the 
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time, took good care not to reply to this d4marche. Reverthelesst 
Mussolini tried againg this time at Stresa in Aprilq to get an Anglo- 
French go ahead to conquer Ethiopia. The subject was not on the agenda 
and was never discussed by the leaders, all of whom had good reasons for 
ignoring it. Yetp-there was some confirmation for Mussolini of Laval's 
ffree hand'. To a document that originally read tto preserve the peaceI9 
the Duce specifically added, with what was a particularly, pregnant pausel 
the words 'of Europe'. Neither the British nor the French objectedt Sir 
John Simon remaining immobile and ignoring the looks of both Ramsay 
MacDonald and Vansittart, and Mussolini later claimed that this addition 
had been intended to indicate the omission of the Ethiopian situation. 
26 
He wanted Anglo-French permission for his projected conquest of Ethiopia. 
The Wal Wal incident had been merely a local flare up unconnected 
with any grand design, but the Italian government fastened upon it as a 
- pretext for setting into motion their plans for colonizing Ethiopia. 
Several reasonsl having little to do with the justification given at the 
timel existed for this Italian adventure. Italy had no need whatsoever 
for to co, -,, -,,. er and ccntrol her wculd be a drain not-a berefit. 
The real reasons were somewhat different. Most important was the domestic 
failure of fascism. With the economy suffering badly, Mussolini needed a 
success, and the conquest of Ethiopia would serve to distract attention 
from internal conditions, to boost Italy's prestige as a great power, 
and to avenge the humiliation, of Adowa. Furthermore, Ethiopia was 
convenient. It adjoined Italy's East African colonies and was the only 
unconquered part of the world available for colonial expansion. Finally, 
there may also have been a desire on the Duce's part to outshine that 
other dictator on the far side of the Alp s. 
27 In these circumstances, 
Wal Wal served as the trigger which set Italy firmly on the course of 
conquest. In February, Mussolini wrote to de Bono, who the previous 
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month had been appointed High Commissioner for Eritrea and Somaliland, 
28 
that it was his 'profound conviction' that military operations would 
b. egin some time in October; 
29 in June, the Italian press were 
proclaiming the inevitability of war; and on 6 July, in a public speech, 
Mussolini announced that 'we have entered upon a struggle which we as a 
Government and a revolutionary people have irrevocably decided to carry 
to its conclusioni. 
30 By the summerg Italian preparations and 
pronouncements left little doubt about the inevitability of invasion. 
As Italy made ready for wart British public opinion grew 
increasingly concerned about the situation and adopted an anti-Italian 
outlook. The changing editorial position of The Times illustrates the 
progress of both of these trends. On 12 January, it'speculated that 
$the obvious desire of both Governments for a friendly understanding 
encourages the hope that direct negotiations will be successful', and 
exactly a month later it still felt that it was too soon to assume that 
Italian actions were more than precautionary and defensive. By 6 Marcht 
howover, Thc, Timen was hoping that the appeara. -ices of preparing for war 
were misleadingg and two months later on 16 May it said that Ith6 origi- 
nal incident between Italy and Ethiopia does not for a moment warrant 
the dimensions which the dispute between the two has now assumed or the 
warlike preparations which are being made by both sides, especially by 
Italyt. A note of optimism crept in at the end of May when the Council 
of the League of Nations ordered an arbitration commission to convene, 
but by 5 JulY it was feared that 'the issue of peace or war is at stake 
and of the whole future of the Leaguet. Three days latert after Musso- 
lini's speech of 6 July, it was concluded that there was no more room 
for doubt about his intentions. Finally, on 26 September, on the eve of 
the invasion and just after the Duce's rejection of the latest peace 
proposalsl The Times stated flatly that Italy was completely in the 
wrong over her projected resort to force. 
By the end of the summer, British opinion of all hues firmly 
supported aotion through the League against any Italian aggression. 
On the left, both the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party 
overwhelmingly passed resolutions condemning Italian threats and 
calling upon the Government fully to support the League. 
31 In the 
middlel the letters to The Times provoked the editor to comment upon 
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how stirred up and anxious British public opinion had become over 
Mussolini's actions and words. 
32 On the right, both Churchill and Sir 
Austen-Chamberlain supported the League. 
33 A few voices did exist on 
the-opposite sidel 
34 but the majority of public opinion from all parts 
of the political spectr= wished the Gover=ent to oppose Italy and 
r, tand by the Covenant. 
As the, public took an increasingly grave view of the situation,. - 
so, did thc,., Covcrr. ment.. InitJ-ally, however, Only the Foreign. offices 
understood the, potentially serious nature of the Italo-Ethiopian 
conflict. As early as January, Sir John Simon told one of his officials 
that the Italians fully intended to conquer Ethiopia. 
35 The following 
month, Sir Sidney Bartong British Minister in Addis Ababa, cabled to 
London, that the independence of Ethiopia was the real issue at stake, 
36 
and SirýEric Drummond, the Ambassador in Rome, warmed Massolini of the 
possible adverse reaction that his present policy would have on both 
British public opinion and Anglo-Italian relations. 
37 The Foreign 
Office were concerned enough that Simon appointed at the beginning of 
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March an interdepartmental committee under the chairmanship of Sir John 
Xaffey to thoroughly examine British interests in Ethiopia in the light 
of the tension in the area. 
Not until May, howeverldid the Cabinet consider the problem. In 
March and April, Ministers had been too preoccupied with the German 
announcements of rearmament and of the. denunciation of Versailles, 'with 
Stresa, and with Simonts upcoming trip to Berlin. At their meeting on 
15 MaYv Ministers for the first time looked at the Italo-Ethiopian 
conflict in detail. 
38 In a quite extensivet rather pessimistict and 
remarkably accurate appraisal of the situationt Simon traced the 
developments from Wal Wal to-the current moment and left little doubt 
that Italy would invade in October at the end of the rainy season. He 
predicted, as a result, the collapse of both the Stresa Front and the 
League, an Italy much weaker in Europe, and German glee at this turn of 
events. Italy, he thoughtv would no more accept an adverse decision from 
'the League than Japan had over Manchuria. 
39 Two days later at another 
Cabinetq Drummondg specially recalled from Rome for information and as 
a warning to the Italians that the Goverranient did-not view the-situation 
lightly, presented a less pessimistic opinion. He thought that within 
two months Mussolini might be willing to find a way out provided he 
could save face. To achieve this, though, Drummond felt that Ethiopia 
would have to be pressed into conceding economic advantages to Italy. 
40 
At these two meetings, the dual line which *the Government was later 
to adopt began to take shape. Dru=ond felt that it was useless to 
proceed on the basis of the Covenant of the League; he thought it better 
I 
to use the Tripartite Treaty of 1906. 'He was convinced that at some 
point pressure would have to be put on'the Emperor of Ethiopia to afford 
some economic adýantages to Italy. ' Various Government departments had 
for some time been considering the idea of ceding to Ethiopia the port 
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of-Zeila'in British Somalilandin exchange for improvements in the 
frontier between thet colony and Ethiopia. In*Simon's memorandum to the 
Cabinet, the Foreign Office had modified this idea to suggest that in 
return for Zeila Ethiopia would grant concessions to Italy. Ministers 
decidedl however, "-that this proposal 'should be reserved, though it 
might be useful later on if Signor Mussolini should himself show any 
disposition of a desire to reach a settlementt. They preferred, for the 
momentt to try the other line of policy and to attempt to avoid a 
conflict by means of conciliation at Geneva. They felt that unless they 
took the initiative the question would be postponed until September, at 
which time the rainy season would have ended and hostilities would be 
imminent if they had not already begun. Consequentlyl Drummond was 
instructed that, while informing Mussolini of, the importance of Stresa, 
he must make clear to the Italian leader that the Government's avowed 
policyq from which they could not depart, was toýgo along with the deep 
feelings existing in the country in favour of support for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes under the League, and to further state that the 
Coilncil -wou'll., d not i6nore the matter until Scptember. The Cabinet, havirs 
decided that the issue must be brought up at Geneva, instructed Anthony 
Eden, Britain's representative to the League and present at both 
meetings though not a member of the Cabinet, to raise itt and they gave 
him fwide discretiont to prevent the outbreak of war. At this point, 
Ministers, aware of and concerned by the problerd, discounted Simon's 
pessimism and still hoped that the. dispute might be peacefully settled 
through the offices of the League of Nations. 
To try to acieve this end, Eden set off for Geneva and the regular 
session of the Council scheduled for the end of May. 
41 To date, the 
League had done nothing. The initial Ethiopian appeals in December and 
Januax7 had been met by the andeavours of Laval and Eden to keep the 
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issue off the agenda and instead to get the two parties to sit down to 
direct negotiations. On 15 January, Ethiopia had formally requested that 
the dispute be put on the agenda. The result had been that Italy had 
modified her demands and agreed to negotiations, and consequently the 
Council had decided to postpone any discussion until its next session. 
Up to mid-Marcht Italy had continued to delay, refusing to set up the 
arbitration commissionp while continuing her military build up. On 17 
March, Ethiopia had once more appealed to the Council and pledged hex- 
self to accept any arbitration decision. Howeverl the concurrent 
developments in Germany had overshadowed this matter, and neither Paris 
nor London had wished to see it discussed at the League. An Italian note 
-of 22 March had provided an excuse by finally agreeing to an arbitration 
commission, and the Council had again postponed any discussion until its 
next regular session in May. At the extraordinary meeting held in April 
following Stresal Laval and Simon had once more kept the issue off the 
'agenda. Such bad been the lack of progress and the general stalling 
tactics when Eden arrived at Geneva in May with instructions to raise 
the subject. After coveral days of private t_-Iks, he and Tav-, -' 3-rived 
at a procedure for the future. Italy acknowledged the League's standing 
in the dispute and accepted arbitration, but refused to promise the 
suspension of her military preparations. The Council set two time 
limits: 25 July for the constitution of the arbitration commission and 
25 August for a settlement. If either date was missed, the Council 
would meet to consider what further steps ought to be taken. For the 
first timet the League of Nations had actually set a deadline, but 
Italy had still managed to gain more time and had not had to halt her 
militar7 activities. Meanwhile, the. end of the rainy season was 
getting closer. - 
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Such was the general situation when on 7 June the British Govern- 
ment reconstituted itself. Stanley Baldwin, leader of the Conservative 
Party and the dominant figure in the National Governmentf finally became 
Prime Minister in place of the ailing Ramsay MacDonald. Sir John Simon 
moved to the Home Office and was replaced at the Foreign Office by Sir 
Samuel Hoare who came over from the India Office. Entering the Cabinet 
as Minister for League of Nations Affairs and joining Hoare as, in 
effect, a second Foreign Secretary was Anthony Eden. The new Cabinet 
contained twenty-two Ministers: 
Prime Minister 
Lord Chancellor 
Lord President 
Lord Privy Seal 
Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Home Secretary 
Foreign Secretary 
Colonial Secretary. 
Dominions Secretary 
Secretary for War 
. 
Secretary for India 
Secretary for Air 
Secretar, y for Scotland 
First Lord of the Admiralty 
President of the Board of Trade 
Minister of Agriculture 
President of the Board of 
Education 
Minister of Labour 
Stanley Baldwin 
Viscount Hailsham 
Ramsay MacDonald 
Marquess of Londonderry 
Neville Chamberlain 
Sir John Simon 
Sir Samuel Hoare 
Malcolm MacDonald 
J. H. Thomas 
Viscount Halifax 
Marquess of Zetland 
Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister 
Sir Godfrey Collins 
Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell 
Walter Ranciman 
Walter Elliot 
Oliver Stanley 
Ernest Brown 
J 
Minister of Health 
i 
First Commissioner of Works 
Minister for League of Nations 
Affairs 
Minister without Portfolio 
Sir Kingsley Wood 
William Ormsby-Core 
Anthony Eden 
Lord Eustace Percy 
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These men, along with a very few others, were in the position to 
influence the crucial decisions of the next several months. For most of 
them, as for Alfred Duff Cooperl. who became Secretar7 of War in November, 
Maurice Hankeyj Secretary to the Cabinet and eminence grise, Sir Austen 
. 
Chambe rlain, former Foreign Secretar7 and elder statesman of the 
Conservative Party, and Geoffrey Dawsont editor of The Timesp capsule 
biographies have been provided in Appendix I. Bat for Stanley Baldwing 
unquestionably the dominant figure in the Government, and for the three 
leading individuals at the Foreign Office, Hoare, Vansittart, and Eden, 
some greater detail about their personalities, beliefs, and policies 
is necessary. 
42 
Stanley Baldwin (1867-1947)t the only son of Alfred and Louisa 
Baldwin, was born iný Bewdly in Worcestershire into the upper middl e 
class. He was educated at Harrow and Trinity College Cambridge, where 
he managed a third in the historical tripos of 1888. Though he had felt 
a vague calling for the Churcht he eventually entered the family firm, 
an ironworksv where he was content for the next twenty years to remain 
second-in-command to his father. 
In 1908p aged 41, he succeeded his father, on the latter's death, 
as Member of Parliament for Bewdleyt a seat he held until bis elevation 
to the Lords in 1937. Prior to the war, he made only six full speeches, 
but in 1916 he became Parliamentary Private Secretary to Bonar Law and 
began his meteoric rise to power. In June of 1917, he was appointed 
127. 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, and in March. of 1921 he entered the 
Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade. Appalled by the 'morally 
repugnant' atmosphere of Lloyd George's Government, 
43 he led the revolt, 
in October of 1922, that culminated in the famous Conservative Party 
meeting at-the Carlton Clubt the consequent destruction of the Coalition, 
and the exile of Lloyd George into the political wilderness from where 
he was never to return. Overnight, Baldwin became a major leader among 
the Tories and was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer in the new 
Government of Bonar Law. The*following spring, he succeeded the latter 
as Prime Minister. His rise to the top had been astonishing and 
44 45 
unprecedented, amazing even himself. Once in power, he stayed 
there, three times Prime Minister (1923-1924,1924-1929f and 1935-1937) 
and the 'ruling force in British politics' until his retirement and 
46 
peerage in 1937. 
Baldwin was far from being the simple English pig farmer in which 
guise he sometimes depicted himself. Highly strung and suffering from 
the same nervous disability as his father, he also inherited, from his 
mother's side of the familyt the temperment of an artist - not that of -- 
scientist or a man of affairs. His cousin, Rudyard Kiplingg thought that 
he was the best writer in the family; both Hoare and Halifax referred 
48 
to the 'romantic streak' in his makeup; and Lloyd George once said of 
him that 'Baldwin is one of us; he is a Celt at heart and that is why so 
many of you find him difficult to understandi. 
49 The British people as 
a whole trusted Baldwin; to them he seemed to embody all that was good 
and solid and decent about Englandt particularly the countryside. And 
Baldwin merited this trust. He felt a deep duty and devotion to his 
homelandq havingg for example, in 19.19 anonymously donated E120,000 
(a fifth of his fortune) towards the payment of war debt; and, to a 
great extent, he succeeded in achievingt at least in political life, 
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what he onoe said was his abiding ambition, 'to prevent the olass war 
becoming a. realityt. 
50 In temperment, Stanley Baldwin was lazy and 
indolent, seldom reading the newspapers and not interested in the 
details of government. He cared about peoplep not policies, 
51 
and one 
of his strengths lay in his ability both to sense and to create moods 
and feelings; his greatest gift, he believed, was his understanding of 
the people of England. -The second of his strengths was his ability to 
rise to the occasion. 
52 Though at bottom lethargicl nevertheless, as 
the General Strike and the Abdication demonstrated, he was at his best 
in time of crisis. During Munich, he told a friend, U should have done 
it very differently... I love a crisi st. 
53 Simple on the surfacet 
33aldwin's character contained tremendous complexities and powers. 
His political style, reflected his personality. -'When it came to 
the question of what the Prime Minister should. 'do', the trouble was that 
he neither wished to do anything in particular norv indeed, believed 
that there was anything to be done that really mattered. Sooner or later, 
if the need for a policy or a measure was great enought the public would 
have it. . 
54 Oncet at the general election of 1.0,2: 3, io 
lead opinion, that time in favour of protection. He lost the election 
and never again tried to ran ahead of the feelings of the countr7.55 
As Prime Minister, he picked his Ministers with care and then let them 
get on unhindered with their jobs; his style closely paralleled that of 
Disraeli and was actually copied by*Harold Macmillan. Nevertheless, 
despite his apparent laxity, Baldwin remained the absolute master of his 
Cabinet, easily accessible to his colleagues, who knew that his support 
on contentious issues would be decisive. In a similar fashion, he 
exerted his control over the House of Commons, spending a considerable 
amQun t of time there and superb in understanding and moulding its atmo- 
sphere. 
56 He was also the most brilliant andjAf necessax7l ruthless 
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politician of his day: not only, according to Churchill, the greatest 
57' 
party manager the Conservatives ever had, but also unrivalled in his 
skill for personal political infighting. He took on and defeated all the 
giants of the period. He beat the press Lordst Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere, when they tried to oust him from power; he destroyed the 
Coalition and Lloyd George; he won out over Lord Curzon in the 
succession to Bonar Law; he kept Neville Chamberlain in thrall and 
avoided any challenge to his position; and he tamed the great men in his 
party, Austen Chamberlain, Birkenhead, and Churchill. In BeaverbrookIs 
words: 'He always won - he always beat me - the toughest and most 
unscrupulous politician you could find - coldq merciless in his 
dir. likess. 
58 
Wdwin's greatest weakness lay in the field of foreign affairs. 
He certainly held pronounced views on international relations, He hated 
bolshevism butq unlike many others in England, did not therefore have 
any liking for Germany; and, having read Mein Kampf, he was well aware 
of the nazi menace. He spoke French and, in so far as he ever liked or 
felt comfortable with foreigners, was pro-French; 'blat ho %-rac Ihorr_4-. PiJea 
at the moral corruption in French politics and placed little faith 
either in their methods of keeping the peace or in their likely strength 
in the event of war. 
59 He also had a fear of aerial bombing so intense 
as to verge on the obsessive; he vastly overrated, as was relatively 
common at the time, the value of air power. In the thirtiest he fully 
realized Britain's military weakness and the importance of rearming. 
33aldwin placed little faith in the League of Nations, a sentiment 
confirmed by the Manchurian crisis which convinced him both that economic 
sanctions would almost inevitably lead to war and that the support of 
the United St4tes was critical to Britain and the League. 
60 
Already in 
1923, he had settled Britain's war debt to the United States - on terms 
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that almost caused Bonar Law I to resign 
61 
- in order to establish 
cordial relations with the Americans; and on 23 November 1935 to a 
Conservative meeting in Glascow, he said: 
It is curious that there is growing among the 
Labour Party support for what is called a collective 
peace system. A collective peace systemq in my view, 
is perfectly impracticable in view of the fact today 
that the United States is not yet, to our unbounded 
regret, a member of the League of Nations and that in 
the last two or three years two great powersq Germany 
and Japan? have both retired from it. It is hardly 
worth considering when those be the facts. A collective 
peace system would never be undertaken without those 
countries. Of that I am certain, and, so long as-I have 
any responsibility in a Government for deciding whether 
or not this country shall join in a collective peace 
systemt I will say this: never as an individual will I 
sanotion the British Navy being used for an armed 
blockade of any country in the world until I know what 
the United States of America is going to do *62 
Though hardly a master of diplomacy, nor at ease with foreigners, nor 
well-versed in the details of foreign policyt Baldwin was aware of and 
concerned by the overall situation. His weakness lay elsewhere. It was 
a matter of style and, ironically, stemmed from what, in other contexts, 
were two of his strengths. In the first placet he was content to let his 
Foreign Secretary proceed as thii latter týought best; this policyg 
successful in the twenties with Austen Chamberlaing was to have unfortu- 
nate results in 1935 with Sam Hoare. Secondt and perhaps more important, 
was Baldwin's sensitivity to and refusal to outrun public opinion. In the 
first half of the thirties in general, and during the Italo-Ethiopian 
conflict in particulary this was to have disastrous consequences. 
The foreign policy of 33aldwin's third Government was conducted by a 
Foreign Office in which responsibility was unhappily divided between 
Sir Samuel Hoare, Foreign Secretax7q and Anthony Eden, Minister for 
63 
League of Nations Affairs. Behind the two of them was the dynamic 
Permanent Undersecretary, Sir Robert Vansittartt 
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Samuel Hoare (1880-1959) describes himself as 'having been brought 
up in a typical Victorian family, whose traditions had for many genera- 
64 tions been Quaker, Evangelicalv and family bankine'. Educated first 
at Harrow and then at New College Oxford, he took double firsts in 
classical honour moderations and modern history. He entered Parliament 
in 1910 for Chelseal the constituency he represented until 1944 when he 
became Viscount Templewood. Durin g the war, he served as a general staff 
officer, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, in the militax7 missions 
to Rassiav 1916-1917, and Italy, 1917-1918. Just after the catastrophe 
at Caporetto, Hoare became worried about the war-weariness in Italy and 
was put in touch with Mussolini, then editing Avanti, the socialist 
newspaper in Milan. Through an intermediary, the future Italian leader 
replied, -#I will mobilize the mutilati 
Ebands of toughs] in Milan, and 
they will break the heads of any paoifists who try to hold anti-war 
meetings in the street'. 
65 Mussolini fulfilled his promise and in later 
years, when he met Hoare, reminded the latter of their work together, 
During Hoare's tenure at the Foreign Office, he wrote personal letters 
-Lo I-Ilueeolinip mentioning this co-oneration and h^. p-; r. g t--t it =ight ha-ve 4: 1 r -- 
some effect on the present: 'Perhaps, also, I somewhat lightly flattered 
myself with the feeling that my past associations with the Duce might 
66 
still have some effect on him'. After the war, Hoare was one of those 
67 
who opposed conciliating Germany. He returned to Parliament, played 
an important supporting role in Baldwin's destruction of the Coalition 
; 68 
and became Air Secretar7 in Bonar Law's Goverment, a position he 
continued to holdp except for the Labour interlude of 1924# until 1929. 
In 1931t upon the formation of the National Goverment, Hoare went to 
I 
the India-office where, for a period of almost four years, he worked 
himself to a frazzle on the politically most contentious issue of the 
period: Indian independence. In the face of fierce Opposition from 
I 
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Churchill, and showing a superb command of detail, he piloted the 
Government of India Bill successfully through the House of Commons. 
In doing sol, he earned the respect of the country and his colleagues. 
He was noto howeverp well liked. Harold Macmillan's judgement is fair: 
'Sam Hoare conducted the Indian negotiations with precision and skill. 
But he 
. 
was not a favourite of the party or the House. He was too prim - 
69 
too old-maidishl. The general impression he gave was one of humour- 
lessness and lack of warmth. 
In Junep Hoare moved from the India Office to the Foreign Office. 
His reputation stood high, and Baldwin, though not personally close to 
him, had every reason to be confident in Hoare's abilitiesy especially 
as he was an expert on central Europe. Nevertheless, the appointment was 
not a happy oneq partly because in his years at the India Office he had 
been so overworked that he had little time to Pay close attention to 
foreign policy but primarily because his health rendered him incapable 
of the task. He was physically weak, mentally tiredl subject to fainting 
j 
spells, and by the beginning of August almost immobile from arthritis in 
his leg. 
70 
Hoare's Cabinet colleague at the Foreign Office was Anthony Eden. 
Born in 1898 and educated at Eton and Christ Church Oxford, he served 
with distinction as a Captain in the war, earning the ? 4ilitar7 Cross. 
He finally received his B. A. in 1922, with a first in oriental languages, 
and entered Parliament the following year, at the age of 26, in a 
byý-election at Warwick and Leamingtong which he represented until 1957. 
From 1926 to 1929, he was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Austen 
Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretar7. In 1931, he became Parliamentary 
Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, and on New Year's Day 1934 he was 
appointed Lord Privy Sealt though not in the Cabinet, with the same 
duties as before. 
33 "I'l 
In these years as a junior Minister at the Foreign Officep Eden 
became widely popular in the country and much liked by the Labour and 
Liberal. opposition. 
71 In the performance of his official duties, he 
spent a considerable amount of time at Geneva, and he became associated 
with the League of Nations and with attempts to make disarmament and 
collective security work. Eden was aq aware of the German threat and 
the necessity to rearm as anyone, but he held somewhat different 
attitudes to Geneva and to foreign policy in 1935 than either Hoare or 
Vansittart, placing greater faith in the League and less value on the 
Stresa Front than the other two. Sir Henry Channon's evaluation of him, 
written in December of 1935 upon his becoming Foreign Secretaz7l though 
somewhat acid, is not entirely lacking in point: 'Anthony Eden has been 
appointed Foreign Secretary by Mr. Baldwin. His appointment is a victory 
for "The Left", for the pro-Leaguers. He has had a meteoric rise, young 
Anthony. I knew him well at Oxford, when he was mild, aesthetic, hand- 
some, cultivated and interested in the East - now at thirty-eight he is 
Foreign Secretar7. There is hardly a parallel in our history. I wish him 
, 
3., ) g., yerated opinion-of his . oks- 
I like him, - latt I have never had an exe, 
brilliancel though his appearance is magnificentt. 
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The third of the leading figures at the Foreign Office was the 
Permanent Undersecretary, Sir Robert Vansittart '(1881-1957). 
73 Born 
into a distinguished family, he was educated at Eton where he was a fine 
athlete and an excellent scholar, specializing in languages and winning 
prizes in both German and French. After public schooll he travelled in 
Germany and France and then turned seriously to preparing himself for 
the diplomatic examination. Successfult he was posted to Paris in 1903, 
Tehran in 1907, and Cairo in 1909. In 1911, he returned to the Foreign 
office in London, becoming in 1920 an Assistant Secretar7. From that 
point until 1924, he was private secretary to the Foreign Secretary. 
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In 1928, he became private secretary to the Prime Minister, Stanley 
Baldwing with whom he established a close personal friendshipq though 
his influence declined in the 1930s. Vansittart continued in the same 
position under Ramsay MacDonald untill at the beginning of 1930, he was 
appointed Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office. He remained in 
that position until 1938 when he was promoted out of power to the 
specially created post of chief diplomatic adviser to the Government. 
Vansitt art was a. brilliant, quick-thinking, multi-talented man. A poet 
and a playwright as well'as a diplomat, he had once had, while posted in 
Francel. a play of hisp written and produced in French, performed on the 
Paris stage. In office, the never ditheredt nor did he ever fear respon- 
sibilitY'- 
74 His intelligence and forceful personality led to his 
dominating the Foreign Officel and his policies were greatly affected by 
his anti-German attitudes. He was a fervent francophile and a rabid 
germanophobe, his hatred of Germany being extreme - though events hardly 
proved him wrong. 
Unfortunatelyq the three leading figures at the Foreign Office 
were not in agreement on, how, to dea-1 with the italo-Eth4Acpi= conflict. 
Hoare and Vansittart emphasized, in the faoe of British military weak- 
nessp the importance of preserving the Anglo-French-Italian entente. 
Upon taking office, Hoare felt that rearmament was absolutely crucial 
but that the Government would not pursue it, because their electoral 
mandate was for economic reconstruction, because of the*pacifistl'pro- 
League of Nations, and pro-disarmament mood of the publicl and because 
of the widespread pro-Germang anti-French feelings. He wrote that 
- 'a consistent policy was impossible without power behind it, and there 
was no chance for at least three years of any rearmament programme 
75 
giving us the militax7 force that we needed#. Under these'circum- 
stances, Hoare immediately fell in line with Vansittart's ideas: 
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From the first moment, I came under the influence 
of his singleness of purpose. His creed was short 
and undeviating. He firmly believed in the reports 
of Hitler's aggressive plans, he was certain that 
the only method of blocking them was by British 
reamamentv and that as British rearmament would 
take years-to complete, the immediate need was to 
gain time and strengthen the allied front. 76 
For Hoare and Vansittart, strengthening the allied front meant preserving 
Anglo-Prench-Italian unity. The Stresa Front was an essential aspect of 
their policy to contain Germany. Anthony Eden, on the other hand, while 
equally aware of the German threat, believed much more strongly in the 
value of the League of Nations and felt that the potentially high cost 
of saving Stresa could turn out to be counterproductive. As he later 
wrote: 
-Vansittart held decided views on international 
affairs and his instincts were usually right, 
but his sense of the political methods that 
could be used was sometimes at fault. For 
instance, he clearly saw the growing military 
power and political ambition of Nazi Germany 
as the principal danger. To meet this he was 
determined to keep the rest of Europe in line 
against Germany, and would pay almost any price 
to do so. He did not discern that to appease 
Massolini beyond a certain point in Abyssinia 
must break up the alignment which Italy was 
intended to strengthen. 77 
Hoare and Eden held fundamentally different attitudes. In the 
context of the Italo-Ethiopian conflicto the former emphasized the 
importance of preserving the Stresa Front, but the latter felt it 
essential not to appease Mussolini too far and instead to-stand firmly 
against aggression and in support of the League of Nations and its 
principles. Already in May, the Foreign Office and the Cabinet had 
launched British policy on its dual line. The appointment of two Cabinet 
Ministers at the Foreign Office, each one preferring a different aspect 
of that dualismv ensured the continuation of this double line and-almost 
inevitably led to incompatibilities between its two aspects. In Baldwin's 
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new Govermment, the. dual line became a matter of bureaucracy and 
personality as well as one of well- or ill-considered policy, The 
structure of the British decision-making system the divided 
responsibility at the Foreign Office - in combination with the 
conflicting views of the two Ministers there ensured that the British 
Government would attempt to balance between the Stresa Pront and the 
League of Nations. 
For the next few months, four men held primary responsibility for 
the course of British foreign policy. The Cabinet as a whole debated 
the issues in detail, and many Ministers played important roles; but 
Hoare, Eden, and Vansittart made and directed policy. And behind them 
war, Stanley Baldwin, master politician and the one man who ultimately 
ran Cabinetv Parliament, and country., 
At the beginning of June, during his first days in office, Hoare 
conduýted several conversations, some alone with Vansittart, some 
including Eden as well, on the subject of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. 
They de-cided, that Eden should go to Rome and pres-, nt 1-4--c-calini vith the 
Zeila proposals which Simon had recommended in his memorandum of the 
previous May. Drummondt when asked for advice, agreedq feeling that the 
78 
Italian leader might interpret this approach favourably. 
When the new Cabinet met on 19 June, Hoare described the situation*79 
It had deteriorated considerably, he said, since Drummond's appreciation 
in MV* Massolinits enthusiasm had not waned, and Italian public opinion 
had grown to accept the inevitability of an invasion. Moreover, the 
French were showing every indication that they would support Italy and 
not the League. Ministerst impressed with the seriousness of the situa- 
tion and with the need to demonstrate to domestic and world opinion 
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-that they were doing something 'to avoid a catastrophett decided that 
the only way to persuade Mussolini not to invade Ethiopia would be to 
take some action at oncet and they authorized Eden to proceed in the 
manner already agreed to by himself, Hoare, and Vansittart. 
Thus, at the end of June, Anthony Eden travelled to Rome with the 
first specific plan for a compromise s9lution to the Italo-Ethiopian 
conflict. He proposed that, in return for the port of Zeila, Ethiopia 
would cede to Italy part of the arrid, semi-scrab land of the Ogaden 
adjoining the Italian colony of Somaliland, and he added that Britain 
would be willing to aid Italy in obtaining economic concessions from 
Haile Selassie. Mussolini knew the details of the British offer in 
I advance, not only 
because they had been leaked to the press but also 
because he was privy to all the diplomatic documents which passed 
through the British Embassy in Rome. This situation hardly facilitated 
British diplomacy or attempts at peace, especially as the Italians had 
purloined a copy of the Maffey Report which concluded that Britain's 
material interests in the area would in no way be affected by an Italian 
f" hiopia. Whether or not this forelmowled, 91, e made any occa. )-re. 
tjon of Pit CA 
difference, Massolini rejected Edents terms out of hand and stated that 
he would not settle for anything less than all the non-Amharic portions 
of Ethiopia, that is the entire country except the central plateau which 
could remain under Ethiopian sovereignty as long as it was plqced under 
Italian control. The alternativet he continued, 'was war and a complete 
80 
conques 
Having achieved nothing in Rome, Eden returned to London via Paris. 
In the French capital, he gainea the impression from talking to Laval 
that the latter was playing a complex double game trying to satisfy both 
33ritain and Italy and hoping that some solution would somehow materialize. 
81 
Similarly, Sir George Clerkv the British Ambassador# reported that it was 
138. 
unlikely that the French Premier woula support any policy entailing 
placing pressure on Mussolini. 
82 
When the Cabinet met on 3 July, they 
were apprehensive about this apparent lack of French co-operation and 
about the consequences that might arise in the event of economic 
sanctions eventually being imposed on Italy. 
83 
At their next meeting 
on 10 July, Ministers learned that the arbitration commission which 
the League had set up in MV had broken up in deadlock. 
84 
For the 
next two -weeks they temporized, waiting upon events; but finally on 
24 July, with the League shortly to meet, they agreed that Hoare should 
attempt to pressure the French to bo-operate in inducing Mussolini to 
modify his attitude and that Eden should pursue the same policy at the 
League. One line having failed at Rome, the other was now to be tried 
at Geneva. 
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The Council met on 31 July. All the delegates were waiting and 
willing to follow the British lead, but the result was substantially 
another delay. Ethiopia agreed not to debate the ownership of Wal Wall 
and Italy acquiesced to the appointment of a fifth, neutral arbitrator. 
The arbitration commission was ordered to report by 4 Septemberv on 
which date the Council would meet againt regardless of any progress or 
lack thereof, to examine the situation. The Council also authorized 
another attempt by Britain, France, and Italy to discuss some basis for 
a compromise. Ethiopia was excluded from these talks, but the British 
and French promised to keep her informed and to take no decision 
without her consent. 
86 
These Tripartite talkst as they were called, began in Paris in the 
middle of August- 
87 
To determine the British linet Baldwing Hoaret 
FAenp Vansittart, and Hankey met on, 6 August (by this time Parliament 
was in recess, Ministers on vacation, and a Cabinet could not easily be 
held). 
88 It was decided that Eden and Vansittart should j; o to Paris, 
139. 
there to work closely with the French and in preliminax7 discussions 
with them to establish a programme which would bring home to the 
Italians that they had two choices: either to accept limited con- 
oessions from Ethiopia or to bring upon themselves action from the 
League. This position did not please Laval, but he agreed and in the 
actual discussions loyally supported his English colleagues. The 
suggested compromise admitted the Italian need for expansion and raw 
I 
materials, and recognized the preponderant interests of Italy in 
Ethiopia. Laval recommended, for examplel economic concessions, the 
appointment of Italian technical advisers, and the granting of rights 
of settlement in'certain areas. The way was-also left open for some 
exchange of territory along the lines of Eden's previous offer in 
June. The Anglo-French proposals were tabled on 16 August. Two days 
later, Aloisi, the Italian representativet rejected them. 
89 
Massolini 
still wanted the same demands he had made to Eden a month and a half 
previously. The conference adjourned indefinitely. 
Before he-left Paris, Eden sent a secret despatch to Hoare. 
He noted that British milittary propavations &E: ainst a possib3a attAnk- 
in the Mediterranean were weak and that either Ministers must rectify 
this quickly on their own initiative or else a special meeting must 
be called before the end of the month (the Cabinet were not scheduled 
to meet next until 23 September). 
90 Hoarej. who had heard rumours from 
several sources that Mussolini was planning what was called a 'mad dogs 
act against the British fleet and Malta, agreed and asked Eden to 
telephone Baldwin, vacationing as usual at Aix-les-Bainso to arrange 
it. 91 Thus, the Cabinet were summoned for an emergency session on 
22 Ailgust- I 
140. 
Four days before the meeting, in a letter to Neville Chamberlain, 
Hoare wrote that 
it is urgently necessary for the Cabinet to 
consider what in these circumstances our attitude 
should be on two assumptions: (1) that the*French 
are completely with us, (2) that the French have 
backed out. It is equally urgent for the Cabinet 
to consider what preparations should be made to 
meet a possible mad dog act by the Italians.... 
Our line, I am surep is to keep in step with the 
Frenchp and, whether now or at Geneva, to act 
with them. 92 
Theng in the two days prior to the Cabinet meeting,. Hoare talked to 
some of the political leaders outside of the Government. Austen 
Chamberlain warned that the British public would not be satisfied with 
a policy of inaction or despair. Herbert Samuel, the Liberal leader, 
noted that there were two conditions necessary for any economic action: 
it must be collective and involve full Anglo-French co-operation. Lloyd 
George, like Chamberlain, emphasized that League. procedures must be 
tried out and that this intention must be impressed upon the French, 
especially Laval who must be left in no doubt about Britain's willing- 
ness to play her part. Lansburyt not yet replaced by Attlee as the 
Labour leader, also stated that the League must be tried - even at the 
risk of failure. He added that he was anxious to help the Govermment, 
as long as they stuck to the Covenant. Lord'Robert Cecil said that the 
League of Nations Union would also support efforts to carry out the 
Covenant. Finally, Churchill spoke his piece. He pressed, as befitted 
a former and future First Lord of the Admiraltyp for reinforcement of 
-the Mediterranean fleett and he advocated collective action. He warmed 
f 
that the collapse of the League would drastically weaken the anti- 
German front in the future. 
93 While Hoare's own words reveal his 
preference for following the French - and consequently for preserving 
141. 
I 
the Stresa Front - Parliamentax7 and public opinion, as well as 
Anthony Eclen, were pushing for Britain-to support the League of 
Nations and to take the lead at Geneva. 
On 22 August, in the middle of the $silly season', the Cabinet 
convened, for one of the two most important meetings held on the subject 
of Ethiopia. 
94 Ministers considered agreat deal of information, 
discussed the entire*situation in detail, and determined the official 
policy which was to be followed right up to their meeting on 2 December, 
on the eve of Sir Samuel Hoare's trip to Paris. 
For'the first time, the Cabinet looked at the Maffey'Report. 
Written from 'the narrow standpoint of British material interests in 
and near Ethiopialf it concluded that, while it would be preferable 
were Ethiopia to retain her independencep an Italian conquest would 
only slightly threaten Britain's concerns in the area. It did not, 
however, deal with either the possible effects on Ethiopia herself or 
the international implications of an invasion. The Maffey Report only 
r `1 c. , C--4 cvcr-jonc already 
]maw: the -roU --n "or the GovexTinent A"--- k, 
was one of European politics and domestic opinion and not who would 
rule Ethiopia. 
The Cabinet also considered a report on the probable effects of 
economic pressure on Italy. 
95 The imposition Of sanctions would not 
hurt Britain significantlyl býcause her financiil relations with Italy 
were relatively unimportant. Other-League members would undoubtedly 
follow whatever lead they reoeived from Britain and France, but the 
co-operation of Germanyp Japan, and the United States was problematical. 
The application of any measures at sea which went beyond the American 
conception of belligerent rights could lead to the United States's 
becoming definitely obstructive. The report went on to point out that 
142. 
Italy's economic position was poor; her geographical characteristics 
and her lack of essential war materialg including coal and oil$ rendered 
her particularly vulnerable to economic sanctions. The gold value of the 
lira was extremely strainedl and serious foreign exchange problems 
existed. Moreover, Italy's East African position was at the mercy of 
the closure of the Suez canal, and there was no question but-that the 
canal could be legally closed. Any request to this effect by the Council 
of the League would override the users' Convention and would even 
encompass neutral shipping carrying Italian goods. The report warned, 
however', that closing the canal would entail risking the possibility 
of war with Italy. Similarly, to effectively embargo imports into Italy, 
it might be necessary, failing the co-operation of the non-member states, 
to impose a blockade and invoke belligerent rights. This, toov could 
very well lead to war. The report clearly warned that to make sanctions 
effective could involve Britain in a conflict with Italy. 
This danger was considered to be very real and was the subject of 
the most i. mportant document the Cabinet examined. 
96 Two very recent 
- 11 cl appreciations of the military sitliation by iolla ChicAr, of' %Pt&Cf jon'kej 
in detail at all the possible contingencies in the event of sanctions 
and wary compared Britisho Frencht and Italian strength around the 
Mediterranean, and recommended certain measures of reinforcement of 
naval, airl and ground forces. The observations of the Chiefs hardly 
imbued Ministe rs with confidence. They warned that any naval engagement, 
even if Britain were supported by other nationst would result in the 
further reduction of'an already weak fleet 'to such an extent as to be 
unable to fulfil its world wide responsibilitiest. In the air, , 
reinforcement of the Mediterranean with forces drawn from the home 
defences would 
143. if 
materially affect the air defence of Great Britain 
and disjoint the arrangements at present in hand 
for attaining air parity with Germany by April 
1937; moreover the existing arrangements for the 
reinforcement of Singapore could not be counted 
upon in the case of an epergency of the kind now 
under consideration. 
The Chiefs also warned that at least two months notice would be 
necessary for British forces to be ablq to effectively co-operate on 
a war bar-is. Thereforet at the-forthcoming Geneva meetings at the 
beginning of September, nothing should be undertaken which would 
precipitaýe hostilities, and any contemplated action should be delayed 
until the military have had time to make adequate preparations: 
Any idea that sanctions can be enforced whenever 
diplomatically desirable is highly dangerous from 
the point of view of the services, and we urge that 
no measures almost certain to lead to war, such as 
the closing of the Suez canal, should be taken until 
the services are prepared. 
The Chiefs asked for a decision as soon as possible on their recommended 
me 
, 
asures. Finally, they raised the all-important question of the 
attitude of the French government: 
we desire to stress that the moral and political 
co-operation of France is not sufficient, Her 
assured military supportg concerted with ourselves 
before the League Council meeting of the 4th 
September, is essential. Without thatv there is 
great risk of all active measures, together with 
the onus which they will carry with them, falling 
on ourselves alone with serious consequences. 
The military situation as set out by the Chiefs of Staffq like the 
e- conomic appreciation from thb Committee-of 
Impdrial Defenceý hardly 
encouraged the Government to act precipitously to oppose Italy. 
97 
The Cabinet also considered the record of a preliminary meeting 
, held 
the previous day. 
98 Present had been Edeng Hoarev Baldwin, Ramsay 
14acDonaldl Neville Chamberlain, and Simon. Eden reported on the 
failure of the Tripartite talks. Despite his warnings that Britain 
would not tolerate a military and economic occupation of Ethiopia, 
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Aloisi had completely rejected the Anglo-French proposals and instead 
put forward outrageous demands; if it came to war he had saidt Italy 
would wipe Ethiopia off the map. The good news, Hoare reported, was 
France's apparent sticking with Britain in the face of Italian pressurev 
and Eden added that Vansittart had received the impression from Uger, 
his counterpart at the Quai d'Orsay, that France would participate in 
economic sanctions. As the discussion among the Ministers proceded, 
Chamberlain pointed out that even the mildest of such measures could 
lead to-war, and therefore steps should be taken to put the armed forces 
into a state of readiness. The general tone of this preliminary meeting 
was thatTrance must not be alienated nor Italy provoked, that a war in 
East Africa was probablej that Britain would most likely have to resort 
to sanctionsp and that the country must be militarily prepared. 
On 22 Augustj with this large amount of information in hand, the 
Cabinet considered the situation. Hoare reported-in detaill and Ministers 
then discussed'the entire problem in all its ramificationst domestic and 
internationall--political and economic. In the course of the meeting, 
n,; wy references-were made to the unfortunate Offoct on 'British diplorf-4cy 
of the nation's military weaknesst and the Cabinet 'were most anxious 
if possible to avoid a war, with Italy which it was generally recognized 
would be a grave calamity'. Ministers made several important decisions. 
They authorized considerable reinforcement of the Mediterranean fleet 
as well as measures strengthening the army and air force-99 They also 
agreed that the Committee on Defence Policy and Requirements (DPR) 
should examine the situation in detail. 
100 But the two most important 
decisions were 
a) That the delegates of the United Kingdom at the 
forthcoming meetings at Geneva should be autho- 
rized to reaffirm the statements that had been 
made in Parliament as to our intention to 
fulfil our Treaty obligations. 
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and I 
b) That they should keep in step with-the policy 
of the French Governmentp and, more particularly 
in the matter of sanctions, they should avoid 
any commitment which France was not equally 
prepared to assume. 
These two decisions put Government policy on a fixed course for 
the next four months. The Cabinet agreed to proceed'on the basis of 
that double line set at the Foreign Office. On the one hand, Britain 
would support Ethiopia, the League, and collective action'; on the other 
handq she would keep in step with the French and take no action that 
might harm-Anglo-French relations, alienate Italy, precipitate a 
Mediterranean war, and destroy the Stresa Front. 
Hoare and Eden now had to translate this general attitude into a 
specific policy to be pursued at the upcoming meetings at Geneva. The 
Council was to deal with the findings of the arbitration commission, 
and the Assembly, in its annual gatheringt would consider the entire 
Italo-Ethiopian conflict. 
On 2 Supte. -Ober, Eden was again on -route to Geneva. ACCOr---4L. A by 
Vansittart, he stopped in Paris for an hour of conversation with Laval 
and L6ger. The French Premier put one crucial question. He asked for 
assurances that Britain would be as firm in upholding the Covenant in 
the future with respect to Europe (an obvious allusion to Germany) as 
she presently appeared-to be with respect to Ethiopia. Eden replied 
that the future depended upon the success of the League in the present. 
Laval retorted that such was the response he had expected but that it 
did not really answer the'question. Eden-could not give him any 
stronger assurances: 'the British Government's wariness and the state of 
our defences made it impossible for me to promise unconditional support 
146. 
of the Covenant for the future, reeardless of the outcome of the 
present dispute. Like it or notv Abyssinia had become a touchstones. 
101 
Laval was not really so devious and double-dealing as the British 
consistently made him out to be. He was far from the most straightfor- 
ward of individuals, and his actions in 1935 tend to be interpreted 
in the light of his Vichy future; but he genuinely faced problems over 
Ethiopia. He had to deal with public opinion, much of which, on the 
Right, was pro-fascist and pro-Italian - and 1935 marked the apogee of 
the right-wing Leagues like the Croix de Feu and Action Frangaise. 
Furthermorej by pursuing their double line; the British Government gave 
him no clear indication of what they would do. Undoubtedlyt he greatly 
valued the Stresa Front, one. of the set pieces of the French system of 
anti-German allianceso but he probably would have followed a clear 
British lead in support of the League - had he ever received one. 
Britain, after all, was the most important ally France had. As it was, 
like the British, he tried to play both ends and - also like the 
Mritish - he was to end up with neither. 
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Fro-ru Paris$ Eden journeyed on to Geneval where lfhfý ronncil convened 
on 4 September to hear the report of the arbitration commission and to 
examine separate Italian and Ethiopian notes. The elephantine labours of 
the commission had produced a mouse: it decided, without having called 
as a witness the British Colonel who had been at Wal Walo that the 
incident had been no one's fault. 
103 The Italian note set out the 
details of alleged Ethiopian atrocities and described that country's 
failure to live up to her responsibilities as a member of the League. 
For her part, Ethiopia asked for action to be taken, under Articles 10 
and 15 of the Covenant, to safeguard the peace. The Council established 
I the Committee of Pive (Britaing France, Polandl Spaint and Turkey) to 
make another attempt at a solution. It then adjourned. 
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Hoare arrived in Geneva a few days after Eden and Vansittart. 
He knew that public opiniont at home and abroad, wanted to see an 
effective League; he knew that it could prove valuable against Germany. 
He also knew that the Foreign Office had almost given up the League for 
dead, that the Cabinet were far from solidly behind it, and that the 
Stresa Front formed an integral part of British policy. He was worried, 
about a possible war in the Mediterranean and the apparent lack of 
French assistancel and he was unwilling to push Laval into making a firm 
commitment. Neverthelesst he decided to try to make-a stirring speech 
which might mobilize the League. As he recalls in his memoirs: 
I accordingly determined to make a revivalist 
appeal to the Assembly. At best, it might start 
a new chapter of League recovery, at worst, it 
might deter Mussolini by a display of League 
fervour. If there was any element of bluff in 
itj it was a moment when bluff was not only 
legitimate but inescapable. 
104 
On 9 September, the Assembly began its annuýl session. The rainy 
season in Ethiopia had almost ended, and there was little doubt that 
invasion was imminent. For the first time, the entire membership of the 
League of Nations considered the Italo-Ethiopian problem. Sir bamuel 
Hoare himself gave the lead. On 11 September, in resounding terms, he 
pledged full support for collective resistance to aggression. His 
promise elicited overwhelming approval: 'not for years has any speech 
at a League assembly by a British delegate made such an impression as 
this speech did this morning, and this was due not to its oratorical 
qualities but to its matter'. 
105 Similarlyq in its leading editorial 
of 12 September, The Times pronounced that 'his speech will rank high 
as an authoritative and historic declaration of British policy. Without 
doubtt he has succeeded in expressing the views, not only of the 
Government I sic] 
, 
but of the country as a whole'. Hoare convinced 
opinion at Genevap and at home, that Britain intended forcefully to 
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uphold the principles of the League. Virtually every member now aligned 
herself in support of the Covenant; even Laval, in his speech on the 
morning of the 13tht followed suit. 
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The day after the Foreign 
Secretary's oration, adding weight to his words and reinforcing the 
impression of Britain's steadfastness, a large portion of the Home 
fleet, including the battle-cruisers Hgod and Renown, arrived at 
Gibraltar. 107 
Appearances were deceptive, however. Hoare was indeed bluffing. 
Though in public he and Laval fully supported a League policy, in 
private they inclined much more to the compromise solution they had 
been pursuing all along. In conversations they held on the loth and 
11th',, Laval stated that international morals were one thing, the 
interests of a country another. Hoare did not assume so extreme a 
position. He stated that the double line of policy was essential and 
that Britain could not support any proposal giving Italy militax7 
control over Ethiopia, 
108 but he agreed that they must avoid provoking 
Mussolini into open hostility and that 
a-rAy economic, pressura upon. whicla the Leagun 
collectively decided should be applied cautiously 
and in stages, and with full account of the 
unescapable fact that the United States, Japan 
and Germany were not Member States of the League. 
In Laval's wordsl we had 'to prevent Mussolini 
being driven into the German camp'. log 
As the French Premier was later to say publically: 
We found ourselves instantly in agreement upon 
ruling out military sanctionsq not adopting any 
measures of naval blockade, never contemplating 
the closure of the Suez Canal - in a word we 
agreed to rule out everything that might lead 
to war. 110 
Having taken one line in public and the other in private, -Hoare 
returned to London. In Geneva, the League continued with other businesep 
awaiting either invasion or the success of the Committee of Five. After 
149. 
several meetings, the Five produced a quite detailed report which would 
have placed'Ethiopia under an international mandate administered by the 
Leagueg thereby preserving her territorial integrity and leaving her 
sovereignty nominally intact. Whatever the intentions of the drafters, 
the proposals nowhere mentioned Italy or special Italian interests. 
However, there were two accompanying protocols issued jointly in the 
name6 of the French and British governments. The first repeated the 
previous offer to Ethiopia of a port in order to facilitate 'territorial 
adjustments' between her and Italy. The second stated that Britain and 
France were 'prepared to recognise a special Italian interest in the 
economic development of Ethiopia. Consequently these Governments will 
look with favour on the conclusion of economic agreements between Italy 
and Ethiopia'. The proposals were vague enough to be acceptable to the 
League, yet at the same time they afforded Mussolini much of what he 
. 
claimed. Nevertheless, on 22 Septemberg he rejected them, albeit in 
terms-encouraging further attempts at a settlement.. The following day 
Haile Selassie accepted them. On 24 September, the Five admitted failure 
an! referrcd the matter back to the Comcil. 
ill 
The British Government continued with their double line. In public 
and through Eden in Geneva, they supported the League. In London, 
however, Hoare still hoped to'preserve the Stre6a Front. On the evening 
of 24 Septemberl just after the Five had transferred authority for a 
solution back to the Council, Eden received from the Foreign Secretary 
an instruction which read: #I trust you will not allow any haste on the 
Council in regard t. o the discussion of sanctions'. 
112 That same day, 
Dr=mond handed Mussolini a personal message of friendship from 
150. 
113 Sir Samuel Hoare. Three days laterg on 27 September, Vansittart 
added to Dino Grandi, the Italian Ambassador in London, that Britain 
did not intend either militax7 sanctionsl or the closure of the Suez 
canal, or any isolated act against Italy. 
114 
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Chapter Six 
The Second Decision Situation: 
Prom ýhe invasion to The Hoare-Laval Plan 
I 
I 
On 3 October, the long-awaited invasion of Ethiopia finally began. 
-It confronted the British Government with the start of a new decision 
situation. They now had to deal with war itself rather than the mere 
-threat ofwar. The potential conflict between their two lines of policy 
became a real-one. Support for the League of Nations entailed actually 
taking concrete measures against Italyq thereby threatening to alienate 
the French, endanger the Stresa Frontp and possibly even result in a 
Mediterranean war. However, continuing to search for an Anglo-French 
compromise acceptable to Mussolini ran the distinct risk of appearing 
to reward a&gressionl thereby threatening to further weaken and probably 
destroy the League. The invasion of Ethiopia aggravated the Government's 
dilemma. As difficult and unsuccessful as trying to prevent the war had 
been, stopping it promised to be even costlier. 
In Londong the Cabinet met four times between the invasion and the 
dissolution of Parliament on 25 October for the general election. 
' 
Ministerst concerns remained substantially the same as-they had been at 
the Cabinet of 22 August. They supported Ethiopia, but certainly not 
wholeheartedly: though favouring a fair settlement, they meant this to 
include territorial exchanges and economic concessions by Haile Selassie. 
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They examined a pessimistic'report on the probable effectiveness of 
sanctions and were sceptical about how well they would work; 
2 
never- 
theless, they decided to support them in principle and to go along with 
those, initially recommended by the League. Tentatively, they also agreed 
thatl if the producing states imposed an oil embargo, Britain would join 
in and consider one on coal. The Cabinet felt, however, that support for 
any of these measures depended upon full co-operation from all League 
members, particularly in the event of an attack on Britain's Mediter- 
ranean forcesy upon the behaviour of the non-members of the League, 
especially the United Statest and upon the attitude of France. Ministers 
believed that French aid was crucial but doubted that it would be forth- 
coming; and, given their fears about a possible mad doe act, it is not 
surprising that at their meetings during October their enthusiasm for 
sanctions varied directly with the latest appreciation of the likelihood 
of French support. There was talk of putting pressure on Laval, but 
Stanley Baldwin 'reminded the Cabinet that we must be careful not to be 
drawn into a quarrel with the French as well as with Italy as a result 
of what was happening at Geneval., Finally, at thesr4 m-9011cs, Ministers 
voiced concern, in the light of the upcoming electionp about public 
opinion and the political*situation. 
In general, the Government continued to pursue their double line. 
At the final Cabinet meeting before the dissolution, 
3 Hoare informed 
his colleagues that he had sent Maurice Peterson, the Ethiopian expert 
at the Foreign Officeito Paris to conduct negotiations. To compensatet 
and to lay to rest the unease over this expressed in the press-and in 
the Housep the Cabinet directed Eden to tell Parliament in the after- 
noon that Inotwithstanding any conversations that might take place with 
a view to the settlement of the Abyssinian dispute, nothing would be 
settled except within the framework of the League of Nations% Ministers 
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agreed that this point should be strongly made in public. Thus whilq 
privately searching for a compromiseg publically the Government, partly 
out of genuine conviction and partly out of political expediency, 
maintained their support for Ethiopia and the League. Aggravating this 
dualism was the split between the beliefs and the preferences of the 
two Cabinet Ministers at the Foreign Office. Hoare, backed by Vansittart, 
had already-before the invasion reassured Mussolini concerning British 
4 intentioxist and afterwards in October was trying to move slowly with 
sanctions while pushing hard for a settlement to bq found in Paris, 
5 
Eden, however, was all for a strong pro-League line and was leading the 
sanctionist front at Geneva; he was the driving force in all the various 
committees dealing with Ethiopia. 
6 
Certainly the League, under this British leadership, reacted 
swiftly to the Italian invasion. Both the Council and the Assembly 
declared*Italy an 
. 
aggressor in violation of the Covenant. 
7 Theng for 
the purpose of organizinz --anctions, the Ar-zc:,, bl,, r rCconstituted itrelf 
as a Co-ordinating Committee, which in turn established, for convenience, 
the smaller Committee of Eighteen that actually did all the work. 
8 
From 11 to 19 October, the Eighteen held its first session and arrived 
at five proposals. Eden suggested anýembargo on export of arms to Italy 
and a prohibition on loans and credits to the Italian government and 
companies. The Eighteen immediately adopted these two sanctions. The 
third proposal# again recommended by Eden, banned all imports from 
9 Italy, and the fourth, put forward by Robert Coulondre the French 
representative, extended the list of war materiel to be embargoed. 
10 
The fifth applied not to relations with Italy but to those among the 
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sanctionist states and provided for mutual support among them. The last 
three proposals were to be submitted to the various governments for 
approvalo and the Eighteen agreed to reconvene at the beginning of 
November to set a date for their commencement. 
The two Committees met again between 31 October and 6 November. 
The Chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee reported that acceptance 
of the first four proposals, the sanctions themselves, had been 
virtually unanimous, that 39 of 50 governments had agreed to the 
recommendation on mutual support, and that the United States had already 
prohibited the export of war materiel to either party. The Committee 
agreed that the third and fourth sanctions should come into effect on 
18 November and then adjourned without setting a definite date for its 
next session; 
The Eighteen continued to meet and adopted in principle an embargo 
on all petroleum products. On 7 November, the Secretary General of the 
League communicated this proposal to the member governments. 
While Eden was leading the League in its pursuit of sanctions, 
the British Government also continued after the invasion to follow the 
second of their two lines of policy. Contact among the Tripartite powers 
had never broken offj and the Anglo-French attempts at a compromise went 
on. 
" Towards the end of October, Peterson travelled to Paris where he 
and his counterpart at the Quai d'Orsay, the Comte de Saint Quentin, 
12 
arrived at possible terms for a settlement. In the final week of the 
monthl'outlines of their new proposals appeared in the British papers. 
These reports varied in specific detail, but they all bore a strong 
family resemblance to what was eventually to become known as the 
Hoare-Laval Plan. 13 Nothing, howevert came of these discussions* 
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The Cabinet never considered any of the proposals, and Peterson himself 
was recalled to London for the latter part of the campaign and the 
election - presumably as an electoral precaution. 
On 1 November, just after this flurz7 of press reports, Hoare and 
Laval met at Geneva for the second session of the Co-ordinating 
Committee. The French Premier proposed thatt with the help of the 
Belgian delegate, M. van Zeeland, they should transfer the task of 
conciliation, which had reverted to the Council after the failure in 
September of the Committee of Five, back to a smaller group. The 
following davv after the two suggested that Britain and Prance continue 
to seek a solution, van Zeeland recommended that the League entrust this 
job to them. The minutes of the meeting record that the Co-ordinating 
Committee 'took note of the desire expressed by the Belgian delegatel. 
14 
No legal mandate was involvedv but a 'moral mandate' was spoken of by 
15 
many diplomats and journalists. That evening, -in a classic example 
of misperception and inaccuracyq Hoare telegraphed to London that 'this 
proposal was warmly supported by most of the other speakers and opposed 
by none. It was clear that _4t represented the un=imous sonso of tho 
16 
meeting'. Hoare's appreciation of the situation was not entirely 
accurate. Rather than bolster the propriety of the Anglo-French talks, 
this attempt created confusion and mistrust'in the minds of some who 
would otherwise have accepted the explanations given by Hoare and Laval 
and aroused ta feeling of uneasiness which marred the unanimity of this 
last meetingt. 
17 Nevertheless, for what it was wortht the two men had 
secured the tacit assent of the sanotionist members of the League for 
their pursuit of a compromise. They had established a basis for any 
future defence of the legitimacy of the Paris discussions. 
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k 
When Hoare returned to-London, it was to participate in the 
ongoing election campaign. Parliament had been dissolved on 25 October. 
In Genevat the League was pursuing sanctions; in Paris, Peterson, until 
he was s=moned back to London, continued to meet with Saint Quentin; 
but in Britain, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict was only one of several 
issues. Though Peterson's telegrams described in detail the Paris 
proceedingst busy Ministers, caught up in campaigningt had no time to 
follow the matter closely. 
18 
After four years in office, the Government had called the election 
in order to capitalize on their Popularityq due in large measure to 
their apparent support for the League of Nationsp so as to renew their 
huge majority in the House of Commons and remain in power for anoiher 
term. They also hoped to gain a mandate to rearm, and Baldwin had 
19 
initially intended this to be central to the campaig m. His intentions 
remained unfulfilled, as the Government minimized rather than stressed 
rearmament. The real issue was 'which party can be trusted to promote 
peace abroad and prosperity at home?. 
20 As far as prosperity-was 
concerned, 10,35 was, a good year in Britain, and-v-hether or not tho 
Government were responsible they were bound to get credit. With respect 
to peace, they emphasized their support for the League and, instead of 
accenting the importance of rearmament, promised only the minimum 
necessary to repair the gaps in the country's defenoes (in practiceg 
they may have felt that this amounted to the same thing, but the 
emphasis and consequent effect on public opinion were very different). 
At the beginning of October, Baldwin had already promised, 'I Sive you 
MY 
. 
word there will be no great armaments'; 
21 
and in his final message 
to the nation, almost on the eve. of the election, he pledged 
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the National Goverment to work faithfully for 
security at home and peace throughout the world. 
spending not a penny more on our own Defence Forces 
than is necessary for the safety of our people, and 
striving always to bring the nations into agreement 
for the all round reduction of armaments in a world 
where collective security has been made the sure 
protection against aggression. 22 
The Foreign Secretary did call more strongly for rearmament as British 
defences 'had got down to bed-rock minimum', but'he too dismissed all 
charges that the Government were attempting to undermine Geneva and 
stated that a strong League of Nations was the best safeguard for 
peace. 
23 In a speech to his constituents,. Hoare denied that there 
was any wrongdoing in the Paris talks or that there was any endeavour 
to go behind the back of the League: 
Our policy has always been perfectly simple - 
namely, loyalty to the League and readiness to 
help with any honourable settlement of the dispute 
that is acceptable to the three parties concerned - 
the Leaguev Italyt and Abyssinia. 24 
Overallp the campaign portrayed the Government as staunchly defending 
the League and the principles behind it and not planning any great 
increasee in military spending... A newspaper not particularly friendly 
to them could write that, on issues of international relations, 'if the 
Government means what it says, only a small minority of electors in all 
25 
parties disagrees'. 
Voting took place on 14 November. The Government won a resounding 
victoryt ending up with 432 seats, down from the abnormal results of 
26 1931 but still a ma 0 st 250. Their'excellent showing i rity of almo 
was due to economic recovery, to inertia from the previous skewed 
representation in the Commons, to reluctance to rock the boat and lack 
of confidence in a Labour alternative, and -to the great personal trust 
in the leadership of Stanley Baldwin. The result also stemmed from the 
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t 
generally held belief that-the Goverment were determined to support 
the League and stop Italian aggression. As Harold Macmillan wrote: 
But if the Government had won a great electoral 
victory by a skilful timing of the election - as 
they were quite entitled to do - they were in 
honour bound to carry out what, in spite of a 
sentence here or there of reservation, was 
believed by the people to be their clear and 
determined intention - to stop Mussolini. When 
the House of Commons met ifi November, no one - 
inside or outside Parliament - doubted that this 
was their firm purpose. 27 
By the time that Baldwin's new Government first discussed Ethiopia, 
on 2 December, matters were rapidly mounting to a climax. The crux of 
the situation had become the proposed embargo on oil and petroleum 
products. Unlike most other measures, this one promised to be quick and 
effective and rapidly to resolve the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. 
No . industrial country could exist for long without oil, and no 
modem army could function without it. The Italian economy, with 
unemployment having risen steadily since 1930,28 was not in good shape 
to begin with and had been further weakened by the burden of financing 
the campaign in East Africa. On 20 Octobery the Bank of Italy had 
ceased to publish figures on its gold reservest and a month later the 
21 
lira had been devalued by nearly 25 per cent. Sanctions were beginning 
to have some effectv and economic experts, including Keynes, believed 
that in the long ran they would have grave repercussions. 
30 But how 
long was the long run? As one newspaper put it in the middle of 
Novemberl while 'the Ethiopian adventure must sooner or later lead to 
a collapse in Italy's trade and financial resources', she twould 
probably be able to resist the sanctions which are imposed today for 
some time ahead without apparent difficultiest. 
31 An oil embargo would 
e 
t. 
drastically shorten this, pdriod. It would also probably ensure the 
failure of the invasion itself. On the battlefield, after initial 
32 
successes on both fronts, - Italian progress had ground-to a halt. The 
logistical and geographical difficulties and de Bono's extreme caution 
and lack of self-confidence meant that Mussolinits orders to advance 
had been ignored and that movement had slowed almost to a standstill, 
Consequentlyv on 16 November, the Duoe sacked de Bono and replaced him 
with Marshall Pietro Badoglio, who, unlike his predecessorp was 
competent. - However, wishing to secure his flanks and assure his supplies, 
]3adoglio similarly disregarded orders for an immediate advance. In 
33ritain at this point, most expert opinion anticipated that Italy would 
have a difficult time in completing her conquest. At least two 
campaigning seasons were foreseen. 
33 Though in a pitched battle 
superior Italian firepower would inevitably triumph, the Ethiopians 
could #indefinitely harass' Mussolini's army if they stuck to guerilla 
warfare. 
34 Expert opinion was wrong, of course; as were the views of 
almost all of the war correspondents. Italian troops were to enter 
Ae, dis Ababa in May of 1936 with-relative ease. This outvome wes, obviou& 
to the few correspondents who covered the war from the Italian-side, 
but almost all of themg including Evelyn Waughp chose or were ordered 
to Addis Ababay where they could get no information, from where they 
filed the most absurd stories on what they believed to be happening, 
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and from where certain of them actually fabricated the reports they 
sent to their newspapers. 
35. The general feeling was that the Italian 
position was not promising and that an oil sanction would prove 
effective. The first-part of this estimate was wrong; the second might 
not have been. 
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Certainly, the Italian government took the threat of an embargo 
seriously enough to attempt to delay if not prevent it. Through 
diplomacy and through rumour, they tried to dissuade the League. 
On 19 November, when reports from Geneva stated that the Eighteen 
would reconvene very shortly, the Italian press reacted with immediate 
alarms as to the possible consequences. On the 24th, rumour in Paris 
had it that Cerutti, the Italian Ambassador, had told Laval that an 
oil embargo would have untoward effects on Franco-Italian relations. 
36 
Three days later, the Italian government announced that they had had to 
cancel leaves and order certain troop movements; and on 30 November, 
despite an Italian statement on the previous day that there had been no 
military redeployment towards the French frontier, reports from Austria 
said that for the past six days Italy had been withdrawing troops from 
the BrerLner. -R=ours were carefully disseminated in Rome that an oil 
sanction would lead to a surprise air attack on the British fleetj and 
on 30 November the representatives at Geneva of certain members of the 
Eighteen, other than France and Britain, were informed that implementa- 
tion of an cm. bargo would be considered r-m $unfriendly act' - a-very 
strong term in diplomatic language. 
37 
Unfortunately for the League, control of oil supplies rested 
primarily in the hands of the United States, one of the three major 
powers not members. The other two, Japan and Germanyt were of little 
short-run importance. While it might have been surmised that Japan's 
sympathies would lie with Italy, another nation flaunting the will of 
the League, in practice she was marginally on the side of Geneva and 
the non-white country of Ethiopia. 
38 Germany, geographically closer 
and a possible supplier of industrial and military material, posed a 
potentially much more serious concern. She heldt howevert 'with great 
skill'to the course of the strictest neutralityt, 39 subjecting to 
- 
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licence the export of many'kinds of goods, including ores and minerals, 
pit 
. 
ch and distillation products, and coal and iron. 
40 Her policy was*to 
neither participate in sanctions nor to increase trade with Italy, and 
with respect to oil she was of no importance. Germany possessed the 
long-term interest of wanting all parties to emerge weakened: a trium- 
phant-Italy could frustrate the Anschluss, and a successful League 
might unite Europe against German ambitions in general. 
41 
The 'attitude of the United Statesq on the other hand, was critical 
in the short ran. The American government interpreted the isolationist 
sentiment in country and Congress in such a fashion as to keep in step 
with the League. On 5 October, two days after the invasion, Roosevelt 
invoked the newly passed Neutrality Act to ban the export of arms and 
essential war material to the two warring countries. The State Depart- 
ment discouraged trade with both partics, in other words with Italy as 
cpmmercial relations with Ethiopia were virtually non-existent, and on 
I November'the government announced suspension of negotiations for an 
Italo-American trade agreement. 
42 It was, however, with respect to 
oil that the United V, 41. a+P-N war, tnfl:,; ' or)--licelf. 
43 As thA world. le la--Zest 
producer and exporter, she could guarantee the success or failure of an 
embargo. Not only could American imports make good the losses from 
League-controlled sources, but also the Italian tanker fleet sufficed 
to transport the necessary amount (this ignored the possibility of a 
naval blockade, but that in turn raised the problems of belligerent 
rights with the United Stat. es and maybe war with Italy). 
44 On the 
surfaceg the government appeared to co-operate with the League. 
45 
Cn 15 November, Cordell Hullq the Secretary of Statet announced that 
certain items, such as oil, being indispensable for war their export 
contravened the policy of the government and the spirit of the 
. Neutrality 
Actl and a week later he further stated that the abnormal 
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increase in sales might force the administration to conclude that they 
were essential war materials. 
46 At the end of the month, the Secretax7 
of the Interior called upon the petroleum industry to voluntarily 
suspend shipments to Italy, and the producers indicated their willing- 
ness to do so as soon as Roosevelt asked them. 
47 Finally, on 1 Decemb 
. 
er, 
the day before the new British Cabinet was to discuss the problem, the 
State Department reaffirmed that trade in key commodities such as oil 
ought to be restricted to a 'normal basist. 
48 
Despite these statements, U. S. support for sanctions remained 
. 
uncertain. American exports of oil to Italy were considerably higher 
in the third quarter of 1935 than during the comparable period the 
. 
49 As for previous year, and they rose sharply in October and November 
placing an embargo, Roosevelt was waiting for the League. Domestic 
opinion was such that he could not afford to be seen either too far 
ahead of the League or slavishly following it, and every delay at Geneva 
50 
made his position more difficult. Moreover, the British Government, 
as we shall shortly see, did not believe-that the United States either 
could or would effectively halt her oil cxpa. -t-- to Italy. 
Nevertheless, the League was getting ready to imPlement the oil 
embargo. On 19 November, reports from Geneva stated that Senhor 
Vasconcellos of Portugal, the Chairman of the Eighteen, was preparing 
to reconvene that body very shortly, and three days later an official 
announcement set the meeting for the 29th. On the 25th, Laval telephoned 
Vasconoellos and requested a postponement as he had to remain in Paris 
for a crucial debate in the Chamber. 
51 Vasconcellos agreed to a short 
delay and said that he would decide upori a new date on the 29th. On that 
dayq Laval telephoned again and asked that the meeting not, be before 
11 December. After consulting with the British, Vasconcellos arranged 
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. 
for the next session to begin on 12 December. 
52 Thus, the League 
was soon- to make the crucial decision on oil, but Laval had managed 
to gain time for the Paris talks to produce a compromise. 
Under the pressure of this upcoming meeting of the Eighteen, 
negotiations in the French capital speedbd up. Peterson returned on 
21 November, convinced that in no circumstances would the Goverment 
go to war for Ethiopia, and he-and Saint Quentin stepped up their 
search fo ra solution. 
53 Activity in general picked up. In London 
and Paris, diplomatic contacts among the French, Italians, and British 
proliferatedv and Pierre Laval finally succeeded in persuading Sam 
Hoare to stop off in Paris on, his way to Switzerland for a vacation. 
54 
-Amidst this flurry of activity, the CID subcommittee on Defence 
1 55 policy and Requirements kDPR) met on 26 November. Stanley Baldwin 
presided and present were several Ministerst Vansittart, and represen- 
tatives of the three armed services. Hoare opened the discussion with 
a brief OvvrV-41-T; J', Of the situation, which, lheýsaidj was no clearer and, 
in some respects# more dangerous than it had been at the last meeting. 
On the credit side, sanctions had been more effective than some people 
had thought probablej and the military progress of the Italians was slow, 
thereby suggesting that they would have difficulties forcing a decision 
before the rainy season began-in the spring.. On-the other hand, Musso- 
lini seemed to be in an intransigent mood, andt while rumours of an 
Italian attack in the Mediterranean could be partly discounted as 
pr opaganda, nevertheless, due to the proposed oil sanction, Italy's 
threatening attitude could not be ignored. The Foreign Secretary did 
not want to suggest that Italian aggression was probablet but he felt 
that the defensive situation ought to be kept under constant and urgent 
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observation. Such being the position, he proceeded to raise the two 
essential issues which the DPR went on to discuss: British defences, 
especially with respect to anti-aircraft ammunitioný and French. 
co-operation. 
Both Duff Cooper, the new War Secretary, and Eyres-Monsell, the 
First Lord, reviewed the details of the availability of anti-aircraft 
ammunition. Supplies were insufficient for prolonged operations, and, 
despite the efforts made and the success achieved in raising output, 
some months must elapse before a reasonably satisfactory Position 
could be reached. 
French co-operation was also regarded pessimistically. Chatfield, 
First Sea Lord and Admiral of the Fleetq presented a ver7 discouraging 
picture gathered from the recent Admiralty talks with the French naval 
authorities. The latter were acutely anxious not to become involved in 
.-a war with Italy and had notj for example, manned the anti-aircraft 
defences of Toulon, -the main Prench naval base and the only place in 
the Mediterranean where the largest of the British ships could dock for 
repairs. Being unpreparod . 1o. - any helpful Operationn, if t'no jP? 'rGncb ý did 
enter the war on Britain's side, they would initially be a burden to an 
extentp the use of their bases being the only advantage to be gained. 
Chatfield continued that, while the Admiralty knew what the Prench naval 
authorities could do in the event of hostilities, it was not certain 
that they would be permitted to carry out even such co-operation as they 
envisaged. 
This scepticism was echoed by several Ministers present. Hoare, 
Simon, Ramsay MacDonald, Eyres-Monsell, and Gunliffe-Lister all shared 
the same doubt that Baldwin expressed when he said that 'he had always 
felt that France would not come in with us if real trouble occurred'. 
The prgbleml as Chatfield had said, was a matter not so much of 
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capabilities and promises but of what France would actually do in the 
crunch. Hoare pointed out that Britain had received clear assurances of 
co-operation from the French but could not be sure what lay behind that 
expression of support. The situation had to be clarified. Vansittart 
suggested that, if Laval could be induced to give a strong lead and 
make it clear to Italy that war against Britain would automatically 
involve Franceq then the British Government would be in a position to 
tell the French that, in view of this categorical statement, they ought 
to take certain defensive steps. The real testt Vansittart continued, 
would be whether the French then took concrete steps. Hoare recommended 
that Sir George Clerk acquaint Laval with these views and put the matter 
to him. In their conclusions, the DPR agreed with Hoare and Vansittart: 
This procedure would supply the practical test 
whether the French Government were ablej or 
unable - as has been suspected - to implement' 
their recognized obligations of practical and 
effective collaboration. 
The sense of the meeting, to be echoed by the full Cabinet a few days 
laterv was to proceed cautiously with further sanctions, especially 
ol-, oil, lintil the crucial -Issue of French supports whiob reriiai. ned Pluch 
in doubt, had been cleared up. The Goverment appeared to be abdicating 
all responsibility. No one suggested thatj were Britain to act 
decisively, Laval would undoubtedly follow. 
On Monday 2 December, yith the Committee of Eighteen scheduled to 
; convene ten days hence to decide upon the potentially decisive oil 
embargo, Baldwin's new Cabinet met. It remained relatively unchanged 
-1 r 
from his previous one. J. H. Thomas and Malcolm MacDonald had swapped 
officesq the former becoming Colonial Secretary and the latter Dominions 
Secretar7. Halifax had replaced Londonderry as Lord Privy Seal and 
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leader of the House of Lords and had himself been succeeded at the War 
Office by Alfred Duff Cooper. For the first time since 23 October$ the 
56' full Cabinet discussed the Ethiopian situation. They could no longer 
afford to temporize; and, in this their most important meeting since 
22 August, they made two crucial decisions, one for each of their two 
lines of policy. 
Ministers had before them five new Cabinet Papers. Two of these 
outlined the nature of the sanctions adopted and proposed at Geneva. 
57 
A third was the record of the previous Tuesday's DPR meeting. The fourth 
contained. summaries by Vansittart and Hoare of separate interviews each 
had had during the past few days with General Garibaldi, a semi-official 
representative from Mussolini. 
58 Garibaldi had combined the threat of 
military action over any oil embargo with a set of peace feelers. 
Vansittart had called the possibility of war suicidal, but the Italian, 
though agreeingg had felt that it might nevertheless occur. Both the 
Permanent Undersecretary and the Foreign Secretar7 had officially 
declined to reply to these peace proposals until Peterson's return from 
Paris but hptd assured the General that they were abRolutely unaccepteýble 
- they would in effect give 
Italy complete control over Ethiopia. 
The fifth and most important Cabinet Paper consisted of the latest 
appreciation of the oil sanction by the Petroleum Department of the 
Board of Trade and by the Foreign Office. 
59 The former believed that 
Italian stocks did not exceed three months of normal use. The latter 
noted that a total halt to oil imports would cripple Italy and bring 
-the war to a speedy end, but that a 'complete and immediate embargo is 
out of the question due to lack of control over American supplies'. 
I 
'The Foreign Office recommended that the Government, while informing the 
League of their willingness to participate provided the producing states 
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co-operated, should avoid taking the lead in proposing a sanotion on 
oil but that they should, if the matter were raised and led to some 
practical action, consent to take part if Romania, the USSR, and the 
Netherlands also agreed. 
This rather hesitant attitude at the Foreign Office was shared by 
many Ministers. An-informal meeting had been held on Friday 29 November 
in ord er to discuss the matter. Runciman had totally opposed an oil 
embargo. Hoare had wished to delay it long enough to allow the Paris 
talks to check the possibility of a-settlement, and Neville Chamberlain 
had been prepared to agree to this procedure. Only Anthony Eden had been 
against i. 
6o 
For the final time before Hoare's trip to Paris, the Cabinet 
discussed the Italo-Ethiopian conflict in detail. 
61 
Gloom pervaded the 
atmosphere. Ministersp fearing a mad dog act, hearing a very unfavourable 
appreciation of the military situation, and laying great store on French 
co-operationg were reluctant to push Mussolini too far. The Foreign 
Secretary noted serious gaps in the system of imperial defence. Eyres- 
Monsell and Cunliffe-Lister agreed with this general estimate and were 
especially unhappy about the position in the Mediterranean: in the airt 
over anti-aircraft defences, and with respect to French aid. Though the 
fleet would undoubtedly defeat the Italians and control the area, 
hostilities would result in serious losses which, the two Ministers 
emphasized, would greatly weaken British sirength in the rest of the 
world. They suggested that, the Mediterranean defences not being ready 
for war, an attempt should be made at peace, with the threat of an oil 
sanction left dangling over Italy but no actual date fixed until after a 
ýailure of discussions for a compromise. Eyres-Monsell and Cunliffe- 
Lister also advocated, from the point of view of the servicesl that no 
decision to apply further sanctions should be taken until French support 
had been assured. 
17P. ' 
Hoare then, recommended this same'two-stage strategy. He wanted a 
decision in principle but a postponement of the application. This was 
what he had favoured in the preliminary meeting the previous Friday, 
and it foreshadowed the eventual Hoare-Laval Plan. The Cabinet endorsed 
this procedure. The date would be determined at the second stage if in 
the meantime no settlement had been reached. As for the specific tactics, 
Peterson, Hoare reported, had not yet made much progress in Paris, but 
negotiations were continuing and he proposed to hold talks with Laval 
on his way to Switzerland for his upcoming vacation. The Cabinet agreed 
that the Foreign Secretary should see the French Premier and 'press the 
matter forward as rapidly as possible? (my emphasis)o They also decided 
that, if these conversations seemed to afford a reasonable prospect of 
-successt the Eighteen should be asked, preferably by the French not the 
British, to postpone fixing a date for the oil sanction until a further 
meeting. 
Stanley Baldwin spoke last and decisively summed up the sense 
of the Cabinet: r 
on broad lines there was general agreement, as 
proved by the discussion. If by any chance 
hostilities should arise out of these events, 
the situation for the Government would be a 
bad one unless everything possible had been 
done to avoid them, especially when the detailed 
facts of our defensivQ preparations became known. 
If that occurred in dealing with Signor Mussolini, 
no-one would be willing to tackle Herr Hitler. 
Consequently if, at the next meeting of the Eighteenv 
the date could be postponed and time could be. gained 
for peace talks with a view to working arrangements 
and for enquiries as to whether the oil sanction 
could be made effective, it would be all to the 
good. If the claim that had been made that sanctions 
meant war proved by experience to be true, it would 
be a disaster of the first magnitude. It had to be 
remembered that in dealing with Signor Mussolini 
we were not dealing with a normal kind of intellect. 
He though tj however, thýit the Cabinet was right in 
supporting the Foreign Secretary's proposalag but 
he hoped that the Cabinet would have an opportunity 
to re-examine the position in the light of the 
0 
f 
latest developments if the peace talks did not 
hold out a prospect of success. -It had to W, 
'remembered that it was this country that i; ould 
have to withstand the first shock of an ItLian 
forcible reaction to sanctions. He himself was 
not willing to be committed at this moment to 
the 21st December as the date of the application 
of oil sanctions. 
At this crucial Cabinet meeting on the eve of Hoare's trip to 
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Parisp Ministers made two fateful decisions. First, they admitted that 
they preferred not to implement the oil sanction. Second, they gave the 
Foreign Secretary carte blanche to arrive at a settlement with Laval. 
]3y agreeing to accept the embargo only in principle and to avoid setting 
a date for its applicationg they were restricting its use to that of 
adding leverage towards persuading Mussolini to accept whatever emerged 
from the Paris talks. All along, they had favoured this half of the dual 
' line to the Geneva half, and they were now committing themselves fully 
to the success of a compromise solution. The Government decided to 
stake ever7thing on the next throw of M. Laval's loaded dice. 
0 
In publicv however, the Government still stood by both strands of 
their double policy. On 3 December, they laid out their programme in 
the Speech from the Throne. They promised rearmament, but only the 
minimum necessary to safeguard the Empire and fulfil their obligations 
to Geneva. On the Ethiopian questionv they pledged themselves to uphold 
the League of Nations and collective action andl at the same timeq to 
attempt to find a peaceful solution acceptable to all three parties: 
Ethiopia, Italyq and the League itself. 
62 
After the speech had been moved and seconded, Clement Attlee, 
Leader of the Opposition, opened the debate. Voicing the same criticisms 
that were to be levied against the-Government by almost all speakers 
from the Opposition benches, he accused them of following a fatal policy 
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of dualism. Howl he wanted-to know, could Italy and Ethiopia be 
bracketed together as both having to accept any compromise when the 
former was the aggressor and the latter the victim? He also charged 
the Government with failing to face up to the real issue: ending the 
causes of war. He condemned their policy of rearmament and asked 'is 
not the-collective system under the Covenant a guard for our Empire? '. 
In reply, Stanley Baldwin avoided specifics and went to work on 
the underlying feelings of his audience. Freely admitting the charge of 
following a double line, he appealed to his fellow members love of peace 
and said that 'if any statesman brought this country into war by 
neglecting anything which he could do with honour and in conjunction 
with other members of the League, his name would very properly be held 
in execration'. 
The debate continued. Two days later$ it was devoted entirely to 
foreign affairs. Hugh Dalton attacked the Government for not having 
moved far or fast enough. They should implement the oil sanction which 
would be decisive. He hoped that in Paris Sir Samuel would indicate how 
troubled British public opinion had been by the te-----4vcrsat4--. n-- in 
French policy during recent months and would inform M. Laval that 
Britain was not interested in 'any terms of settlement which will allow 
the Italian dictator to profit by reason of his aggression'. 
Hoare began his answer by stressing the importance of collective 
action. All League members must share in the responsibilities and the 
risks. He then justified the Government's double line on the grounds 
that both the League and the House of Commons had time after time 
approved it. Sanctions were working well and the Eighteen would shortly 
I 
meet to discuss the practicality of. the oil embargo, to which both 
Britain and the League had in principle agreedl and this country woula 
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I 
take its share in whatever collective action was decided. The delay 
in this, meeting, due to the domestic political crisis in France, 
gives a further opportunity for an intensive effort. 
to bring about a peaceful settlement.... the French 
and we intend not only to go on trying but to 
redouble our efforts during the short period of 
time that is still open before the Geneva meeting. 
Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary added, there was no likelihood that 
the League would weaken in its pursuit of collective action. He conclu- 
ded with a reminder that peace everywhere was the basis of the Govern- 
ment's foreign policy. 
Hoare was followed by a former Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, who was later to play a decisive role during the climax 
of the Hoare-Laval crisis. When he came to deal with the Ethiopian 
problem, Sir Austen took his stand upon a matter of principle. He 
emphasized his warm. friendship with Italy and expressed his distaste 
and dislike for Ethiopia, a slave-holding and a slave-raiding state 
and a bad neighbour whom the British Government had not thought worthy 
of League membership. He approved the double line of policy, and he 
wished the Gcvernment to make. clear to the Ethiop4. - , 12 that indefinite 
pressure would not be put on Italy and that they would only be supported 
until a solution acceptable to the Italians and endorsed by the League 
could be found. Ethiopia, Sir Austen said, was not the client he would 
have chosen to fight a test case. Nevertheless, a great principle was at 
stake: 'whether all the efforts which have been made since the War to 
establish a new public law and new standards of conduct between nations 
are to be abandoned at the first test, or are to be asserted, and by the 
I 
assertion of them, strengthenedt. 
I Backbenchers from both sides of the House continued the debate. 
The Italo-Ethiopian conflict and armaments were the two main points 
at issue, and the Goverment's Policies were criticized and defended, 
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both in general and with respect to details. Anthony Eden then 
concluded both his own speech and the day's debate with a pledge of 
support for collective security. 
The debate in the House of Commons began on the first anniversar7 
of the Wal Wal incident. This minor skirmish at an obscure watering 
hole deep in the arrid wastes of Ethiopiats Ogaden desert had turned 
into a major international pjýoblemj presenting the British GqVernment 
with an acute dilemma. Support for the League of Nations became 
increasingly incompatible with the preservation of the Stresa Pront, 
and the whole thrust of the Goveimmentts policy was to balance between 
the two and somehow preserve both. By the beginning of December of 
19-3.5, the imminent possibility of an oil embargo on Italy brought 
matters to a head. The imposition of this measure threatened to lead 
to a Mediterranean war between Britain and Italy, to imperil Angle- 
French relationsp and to irretrievably destroy Stresa. Yetg given the 
NT'q' tinny Cc-, rernmen-14-Its public pledges of--support for the OL r, 
postponement of the embargo without good reason would ruin their 
credibility and shatter the League. To find such a good reason, Sir 
Samuel Hoare was about to leave for Paris, there to try to find that 
compromise solution which would save Stresa without destroying the 
League of Nations. 
I 
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Notes to Chapter Six 
Cabinet Meetings 4505), 4605), 4705), and 48(35) of 9,15,16, 
and 23 October 1935. The second of these meetings was a special 
Cabinet devoted to the coal-mining industry; but, at the other 
three, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict was discussed in some detail. 
All descriptions of and quotations from Cabinet meetings, unless 
otherwise noted, are taken directly from the Cabinet Minutes. 
Cabinet Paper 18605), 4 October 1935. A provisional report on 
economic and financial sanctions against Italy from the CID 
Advisory Committee on Trade'Questions in Time of War. 
3- Cabinet Meeting 48(35)9 23 October 1935- 
4. See above, pp. 149-150- 
5- Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators, pp. 281-2821*and Keith Middlemas 
and John Barnes, Baldwin, p. 861. Arnold Toynbee (Survey of Inter- 
national'Affairs 19359 volume ii, p. 284) notes that in October 
Hoare telegraphed to Sir Sidney Barton in Addis Ababa instructing 
him to push Haile Selassie to consent to begin negotiations for 
a compromise. 
6. Toynbeel pp. 235-236, and F. P. Walterst A_History of the League of 
Nations, p. 654. 
The Council agreed that all members of the League were now obligated 
to fulfil their duties under Article 16 of the Covenant (Walters, 
p. 654). Article 16 stated: 
1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in 
disregard of its cov--n=t-- under Articlc- 11,13 or 
15t it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed 
an act of war against all other Members of the Leaguet 
which thereby undertake immediately to subject it to 
the severance of all trade or financial relations, 
the prohibition of all intercourse between their 
nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking, 
State, and the prevention of all financialq commercial 
or personal intercourse between the nationals of the 
covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any 
other Statev whether a Member of the League or not. 
2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case 
to recommend to the several Govexmments concerned 
what effective militar7l naval or air force the 
Members of theýLeague shall severally contribute 
to the armed forces to be used to protect the 
covenants of the League. 
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3. The Members of the League agree, further, 
that they will mutually support one another in 
the financial and economic measures which are 
taken under this Article, in order to minimize 
the loss and inconvenience resulting from the 
above measures, and that they will mutually 
support one another in resisting any special 
measures aimed at one of their number by the 
covenant-breaking State, and that they will 
take the necessary steps to afford passage 
through their territory to. the forces of any 
of the Members of the League which are 
co-operating to protect the covenants of the 
League. 
4. Any Member of the League which has violated 
any covenant of the League may be declared to be 
no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the 
Council concurred in by the Representatives of all 
the other Members of the League represented thereon. 
8. The Co-ordinating Committee was a standing conference of the fifty 
out of fifty-four League members who supported sanctions (the other 
four were Italy and her client states of Albania, Austria, and 
Hungary). It had no legal power. It simply recommended action to 
the member states who were obligated under the Covenantl but not 
under any decision of either the Co-ordinating Committee or the 
Committee of Eighteeng to implement sanctions. For these legal 
points, see Sir John Fischer Williams, 'Sanctions Under the 
Covenant1t in The British Yearbook of International Law 1936. 
The member states of the Eighteen were Argentina# Belgium, Britaint 
Canada, France, Greece, Mexicoq the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal# 
Romania, South Africaq Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey9 
the Uhl-)SRI and Yugoslavia. 
Senhor Vasconcellos of Portugal was the chairman of both of these 
committees. (For these detailsp see Toynbee, p. 222, and Walters, 
pp. 655-659. ) 
Thereby putting an end to the 70 per cent of the Italian export 
trade that went to League members and harming Italy's financial 
position. Walters, p. 660. 
10. Coulondre held the position of Assistant Director of the Political 
and Commercial Affairs Department at the Quai d'Orsay. One of his 
recommendations was 'means of propulsion such as oils and petrols, 
(Manchester Guardian, 14 October 1935)- In the light of future 
events, the fact that the suggestion for the oil sanction 
originally came from the French seems rather ironic. 
185. 
11. The day after the invasion, Italy submitted 'most cordial' notes 
to France and Britain saying that the military operations did not 
preclude friendly discussions. among the Tripartite powers with a 
view towards reaching a peaceful settlement - although one which 
would give 'satisfaction to the just demands of Italy' (The Times, 
5 October 1935)- On 16 October, Mussolini sent his minimum terms 
for a peaceful solution to the French government (Gaetano Salvemini, 
Prelude to World War III p- 348), and it was in response to these 
Italian proposals that Peterson went to Paris (Geoffrey Warner, 
Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France, pp. 109-110). And on 18 
October, after Drummond had met with Mussolini in the morning, 
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Chapter Seven 
The Hoare-Laval Plan 
one conviction I carried back with me to 
Paris - that in no circumstances would the 
Baldwin government go to war for Abyssinia. 
- Maurice Petersonl 
Towards the end of November, as the possibility of an oil embargo 
drew near, the pace of diplomacy among the Tripartite powers picked up. 
On the 21st of the month, with the election over and the Goverment 
securely ensconced in office for another termt Peterson returned to 
Paris and resumed with Saint Quentin the search for a negotiated 
settlement. During the follo. wing days, Laval met -several tiMes'with 
Clel-k and Cerutti (the Italian Ambassador in Pr-ri-. -) =d conti=cd to 
thread his way between the British and the Italians. He spoke to the 
former about Anglo-French co-operation and about postponing the upcoming 
session of the Eighteen, and he proceeded to arrange for it to be I 
delayed until 12 December. He then passed on to the latter the latest 
peace proposals but accompanied them with warnings not only that they 
were the last offer that could be made before the forthcoming meeting 
at Geneva but also that anyattack on Britain would bring in France. 
2 
In the midst of this delicate diplomatic manoeuvring, Laval was also 
attempting to arrange a meeting with the British Foreign Secretary. 
Although Hoare rejected the French*Premier's initial request to come 
0 
to London, he agreed to stop off in Paris on his way to Switzerland 
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for a badly needed vacation. On 2 December, when all had been arranged, 
Hoare informed his Cabinet colleagues of his plans and received their 
permission to see Laval and to 'press the matter forward as rapidly as 
possiblet. 
3, In London, the Foreign Office continued to pursue its dual 
.- 
line. Vansittart met with Grandi? the Italian Ambassador, on 3,41 and 
4 
5 December to discuss the terms of a pQssible compromise, and the 
latter was later to say that 'the Lava-1-Hoare plan of 1935 was nothing 
more or less than the Grandi-Vansittart plant. 
5 On the other hand, 
the Permanent Undersecretary saw Corbin, the French Ambassadorg on 
December and warned him that any settlement must be acceptable to 
the League of Nations and thereby strengthen not destroy it. He also 
expressed his disappointment with the French attitude and with the lack 
of firm co-operation on the part of M. Lavalls government. 
. Both The Times and the Manchester Guardian kept their readers 
well aware of the general nature if not the specific details of these 
developments. They speculated that chances were quite good that MUsso- 
lini would accept the proposals likely to emerge from the Paris talkst 
ani! cn 6 Dc--=bcr the., printod broadly &I accurate vcrciono of the 
peterson-Saint Quentin recommendations. They noted, however, that while 
substantial progress towards a settlement had been made differences 
still remained between the British and French positions. 
To bridge these differences, Vansittart went to Paris on the 
aftermoon of Friday 6 Decemiei, and Hoare-joined him the following 
day. Both were determined to find a compromise solution to the Italo- 
Ethiopian conflict. They hoped to save the League of Nations as well 
as the Stresa Front, but their primar7 concern was to arrive atp over 
the weekend, some scheme which would enable them to postpone the oil 
embargop thereby ensuring no war in the Mediterranean and averting 
potential crises in both Anglo-Prench and Analo-Italian-relations. 
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Despite their evasiveness at the time and in their memoirs, there can 
be no doubt that such was their real intention. Eden certainly feared 
that something was afoot and shortly before the Foreign Secretary's 
departure warned him against Laval - and added, 'don't forget that in 
Paris, Van can be more French than the French'. Hoare reassured Eden: 
'Don't worry, I shall not commit you to anything. It wouldn't be fair 
on my way through to my holidays. 
7 Whatever this exchange might have 
meantp it'did not signify the Foreign Secretary's true feelings. The 
Cabinet had already authorized him to push for a compromise; 
8 
Baldwin 
had told him just before he left that, while he might push Laval as far 
as he could, he was on no account to involve Britain*in war; 
9 in 
Parliamento he had announced that he was going to redouble his efforts 
to find a peaceful solution; 
10 
and in a telegram sent to Drummond the 
d. ay before he departedl Hoare said that he was meeting Laval 'with the 
desire of finding' a negotiated settlement. 
11 Similarlyg just prior 
to leaving London, Vansittart asked two of his officials how long it 
would take to alter the climate of opinion on Ethiopia. Rex Leeper, 
head of the news department, replied that thr2e ureeks vrould bo- nec-coc: =1 
t. o prepare the Public mind for a compromise instead of sanctions. 'We 
have only three dayspt declared Vansittart. 
12 
Hoare arrived in Paris late in the afternoon of SaturdaY 7 December. 
vansittart, Clerkv and Peterson met him at the station; andt after a 
brief stop at the Embassy, all four, went to the Quai d'Orsay. 
13 There, 
after pushing their way in past a horde of reporters and photographers, 
I 
they began discussions at half pastfive with Lavall Ugert Saint 
Quenting and Ren6 Massigli, a senior diplomat and head of the permanent 
French delegation to the League of Nations. 
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The initial concerm of Laval was to postpone implementation of the 
oil embargo; that of Hoare was to ensure French support in the event of 
hostilities in the Mediterranean. 
14 The French Premier opened the 
conversations with the assertion that he had learned, both from his own 
ambassador in Rome and the Italian ambassador in Paris, that Italy 
considered the oil embargo a military measure. As no country could 
exist without petroleum and no war could be carried on without it, he 
was absolutely sure that Mussolini would reply with tsome resolution 
taken in a spirit of despair' - with a Mediterranean attack. Laval 
continued that, while the embargo need not be permanently abandonedg 
he wished to postpone it and first attempt conciliation. On the question 
of a common military front, he added that he hadl following his inter- 
view with Sir George Clerkj warned the Italians that they must not make 
a mistake in judging the French attitude. The British Foreign Secretary 
was not convinced on either point. His information led him to believe 
that an oil embarg6 would be regarded as an economic measure and not a 
hostile act. Neverthelessq an Italian attack was possiblet and he wished 
to Imow the position of M. Laval's government. -Whiln not moanir!; to 
criticize France, he must know the true situation. Laval replied that 
the policy of sanctions did not command universal approval in France 
but that when all was said and done France did not break her engagements. 
However, he had received fresh confirmation that an embargo meant war 
andq precisely because of France's determination to honour her commit- 
ments to Britain, he wished to persuade the British to do everythine 
possible to avoid what would be a very risky adventure. Hoare agreed 
that the sanction on petroleum increased the danger of a mad dog act 
and that the search for peace must be pressed on, but he stipulated that 
if the embargo were to be postponed there must be good hope of the 
negotiations' proving successful. It was therefore necessar7 to convince 
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Italy that Britain and France stood together. Naval talks ought to be 
carried further and supplemented by army and air conversations. To this, 
Vansittart added that the fixing of the date for the embargog the peace 
discussions, and these staff talks ought all to proceed simultaneously. 
Laval accepted this suggestion; and, on this note of apparent agreement, 
the opening phase of the discussions eilded. 
15 
Hoare and Laval next turned to the actual substance and procedure 
involved in any settlement. The Foreign Secretary warned that it was 
essential to avoid creating any impression that the League of Nations 
was weakening., The French Premier agreed but stressed that Geneva would 
undoubtedly accept whatever Britain and France approved. His own posi- 
tion, he saidp fell somewhere between those of Britain and Italy. 
Though the demands of the latter were indeed excessive, he appealed to 
the Foreign Secretary to be more generous. Hoare replied that it was 
crucial not to give the appearance of rewarding the aggressor: the 
proposals must be based on those of the Committee of Five; Ethiopia must 
gain an outlet to the sea; and any idea of an Italian mandate must be 
exr-Inded. - 11"he arrangement must be a 'judicious mixture of an-exchange of 
territory and the conferring of economic concessions'. Vansittart added 
that the proposals must be joint Anglo-French ones: there could be no 
question of Francets acting as a mediator between Britain and Italy. 
Moreoverl he notedt there was a limit. to what the Emperor could be 
expected to cede, even in return for a port. To 'go beyond this limit 
would greatly endanger the League itself. Laval accepted the application 
of the principles set down by the Five, but he stated that their idea of 
an international mandate over Ethiopia did not interest Mussolini. 
At this point, as it was getting late, the meeting adjourned, 
Hoare had originally intended to carry on to Geneva on Saturday night, 
but it was agreed that, contrary to plan, he would pemain overnight in 
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Paris in order that discussions might 'continue on Sunday. At the end 
of the day's talks, a communiqu6 was released: 
The two Ministers confirmed the existence of 
complete agreement between the two Governments 
for the continuation of a policy of close colla- 
boration. They began an exchange of views which 
will be continued tomorrow in order to determine 
the bases which might be proposed for the friendly 
settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. 16 
Conversations resumed Sunday morning at half past ten. Rather 
oddlyg neither Peterson nor Saint Quentin, the two experts on the 
situation, attended. 
17 Despite their absence, both the substance of 
a set of proposals and the procedure for handling them were considered 
18 
and agreed upon. 
The actual terms of settlement consisted of Ethiopian concessions 
to Italy disguised as an equitable exchange of territory (see Appendix 
II for a map and details). In the north, Ethiopia would ceae a portion 
of eastern Tigr6 adjoining Eritrea, in the northeast a portion of the 
Danak il also adjoining Eritrea, and in the south a portion of the 
Ogaden adjoining Italian Somaliland. To the south and west, Italy 
would also receive a zone for eccno. mic ex - ,, ans4on extending zouth fr. -. m 
latitude 80 and east from longitude 350- While that part of the Ogaden 
ceded directly was useless desert in which no Italian could survivet 
let alone prosper, this economic zone included fertile land with a 
reasonably temperate climate. In return for all of these concestionst 
Ethiopia would receive an outlet to the sea, preferably at Assab in 
Eritrea but alternatively at Zeila in British Somaliland if the Dnperor. 
wished, and a corridor of access to it. Howeverl Laval took good care 
to safeguard French economic interests. He and Hoare agreed that Britain 
and France would attempt to obtain from the Ethiopian goverment 
.1 
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an undertaking not to construct from the 
Ethiopian [sic] port which it acquires a 
railway communicating with the interior 
and also an undertaking to conclude with 
the French government all the necessary 
arrangements to safeguard the interests 
of the port of Djibuti and of the Franco- 
Ethiopian railway. 19 
In broad outline, these terms of settlement were compatible with the 
inglo-Frýnch protocols which accompanied the rep6rt, in September, of 
the Committee of Five. They were, howeverg only barely in keeping with 
the actual recommendations of the Five and their suggestion of linter- 
national assistance to Ethiopia'. The Hoare-Laval Plan was far more 
generous to Italy than to Ethiopia and provided a solution mainly at 
the latter's expense. Nevertheless, it would have provided Haile 
Selassie with the valuable benefit of direct access to the sea, and 
it would have left him with a great deal more than he was shortly to 
end up with. 
Having thus dealt with substantive mattersl Hoare and Laval 
turned to procedural ones. Wanting very much for Mussolini to accept 
their Plant they decided partly-to- bribe a. n. d-partly to blackmail him 
into doing so. As soon as the British Government had given their 
approval to the proposals, an outline of them was to be communicated 
strictly confidentially to the Italian leader, who would be asked for 
a reply in principle within twenty-four hours. He was also to be' 
informed that, were he to accept these terms as a basis for negotiation, 
the committee of Five would meet on Thursday 12 December before or 
instead of the Eighteen and ensure that no oil embargo be implemented. 
The French Premier gave his assurances that he would put all possible 
pressure on Mussolini to accept the proposals and that he would make 
it clear to him that if he refused. then the sanction must proceed. 
Hoare and Laval agreed that no bargain would be made and that it woulcl 
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be stated quite plainly that, if negotiations had not started 
satisfactorily, it would be impossible for the embargo to be delayed. 
Assuming that Mussol ini could be so informed on Monday 9 December, the 
following day the Emperor would be told that Britain and France were 
seeking a solution based on the proposals of the Five which Ethiopia 
had accepted last September and that his representative would be heard 
when the Committee met. If a favourable reply came from Mussolinil the 
Five would indeed be summoned for Thursday. They would either proceed 
with further negotiations themselves or delegate the matter back to the 
French and the British. Thusl Mussolini was to be bribed with the 
promise of Ethiopian territory and economic concessions, and he was to 
be blackmailed with the threat of the oil embargo. This combination, 
Hoare and Laval calculated, would succeed in getting the Italians to 
agree to sit down to negotiations and consequently would furnish a 
legitimate excuse for postponing the oil embargo. 
At half past six on Sunday afternoon, the talks finally finished. 
With the proposals and the procedure settled, the French Premier and 
the British Foreign ýecretary sealed their agreement by initialling 
the Hoare-Laval Plan. That same ev'enine, a joint communiqu6 was 
released: 
Animated by the same spirit. of conciliation, 
and inspired by close Franco-British friendship, 
we have in the course of our long conversations 
of to-day and yesterday sought the formulas which 
might serve as a basis for a friendly settlement 
of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. 
There could be no question at present of 
publishing these formulas. The British Goverment 
has not yet been informed of them; and, once its 
agreement has been received, it will be necessary 
to submit them to the consideration of the inte- 
rested Governments and to the decision of the 
League of Nations. 
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We have worked together with the same anxiety 
to reach as rapidly as possible a pacific and 
honourable solution. We are both satisfied with 
the results which we have reached. 20 
The British Foreign Secretax7 was indeed well satisfied with what 
he had accomplished. As he drove away from the Quai d'Orsayt 'Vansittart 
and Clerk. congratulated me on having re-established the Anglo-French 
front'. 
21 Daring the few hours remaining before his departure for 
Switzerland at ten o'clock, he hastily wrote a letter to the Cabinet 
explaining what had been decided and strongly advocating that they act 
at once on the basis he and Laval had set out 
(see Appendix II). He 
concluded that 
The recommendationst in my view, have two great 
advantages. In the first place, they reduce the 
question of territorial cessions to a minimum. 
In the second place, they bring back the League 
into the front of the picture and put the 
responsibility for the settlement where it 
should lie - upon the shoulders of the League 
rather than upon the French and ourselves. 
Hoare felt that lie hat! very good rcas-Cns for hir, actimna. Ibr arranging 
an excuse for postponing the oil embargo, he believed that he was, as 
Baldwin had instructed him to do before he left Londong keeping Britain 
out of a war. 
22 Moreover, he was convinced that the proposals were the 
best that could be arranged under the circumstances and were 
the minimum upon which the French government 
were prepared to proceed, and this minimum was 
only reached after two days of strenuous 
discussions. 23 
The British negotiators also felt that any tems less favourable to the 
Italians would not induce them to st. oP fighting and agree to a negotiated 
settlement. 
24 Most important, t. hough, were their Perceptions of the 
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military situation in the Mediterranean and the threat of war. Despite 
Laval's firm assurances of support, 
France as a whole was determined not to go to war 
with Italy.... To force France against her will 
to fight would have meant a definite break of the 
Anglo-French understanding, and therewith risked 
the end, not only of the League of Nations, but, 
far more serious, of European civilization. Europe 
would have been left at the mercy of Germany when 
the time came for Berlin to move. 25 ' 
Even though the French government had finally been persuaded to show a 
much more willing attitude to co-operate, the British felt there was 
little in practice they could or would do. 
26 Ver7 simply, Hoare and 
Vansittart were afraidg-not of losing, but of the consequences of 
33ritain's having alone to bear the brunt of an Italian attack. This 
would, they feltj not only end Stresal undermine the Anglo-French 
entente, and weaken Britaints own defences, but it would also destroy 
the League of Nations. Rather than risk this cal. Imity, the Foreign 
Secretary attempted to reach a settlement which would be acceptable to 
Mussolini, shore up relations between Britain and France, yet still 
27 
satisfy and preserve the League. He believed that he had found one 
in the Hoare-Laval Plan. 
The Foreign Secretary and the Permanent Undersecretary were very 
pleased with what they thought they 
had achieved. That eveningg Hoare 
left for Switzerland and his badly needed holiday. By the time he 
arrived at the station, 
he was absolutely exhausted. He seemed so near 
28 
collapse that his secretary thought 
he would have to support him. 
Peterson travelled overnight to London with. a copy of the proposals 
and with the Foreign 
Secretary's letter to the Cabinet. Vansittart 
remained in Paris for further negotiations, 
None of the three 
anticipated the storm 
that was about to break. 
I 
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CAB 53/26. 
16. Eden, p. 299. 
17- Colving P- 78. 
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18. For Sunday's meeting, unlike Saturday's, there was no formal 
record. The most detailed account available, and the one least 
coloured by hindsight, is in Hoarets letter to the Cabinet 
written Sunday evening. That and the proposals themselves may 
be found in Cabinet Paper 23505), 9 December 1935, reproduced 
in Appendix IL 
19. Quoted from an unsigned Foreign Office minute of Thursday 
12 December 1935 (registry number J 91061111, PRO file number 
F, O. 371/19168). This clause was deleted from the version 
approved by the Cabinet and consequently is not to be found 
either in Cabinet Paper 23505) (Appendix II) or in the White 
Paper on Ethiopia (Appendix IV). For an explanation of this 
somewhat obscure matter, see Appendix III. 
20. Arnold Toynbeet SurveX of-International Affairs 1935t volume ii, 
Pp. 300-301- 
21. Templewoodt p. 182. 
2.2. See above, p. 192. In a letter to Baldwin dated 22 December 1935, 
Hoare wrote, 'I believe I have succeeded in doing what you wanted 
me to do. I have kept the country out of war. # (Cross, pp. 261-262) 
23- Speech in the House of Commons on 19 December 1935. Quoted from 
Parliamentary Debates. Official Report. Fifth Series. Volume 307- 
24- Petersonv p. 119. He claims that Laval was in daily contact with 
j*, ussolini over the telephone. Hoare wrote (Templewood, p. 179)t 
'More than once he rang up Mussolini with whom he seemed to have 
a direct line. ' Vansittart (The Mist Procession, P- 540) was also 
certain that Laval was in daily touch with the Italian leader. 
25. Telegram from Clerk to Hoare 1 15 December 1935 (registry number 
J 9431911119 PRO filp nnnlbpr CAD 2111412,111 rr-produced in Appendix I. I. 
26. For example, on 8 December, Sir Charles Mendl, the Press Secretary 
at the British Embassy in Paris, wrote to Vansittart 
(document 
available in PRO file number CAB 63/50): 
Even if M. Laval and the French Government give 
every assurance that in the event of a mad-dog incident 
occurringl they will be with us in every way, and in 
spite of the fact that 'Etats-Majorl are going to work 
together, no French Government - in view of the past 
three months' preparation of public opinion in the 
contrary sense - can in my opinion 'deliver the goods'. 
There would, in my considered opiniong be riots and 
almost civil war here. 
It is sad to writel but none the less true. Perhaps 
no one, not even Uger, will dare to tell you this, for 
they regret it so much and in. a great many cases are 
ashamed of it, but the moment is so grave that I think 
this eventuality must be taken into most serious 
consideration. 
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27- No mention occurs in the records of the possibility that Ethiopia 
might reject the terms. Presumablyq it was felt either that Haile 
Selassie would have to accept or that any rejection on his part 
would cause the blame for the continuation of war to fall upon 
him - thus allowing the League to abandon Ethiopia and letting 
Britain, and Francel off the horns of their dilemma. Similarly, 
as Laval stated during the first day of talks, the negotiators 
appear to have assumed that the League of Nations would approve 
of any Anglo-French proposals. 
28. Cross, p. 247. 
Chapter Eight 
The Third Decision Situation: 
The Hoare-Laval Crisis 
%%, -Laval Plan presented the British Government with an The Hoare 
occasion for deoi. sion that began for them the third decision situation 
of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. For twelve days, they wrestled with 
the problems caused by the Paris peace proposals. At the end of that 
. period, both their foreign policy and their domestic prestige lay in 
shaAnbl es- 
Sunday 8 Dece. m. bf-r 
Sunday evening, a very uneasy Anthony Eden went to speak to Stanley 
1 
Baldwin. During the day, information from Paris had gradually trickled 
into London. In the morning, the record of Saturday's discussions and 
the,, text of the same nightfs communiqu6 had arrived at the Foreign 
office. Later ong two further telegrams had come from the Foreign 
Secretary. In the first, he had expressed satisfaction with the progress 
of the talks; in the secondg he had asked -without any further explana- 
tion - that the Cabinet be convened on Monday. Perturbed by these 
developmentst Eden crossed Downing Street to consult with the Prime 
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Minister. That afternoon at Chequers, Baldwin had also received a 
message from Hoare requesting a Cabinet meeting on Monday, 
2 but he 
was equally puzzled as to why. He knew nothing else and agreed that 
they ought to try to get more information from Paris. Accordingly, 
Eden returned to the Foreign Oýfice and telephoned to the British 
Embassy. By this time, the conversations at the Quai d'Orsay had 
endedl and the secretary to whom he spoke informed him that Hoare was 
resting and Vansittartj staying as usual at the Ritz, was unavailable 
for comment. Asked for some further indication of what was going on, 
the secretary went to inquire and returned in a minute or two with the 
message that both the Foreigm Secretary and the Permanent Undersecretary 
were 'well satisfied with the day's work', that Hoare was about to leave 
for Switzerlandt and that Peterson was travelling overnight to London 
with a full record of the talks. 
Eden rang back to Baldwin to report. They were not reassured by 
the latest news. They had not expected the Foreign Secretary to stay 
3 
overnight in Paris; but they now knew that he had done so, and they 
ý-I worried p-boull, what else'he might have done that required so uracnt a 
Cabinet meeting. They agreed, howeverv that they could do nothing but 
await Peterson's arrival in the morning. Meanwhile, Eden 'drew comfort 
from the fact that Hoare was continuing his 'journey to Switzerland for 
his holiday, which hardly seemed to indicate any exceptional event'. 
Eden was wrong. In retrospect, Baldwin admitted that they ought 
to have found out more about what was actually happening in the French 
capital. 
4 Had they done so - had they'insisted upon talking personally 
to Hoare or Vansittartl or even to Clerk or Peterson - they might have 
forestalled the disasters of the next eleven clays. They did not do So. 
The Hoare-Laval crisis had began. 
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Monday 9 Dedember 
Monday morning brought confirmation for Eden and Baldwin of their 
anxieties. Peterson arrived at the former's house just before breakfast 
with two documents. 
5 The first was Hoare's letter summarizing the 
situation and advising the Cabinet to act at once upon his suggestions. 
The second was the Hoare-Laval Plan itself, consisting of four hastily 
drafted pages, written in French, and initialled IS. H., P. L. 1. Eden was 
su-rprised that the Foreign Secretary, being merely competent in French, 
had not insisted upon a translation. He was absolutely astonished by 
the actual proposals. He felt that they could not be reconciled either 
with the recommendations of the Committee of Five or with the instruc- 
tions previously given Peterson. 
6- 
Eden also found it remarkable that 
Peterson had not brought any verbatim record of Sundayis conversations, 
which he had not attended and upon which he could 'shed little light. 
7 
Later in the morning, at the Foreign Office, Eden explained the situa- 
tionjn detail-to Baldwin. Afterwards, when the Prime MinistAr asked 
him what he thought, Eden replied*that he was troubled but that two 
things were clear. Neither Haile Selassie nor the League would accept 
these terms. 'Baldwin granted and looked unhappy and commented: "That 
lets us out, doesntt it? " but he agr eed that the Cabinet must meet that 
evening and seemed as uncertain as myself why Hoare had suddenly done 
this thing. ' 
Though puzzled in general, Eden was clear on one point. With Hoare 
in switzerland, he now became effective head of the Foreign Office with 
the responsibility for implementing. the proposals. Ile wanted, however, 
_to'resign 
and to have nothing to do with them. He did not do so partly 
becau se of the uncertainty about the fate of the Plan and partly because, 
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as Hoare's 'Siamese twin' in the system of dual responsibility at the 
Foreign Office, he felt he could not abandon his colleague without 
knowing in any detail the reasons behind the latter's actions. Never- 
thelessl what he could and did do was to begin to alter both the nature 
of, the Plan and the procedures for handling it. After taking care to 
consult Baldwin and obtain approval for what he intended to dog Eden 
spoke that afternoon to Vansittart in Paris and arranged three changes. 
Firstg he* wanted the proposals communicated simultaneously to Mussolini 
and Haile Selassie. Second, he insisted that Britain and France not 
pressure the Eighteen to postpone their meeting scheduled for Thursday. 
Third, he deleted the clause banning Ethiopian construction of a rail- 
way. This had been included in the draft brought by Peterson and in the 
initial text of the Cabinet Paper circulated early in the day, but it 
did not appear in the laterv official version which the Cabinet actually 
considered. 
The issue of the railway eventually proved an acute embarrassment 
to the Governmentj but Eden's two procedural changes overshadowed it 
greatly in immediate importmance. Though =iincntly 'fairt, th y rc U ad .cd 
the possibility of the peace proposal's succeeding. Hoare and Laval had 
wished to present Haile Selassie with the fait accompli of Italian 
approval, in order either to ensure acceptance of the compromise or to 
transfer all blame for any failure away from Italy and onto Ethiopia - 
therebyl. they hoped, avoiding the oil embargo and saving Stresa without 
destroying the League. Eden's alterations weakened the force of this 
arrangement. Simultaneous communication of the terms to both parties 
not only meant a delay - in order to gain French agreement - in a 
process highly dependent upon speed. but also meant an increase in the 
chance of a leak 
(perhaps an intentional one) and of a consequent outcry. 
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of public opinion. If the Emperor learned of the details before 
Mussolini accepted them, he could get in first with a rejection or 
a qualified acceptance_and blunt the effect plotted in Paris. Moreover, 
by refusing to countenance the postponement of the meeting of the 
Eighteen, Eden was providing the League with a similar opportunity to 
turn down the proposals, or at least express its displeasure, before 
Britain and France could pressure, undoubtedly successfully, the 
Committee of Five into giving them its imprimatur. Thus, by altering 
the procedure and reducing the chances of the Plan's success, - Eden, 
with Baldwin's backing, had made the first crucial decision of the 
Hoare-Laval crisis. 
I>ublic reaction to the proposals began in London in the afternoon. 
The evening papers printed versions of -the peace terms that they had 
picked up from the morning press in Paris. In the House of Commons, 
the Government neither confirmed nor denied these stories, and in 
recponsc to qucstioning from reporierz Baldwin would only say-that 
matters were under consideration and that he should prefer not to make 
any further statement at the moment. This lack of any denial troubled 
the Government's supporters in Parliament, who felt that the reports, 
even if only generally'correctp went'far beyond anything yet put to them 
for approval. 
8 
Ministers themselves shared this unease. They met thatýevening at 
six o'clock in an atmosphere of almost unrelieved gloom. 
9 They knew 
that they had immediately either to accept or to reject the Hoare-Laval 
plan; they feared the costs likely-to result from either course; and 
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they possessed scant information on which to base their decision. Only 
three Cabinet Papers were circulated. The first consisted of the record 
10 
of Saturday's conversations in Paris. The second contained the two 
documents which Peterson had brought in the morning: the text of the 
Hoare-Laval Plan and the Foreign Secretary's letter to the Cabinet. 
" 
(Both of these-Cabinet Papers are reproduced in Appendix II). The third 
was a very pessimistic report from the Board of Trade on the subject of 
oil supplies for Italy. It stated that a complete embargo, though likely 
to prove effective, would depend primarily upon the whole-hearted com- 
mitment of the government of the United States, which was not a member 
12 
of the League. of Nations. Cabinet possessed no other documents. 
They consulted no other sources of information. They 'probably met in 
greater ignorance than on any oth er occasion between the warst. 
13 
Baldwin opened the meeting. He infor-med the assembled Ministers 
that he had summoned them at the Foreign Secretary's request, and he 
read them a personal letter from Hoare which Peterson had given him 
that morning. InAt, after having stressed the urgency of, the matter 
and the importance of keeping in line with tho French, the Foreign 
Secretary had written-that an agreement had been reached, that it was 
essential to approve it immediately, and that his colleagues at the 
Embassy had assured him that it was the best thing he had ever done. 
14 
Eden then explained the situation. First, he asked for approval 
of the two changes in procedure which, with Baldwints assent, he had 
already begun to arrange. As the new terms went a good deal further 
than those of the Committee of Fivel it seemed fairer to treat Haile 
Selassie equally with Mussolini, Sir George Clerk had agreed, and he 
and Vansittart would try to straight. en out this matter with. the French. 
Similarlyl the Permanent Undersecretary would arrange thatj instead of 
requesting a postponement of the meeting of the Eighteen, Britain and 
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France would inform the Committee of their attempt at a solution to the 
conflict and ask them to refer the matter to the Five. The increased 
risk of a leak, he noted, no longer mattered as the French had already 
allowed the proposals to become known to'their press. 
15 If this 
suggested course of action was adopted, the Eighteen would most 
probably adjourn and postpone any consideration of the oil embargo. 
Eden next made use of maps and of some extra information gleaned from 
Peterson to explain the terms in great detail. He pointed out that, 
according to a message he had received from Laval, the French intended 
to interpret them as generously towards Mussolini as possible. Finally, 
Eden supported Hoare's recommendations. He did so not because he liked 
them, but because of the Foreign Secretary's reputation for caution 
and shrewdness, because of his own feeling that something - as yet 
unknown in London - must have happened in Paris', and because of loyalty 
to his colleague. Though Eden later regretted this loyalty, it led him 
at the time, despite his initial impulse to resign and despite his 
dislike for the terms, to advise the Cabinet to accept the Hoare-Laval 
Plan. 16 A 
He added, however, a cautionary note. He warned that certain 
League members would find the proposals very distastefull and he 
expressed serious reservations about French support in the event of 
Italian aggression. Laval had stated that France would honour her 
obligations but had added that sanctions were unpopular wi: th an 
important section of opinion. - Eden thought that fear of French 
unreliability - especially if Italy approved the Plan while Ethiopia 
turned it down - had undoubtedly influenced the Foreign Secretary. 
Hence, Eden further recommended that the Emperor be pressed to accept 
the Plan as a basis for discussion - or at least not to reject it out 
of 
. hand. 17 
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The Cabinet next discussed the situation at length. While some 
Ministers approved the proposals (for example, Monsellq the First Lord 
18 
of the Admiralty, who though absent conveyed his support via Baldwin 
the majority disliked both the Hoare-Laval Plan and the probable effects 
of accepting it. They recognized that the situation could prove very 
satisfactory if all three parties to the dispute accepted the terms, but 
they doubted that the Emperor would give a definite yes, even as a basis 
forýnegotiations. If he did not'$ and both Italy and the League approved 
the settlementv the Cabinet felt that a very difficult position would 
arise as the French would feel justified in refusing to co-operate in 
eitfier future sanctions or-their consequences. If both Ethiopia and the 
League rejected the proposals, the Cabinet believed that the situation 
would prove equally unfortunate as the League might then be divided over 
'0 sanctions - with similar results - and the Government would have to 
19 
completely reconsider their position. Ministers also exhibited a 
marked distaste for the Plan itself. They criticized it on the grounds 
that the terms of settlement were better for Massolini than those of the 
F, vej thatýit would be said that-Italy's resort. to forcc had gained her 
pore than she would have otherwise received, and that the sphere of 
economic exploitation was unduly extended. 
Despite some attempt to counter these objections, the Cabinet on 
the whole demonstrated little enthusiasm for the Hoare-Laval Plan. 
20 
Nevertheless, at the end of the meeting, after some seventy minutes of 
21 discussion, Ministers finally accepted the peace terms; but they were 
discontented and apprehensive and hedged their approval. First, they 
supported the proposals as revised, without any ban on the construction 
of a'railway. Second, they agreed with Eden's changes in procedure and 
authorized him to clear them immediately with the French. Thirdq they 
also agreed with Eden's recommendation thatq when the terms were 
212. 
forwarded to Addis Ababa, an accompanying message to the British' 
Minister resident there should ask him to do his best, to persuade Haile 
Selassie to accept them or at least not to reject them out of hand. 
Fourth, without any reservations or second thoughts, the Cabinet, 
'assumed that the decision on the oil sanction would be adjourned'. 
Finallyl they agreed to hold their regular meeting of next Wednesday 
anýhour earlier than usualýin order to discuss the situation before 
Eden left that afternoon for Geneva and the meeting of the Eighteen. 
22 
These decisions reflected the uncertainty and tentativeness of 
Ministers. They were trying to make the best, of what they knew to be a 
bad situation. They were engaged in a salvage operation and only very 
reluctantly did they eventually approve of the Hoare-Laval Plan. They 
realized that a rejection of the settlement would force Hoare's resig- 
nation: the release of Sunday. night's communiqu6, the leak in the press, 
and the initialling of the draft all meant that he had committed himself 
publically and irrevocably. 
23 Any'attempt to retain him while at the 
same time discarding his proposals could only result in a situation 
where neithcr Parliament nor foreign governments could or would trust 
him. The fates of Hoare and his Plan were inseparable. As Baldwin said, 
they had 'either to ratify or disown Sam'. 
24 Nevertheless, a minority 
of Ministers, led by Neville Chamberlain, wished to reject the Plan, 
whatever the cost to the Foreign Secretary. The majority, howeverl 
agreed with the Prime Rinister that, despite all the arguments against 
the proposals, they must support them. 
25 They felt that . they should not 
condemn a fellow Minister without giving him a chance to defend himself 
and that they had a duty to stand by a sick and absent colleague. 
26 
Moreover, after his excellent performance at the India office, Hoare 
was, if not warmly liked, certainly greatly respected; his reputation 
led his colleagues to believe that he must have had good reasons for 
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what he did. As Halifax wrote: 'And what of course explains - but 
doesn't justify - what we did was the habit of immense confidence we 
had rightly 
. developed in him'. 27 The Cabinet also felt, or at least 
hoped, that the Plan might prove successful in getting negotiations 
started at Geneval where the specific details could then be altered. 
28 
More importantly, the Cabinet feared that an immediate rejection would 
have antagonized the French and caused Laval to refuse to furnish 
Britain with any military support in the Mediterranean. 
29 Similarly, 
the Cabinet decided to send that extra telegram to Barton in Addis Ababa 
because they realized that an outright Ethiopian rejection would have 
provided-Laval with a justification for not proceeding with the oil 
embargo, not implementing any further sanctionso perhaps ending those 
already in existence, and leaving Britain alone in the lurch. As far as 
the oil embargo was concerned, its likely postponement neither surprised 
nor upset the Cabinet, and they were glad to have an excuse to do what 
they had wanted to do all along. In fact, Neville Chamberlain shortly 
wrote to his sister that the object of Hoarets stopover in Paris had 
been to do exactly this: 
I believed, and so far as I know, my colleagues 
believed also, that he was going to stop off at 
Paris for a few hours on his way to Switzerland, 
to get the discussions with the French into such 
a condition that we could say to the League, 
tdon't prejudice the chances of a favourable 
issue by thrusting in a particularly provocative 
extra sanction at this momentt. 30 
Finally, the Cabinet's decision to meet earlier than usual on Wednesday 
reflected both their hesitancy about their support and their expectation 
that something was bound to happen during the next couple of days. 
Ministers' support for their Foreign Secretary, however reluctant, 
constituted the second crucial decision of the day. They accepted the 
Hoare-Laval Plan for four reasons. They hoped that the proposals might 
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lead to negotiation's beginning at Geneva; they feared the effect of 
a rejection upon Anglo-French relations; and they wanted an excuse for 
postponing the oil embargo. Most importantlyl though, they accepted the 
Hoare-Laval Plan out of personal sympathy for and loyalty to a respected, 
absentf and ailing colleague. It can fairly be stated that the majority 
of the Cabinet agreed to the settlement in spite of their dislike both 
for its terms and for its probable consequences. 
After the Cabinetp Eden returned to the Foreign Office to begin 
to implement the Plan as altered. He immediately telephoned Vansittart, 
who anticipated no trouble from Laval over the proposed changes. 
After 
dinner, however, Sir Robert reported that the French were creating 
difficulties and wanted to send a shorter account of the proposals to 
Haile Selassie. Eden refused. The Cabinet had decided that a full 
version must be sent. Shortly after midnight, Vansittart phoned again 
to say that the French would consent only on the condition that Britain 
agreed to the oil sanction's not being accepted at Geneva. Again Eden 
refused. Though he knew that the embargo would be postponed, he could 
not give such an undertaking without consulting Baldwin and gaining 
Cabinet approval. Vansittart went once more'to see Laval. Eden went 
to bed. 31 
The Hoare-Laval Plan presented the British Government with an 
exceedingly difficult and unpleasant problem. In response, Ministers 
made two crucial decisions. They altered the procedures arranged in 
Paris, and they went ahead and accepted the Hoare-Laval Plan as revised. 
These decisions proved incompatible. The second ensured a political 
215. 
uproar. The first made it probable that the Government would not even 
have a solution to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict to show for their 
troubles. For the most generous of intentions, for-reasons both 
sensible and compassionatev the Cabinet made a mistake. During the 
next few days, their error was to lead to catastrophic consequences, 
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Tuesday 10 December 
Tuesday morningp Eden returned to the Foreign Office to continue 
his argument with the French government. 
32 He found and circulated to 
the Cabinet Vansittart's latest telegram, giving the details of a 
meeting with Laval at 2 a. m. 
33 Anticipating that Haile Selassie would 
undoubtedly turn down the proposals in order to precipitate the oil 
sanotionl-the French Premier had eventually agreed to send them to 
Addis Ababa only because of Briti sh pressure. 
34 Considerine this a 
major concessiong he had insisted that any rejection must definitely 
mean no embargo; an Ethiopian refusal coupled with an Italian acceptance 
would make it impossible for him to persuade his colleagues to consent 
to any further measures. While he did not want to quarrel over this 
matter, he believed that in the above circumstances no country would 
proceed with additional pressure on Italy. Vansittart reported that 
Laval was not budging from this position and agreed that his argument 
j; c-ald prcbably find a good deal. of cupport outsido France: genor, -' 
opinion would not agree 'to apply stick to a country which had accepted 
the proposals'. 
Eden considered Laval's condition on the oil embargo unacceptable. 
He asked Baldwin to summon a Cabinet for noon and spent the rest of the 
morning drafting a reply. 
When the Cabinet met, they had a somewhat clearer picture of the 
situation than the previous day. 
3.5 They knew more of Laval's-inten- 
tions; they appreciated that initial reaction in Parliament had not been 
favourable, and they understood thato secrecy being impossiblel they 
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would eventually have to consider public opinion. Nonetheless, though 
not so ignorantl Ministers were no less gloomy than on Monday. They 
still disliked the Hoare-Laval Plan and continued to be greatly 
concerned about the consequences of their having accepted it. 
Eden opened the meeting by outlining the French Premier's latest 
demands. Following some general discussion, he distributed his proposed 
36 
reply. It insisted that early and complete communication of the text 
to Ethiopia was essential, that it was a matter of fair play, and that 
it could in no way be interpreted as a French concession to the British 
point of view. Second, while admitting that an imposition in the near 
future of an oil embargo was unlikely except in the event of an Italian 
rejectiono Eden's note strongly and definitely refused to agree to drop 
this measure in advance of the Italian and Ethiopian replies. Unlike 
Laval, Eden wished to, observe at least the niceties of behaviour. The 
Cabinet agreed completely with the League of Nations Minister and 
authorized him to proceed as he had outlined. 
Ministers next considered the overall situation. Their concerns 
rcm. ained very much the same asýon Monday. They fcarcd the conrioquenc-acc 
. 
of an Italian acceptance and an Ethiopian rejection; and they worried 
greatly about support in the Mediterranean, Swinton reporting on the 
very unsatisfactory nature of air discussions with the French which had 
began the previous day in Paris: 'it was clear, however, that they 
intended that the whole brunt of any hostilities should fall upon the 
British, and that no reliance could be placed upon them'. While some 
attempts were made, just as at the previous day's meeting, to defend the 
proposals, the Cabinet continued to dislike them; and Peterson, who 
attended at Baldwin's requests could add nothing to allay their 
anxieties. 
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In fact, the Government confronted an additional problem. Public 
opinion and the political situation within Britain threatened to pose 
serious difficulties. Before the Cabinet met, details of the Plan had 
already appeared in the morning papers, and according to The Times, 
'It is believed that in substance the proposals drafted in Paris are: - 
Italy would receive Danakil and the eastern 
part of the Tigr6, incl-ading Adowa and I-L-d-cale, 
but not Aksum. 
2. Ethiopia would obtain the port of Assab in 
Eritrea and a corridor to that port through 
Italian territory, or alternatively the port 
of Zeila. 
3- Italy would receive in the south all the 
territory included between the frontier of 
British Somalilandp the eighth parallel of 
latitude in the north and the thirty-sixth 
degree of longitude in the westv including 
most of the Ogaden. 
Withinher new frontiers Ethiopia would 
preserve her full independence and would 
receive League assistance for her develop- 
ment and the carrying out of necessary 
reforms. . 
(Thir, outlinel though correct for the northg ceded Italy outright in 
the south what she would only have received in a more roundabout way 
through the proposed zone of economic expansion and colonization. ) The 
manciester Guardian printed substantially the same version and added 
that out of Ethiopia's 350POOO square miles of territoryl 1509000 were 
to become Italian. Its editorial was incredulous: 
The first impression of the reported tpeaco 
terms, agreed on by Sir Samuel Hoare and M. Laval 
in Paris is that there must have been some mistake; 
these are surely not the Anglo-French proposals but 
the maximum terms of Mussolini.... It is impossible 
to believe it.... Such terms could never be granted 
by Abyssinia and could hardly be won by Italy in ten 
years' war. For the moment we can only believe that 
the Paris reports must be untrue and that full 
details will remove the present painful impression. 
F, den informed his colleagues that the press were asking for guidance 
and wanted to know if the Government had agreed to anything. Baldwin 
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added that the Leader of the Opposition had already served notice that 
he would ask that afternoon whether, before the Government took any 
further actiony they would inform the House of the nature of the 
proposals to which they had committed themselves. 
Thus, at the end of the meeting, having already dealt with French 
obstruction, Ministers had to decide how to handle a potentially adverse 
domestic reaction. They wanted to avoid or at least delay this incipient 
outburst. They agreed that Eden should tell the press that no proposals 
had yet been submitted to Italy or Ethiopia but that details of 
procedure were being discussed with the French. They also decided to 
respond to Attleets question by saying that nothing had yet been 
presented to either of the warring parties and that it would be 
premature to make any further statement at the present. If a supple- 
mentary was asked regarding when such a statement would be made, the 
answer should be if and when the appropriate League committee authorized 
publication of any suggested-settlement. Finally, if the Opposition 
wanted a debatet the Prime Minister should try to arrange that it not 
t. *-. c place bc1fore the folloiving Tuesday. In so far as pocsible, giv-!: rx 
the press reports, the Cabinet wished to preserve secrecy. They 
instructed Baldwin and Eden to stall. 
Tuesday's meeting served primarily to confirm the decisions taken 
on Monday. Ministers were still supporting the Foreign Secretary, still 
attempting to alter the procedure for handling the Plan, still worx7ing 
about French support, and still assuming, though unwilling to promise 
unconditionally to Lavalq that the oil embargo would be postponed. In 
addition, they were now trying to ensure that they would not have to 
confront the wrath of public and Parliament' before they had dealt with 
Geneva. 
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i 
They failed. That afternoon during question time in the House of 
Commons, Attlee refused to be fobbed off by the Cabinet's authorized 
answer to his queryj and he pressed for more information. Baldwin did 
h is best to mollify the Leader of the Opposition, promising both a 
White Paper and a debate as soon as possible and in any event before 
the Christmas recess; but Attlee would not accept any delay and stated 
that the Labour Party intended to raise the matter later in the day - 
which they could easily do as the House was sheduled that evening to 
debate the reply to the Speech from the Throne. 
Towards half past seven, Labour began a debate on the Hoare-Laval 
Plan. It was an absolute debacle for the Government. The criticisms of 
the proposals 
' as published in, The Times37 - proved difficult to 
answer and very much to the point: that they violated the Covenant; 
that they contradicted the pledges given by Hoare at Geneva and by him 
and IC-den to the House; that they gave Mussolini far more than he had so 
far gained by war; that they favoured Italy more than those offered 
before the invasion; that they were grossly unfair, particularly with 
respect to the so-called cxchange of torri. tcry; and most importantly 
that the honour of the Government lay at stake: they had called an 
election over this issue and won a great victory on the basis of their 
affirmations of support for the League and its principles - and they now 
intended to renege on their promises. 
Neither Eden nor Baldwin succeeded in refuting the main objections. 
The former fared rather better. While pleading the unavoidability of 
secrecy at this stage, he stated that 'considerable inaccuracies' 
existed in the press reports. He then justified the idea of the negotia- 
tions and defended the proposals not on any specific detail but on their 
three main principles: 
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An exchange of territory, conveying definite 
advantages to both sides; League assistance to 
Ethiopia for the purpose of social, economic and 
administrative developments; special facilities 
for Italian settlers and Italian companies in 
connection with that economic development. 
Those are the three principles upon which 
these proposals were based. 
Eden assured members that the proposalsl being only recommendations, 
would not be imposed upon any party to the disputet and he asked the 
House to trust the Government in these difficult matters. 
In contrast, Baldwin's speech was muddled and confused. It was an 
abject failure. Though he denied any underhandedness or attempt to 
impose terms of settlement, he conceded that the press reports were 
fairly accurate and, unlike Eden, made no attempt to indicate that they 
differed significantly from the actual Paris terms. He then went on to 
damn the League with faint praise and to admit that the oil sanction 
would have to be reconsidered - hardly an approach guaranteed to win 
him the approbation of the House. His ultimate defence rested upon the 
necessity of secrecy, and he astonished Parliament with two of the most 
enigmatic sentences ever uttered by a Prime Minister: 
I have seldom spoken with greater regret, for my 
lips are not yet unsealed. Were these troubles 
over I would make a caseg and I guarantee that 
not a man would go into the lobby against us. 
Baldwin made no attempt to explain what he meant, and he later admitted 
that this remark was 'one of the stupidest things I ever saidt. 
38 He 
was referring to various aspects of the situation that he felt he could 
not state openly in the House. He meant the danger of war, the menace 
to the fleet from Italian small craft operating in an enclosed areaq 
the ability Of Italian bombers to reach London, the drastic shortage of 
anti-aircraft ammunitiont and the threat from Germany. 
39 At the same 
timet though he felt morally certain that Mussolini had bought Laval, 
40 
he also knew that he could not stand up in Parliament and say that 
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France would desert Britain at the first sign of hostilities. Baldwin 
was correct in his judgement of what he coul d openly say, but his actual 
remark was a tremendous blunder. It aggravated the climate of discontent 
in the House of Commons and provided a boon to cartoonists who portrayed 
the Prime Minister with his lips taped together. The entire debate 
proved catastrophic for the Government. They failed to make even a 
half-convincing case for their actions and succeeded only in worsening 
their own position. Not a single one of their own supporters attempted 
to defend them041 
Meanwhile, as the House pilloried the Government and the press 
began to express its criticism, more bad news arrived from Paris and 
helped to confirm Ministers' fears. Vansittart had spoken to GeorgeSs 
Mandell the prominent politician, and General Gamelin, chief of staff, 
both of whom had said thatq while opinion was moving towards the British 
position, London must have patience for the moment and co-operate with 
parir 
42 Vansittart also reported that Cerutti had warned him thnt an 
43 
oil embarf; o meant war, and Clerk passed on a message which his 
Ethiopian colleague had jýist received from Addis Ababa: the Ethiopian 
government would reject any proposals which*rewarded Italian aggression 
and ignored the principles of the League of Nations. 
44 
Later in the evening, some less depressing tidings finally arrived. 
vansittart informed London that he and Clerk had presented the Govern- 
mentts views to Laval at six o'clock and that the French Premier, while 
evidently disappointed, had ultimately allowed that the British must 
judge the situation with respect to an oil embargo in the light of 
actual circumstances - such as their belief in the sincerity of any 
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acceptance of the proposals by Mussolini - and could not commit 
themselves in advance. 
45 
The French and British positions now ostensibly in accord, the 
Foreign Office proceeded late Tuesday evening to send telegrams 
simultaneously to the Ambassador in Rome and the Minister in Addis 
Ababa instructing each to make known, without publication and jointly 
with his French colleagueg the terms of the Hoare-Laval Plan to the 
Italian and Ethiopian governments. Another despatch, sent only to 
Bartonj told him to urge the Emperor to accept the proposals. All of 
these telegrams had been authorized by the Cabinet and were to be 
included in the White Paper that was to be released the following 
Saturday (Appendix IV). 
Barton, howevert received an extra message, not approved by the 
Cabinet, not sent to Drummond in Romel and not to be included in the 
White Paper. It informed him that Britain and France intended, 'at an 
appropriate momenttl to obtain from Haile Selassie an undertaking not 
to build a railway to his promised port. On Monday, Eden had deleted 
t-_ý, is clause from the Plarnq and-it did not appear in. the version 
considered and accepted by Ministers. Nevertheless, for some inexpli- 
cable reason, this telegram was sent to the British Minister in Ethiopia, 
Eden took this action entirely on his own withority (see Appendix III). 
His rationale is unknown and defies conjecture. 
5 
While the Cabinet were attempting to recover from the shock of 
the Foreign Secretary's actions, Sir Samuel Hoare himself lay flat on 
his back in Switzerland. He had arrived in-Zuoz Monday afternoon and 
gone figure skating -a sport at which he fancied his abilities - the 
following morning. While on the icep he had suffered a fainting spell, 
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fallen, and badly broken his nose in two places. His doctor declared 
that due to the danger of infection he was on no-account to travel for 
two or three days. 
46 
The Foreign Secretary's absence from London had been a major 
factor in the Cabinet's decisions on Monday. His accident meant that 
he could not return before the weekend. The Government would now have 
to continue to deal with the international and domestic consequences 
of the Hoare-Laval Plan without the presence and advice of the man 
responsible for and most knowledgeable about it. 
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Wednesday 11 December 
Wednesday morningt information from at home and abroad began to 
demonstrate to the Government the extent of the distaste-for the Hoare- 
Laval Plan. 
47 From Washington, the Ambassador reported that if these 
terms were final they would nullify any efforts that the United States 
government might make to influence opinion in support of collective 
action. 
48 In Geneva, unofficial, accounts of the proposals greatly 
upset delegates to the League. 
49 And Malcolm MacDonald received 
objections from the majority of the Dominions High Commissioners. 
50 
Even within the French government dissension existed. At a Cabinet 
meeting on Tuesday, Herriot, leader of the Radicals upon whom Laval 
depended for his majority in the Chamber, had vigorously disagreed 
with the Premier's contention that an Ethiopian rejection would make 
the continuation of sanctions unjustifiable. 
51 
Comment in the papers ranged from the outraged indignation of the 
News Chronicle =d tl; e Daily Herald to t-hc cautious approval. of the 
Scotsman and the Daily Express. In the middle stood the Daily Telegraph, 
which described ýthe settlement as bearing no relationship to the known 
position in East Africa 
(see above, page 169, for the abominable quality 
of war reporting) but which added that the reality of the Italian 
invasion meant that rigid insistence on a. return to the status quo was 
not the way to peace. The majority of the press, though by no means the 
totality, opposed the Hoare-Laval Plan, and even those papers which 
favoured it did so mainly out of a desire for peace rather than from 
outright support of the actual terms. The Times', while approving of the 
principles ennunciated Tuesday by Eden in the House, objected to the 
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proposals themselves and warned that any solution tmust not constitute 
a premium upon armed aggression, or serve as an encouragement to every 
future lawbreaker'. 
At ten o'clock in the morningt the Cabinet met. 
52 They had to 
decide what line to instruct Eden to adopt on Thursday at the meeting 
of the Committee of Eighteen. Aware of the opposition in the House, in 
the countryl and at Geneva itself, Ministers began to hedge on their 
support for the Hoare-Laval. Plan. 
As he had for the past two davs, Eden continued to make the 
running. 
53 He hoped that his colleagues would not expect him to 
champion the proposals in any detail, forp as most delegates to the 
League had probably already made up their minds, any such attempt would 
undoubtedly prove futile. He felt that Laval intended to weaken the 
terms in favour of Mussolini, and he wanted the Cabinet to authorize 
him to resist this and to ensure that any alterations went in the 
Oppo--ite direction. Eden fully, agreed with Neville Chamberlain's 
suggestion that he might be better off basing any defence upon the three 
principles which he himself had used in the House during the previous 
day's debate. With respect to the oil embar&o, Eden thought that the 
Government should support any action which other members of the League 
were prepared to take, but as a practical matter he believed that the 
question would be postponed pending replies from Rome and Addis Ababa - 
andt as Neville Chamberlain again added, the attitude of the United 
States. 
Discussion continued on the oil sanction. Baldwin stated that the 
effectiveness of this measure was an important consideration, and he 
emphasized several times that the question ought to be decided as a 
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business proposition and the embargo not undertaken till the Goverment 
could be certain that it would work. He felt United States co-operation 
to be crucial and believed that Britain should not do anything until 
they knew the intentions of the American government. The Cabinet debated 
the problem and expressed various opinions, one Minister suggesting that 
politically the important point was to avoid giving the impression of 
pusillanimity as this would be disastrous to British prestige. The 
dominant View was that Britain should maintain existing sanctions but 
attempt to avoid an embargo on oil; but 'there was general agreement 
that the Minister for League of Nations Affairs must not say that we 
would in no circumstances agree to the imposition of an oil sanction at 
some future date, or that recent events had removed sanctions altogether 
from the field of actiont. 
The Cabinet-reached no formal conclusions, but Maurice Hankey, the 
Secretary, drafted a summary of the discussion (included in the minutes) 
and handed it to Eden just prior to his departure at two for Geneva. It 
reflected the attitude of Ministers and constituted a set of informal 
instructions. -The Cabinet, as Baldwin pointea cut, agreed with the line 
which Eden himself had suggested at the outset of the meeting. They also 
approved of the Prime Minister's caution - undoubtedly an example of 
closing the stable door - that if Eden found himself in a difficult 
position he should refer to London for further instructions. 
For the third day in a row, the Cabinet followed the-lead given by 
33aldwin and Eden. Already, the latter had insisted upon altering the 
procedures and recommended, despite misgivings, acceptance of the terms. 
, _In 
both cases, Baldwin had fully backed him, and the Prime Minister had 
himself-taken the lead in defending. Hoare and in arguing against imple- 
menting the oil embargo. At today's meeting, Eden, again supported by 
j3aldwin, guided the Cabinet in making the third crucial decision of the 
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Hoare-Laval crisis: though still supporting the Foreign Secretary, 
Ministers began to hedge on his proposals. They agreed with Eden's 
recommendation that he should be circumspect at Geneva and should not 
advocate the Plan, especially in detail. They also approved of Baldwin's 
reluctance to proceed with the oil embargo - although they emphasized 
that Eden must be careful not to say this. As one Minister said, 'Eden 
has been told to tell the League that we shall not press them to accept 
it 
Ethe Hoare-Laval Plan]y i. e. we shall ask them to reject it,. 54 
It was a retreat. 
In the afternoon, opposition continued in the House of Commons. 
Pre'ssed during question time, Baldwin, who had assumed temporary 
responsibility for the Foreign Office in the absence of Hoare, Eden, 
and Vansittart, 
55 
gave no substantive answers and refused to commit 
himself or the Government in any respect on the subject of the Paris 
'proposals. He'did, however, say that Britain would not engage in any 
unilateral-embargo on oil and that it was essential to act collectively 
*through the League. Labour did not pursue the debate on foreign affairs, 
thereby saving the Government further acute embarrassment; but Vyvyan 
Adams, an extreme left-wing Conservative, tabled the first motion of 
censure: that the House did not assent to any settlement granting the 
aggressor more concessions now after her aggression than she could have 
previously received by peaceful negotiations. 
56 'The feeling in the 
House, I Harold Nicolson noted in his diaz7, 'is still enraged against 
the Laval agreement*. 
57 
And the editor of. The Times recorded in his diary: 'Public indigna- 
- tion growing over Paris Peace Plan. A bad press for the Government,., 
and a volume of letterst. 
58 Opposition was increasing, and the Cabinet 
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led by Baldwin and Eden had started to back down. They no longer wanted 
Geneva merely to modify the Plan; they were now beginning to hope that 
the League would actually reject it and save them from the unfortunate 
consequences of their own and their Foreign Secretary's actions. Of 
course, a League rejection coupled with an Italian acceptance threatened 
to activate another of the Cabinet's fears - French'refusal to provide 
any further co-operation. As of Wednesday, however, this worry began to 
fade away in the light of the greater domestic political danger likely 
to result from continued approval of the Paris peace proposals. 
S 
* 
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A Very Long Weekend 
Thursday 12 December - Sunday 15 December 
During these four days from Thursday to Sunday, with no Cabinet 
meetings to attend and no decisions -to make, Ministers, except for 
Eden at Gienevaq enjoyed a respite of sorts. In privatel however, 
they became increasingly alarmed about the mounting opposition at 
home and abroad. 
From their own embassies and from the foreign correspondents of 
The Timest the Government continued to learn of international reaction. 
()nly in Germany was there unrestrained glee, 
59 
while in Canada 
60 
and 
Belgium 
61 feelings were mixed. Otherwise, the information reaching 
London was overwhelmingly negative. British diplomats in the four 
Scandinavian countries, in Holland, in South Africa, and in Yugoslavia 
all described the horror at the proposals. 
62 
In Moscow, Pravd objected 
63 U and, from Washingtont tho 
,... strongly; assador 
reported that the 
pressl although hesitant pending official disclosure, were cynical, and 
he anticipated that Congress would now incline more towards an assertion 
of neutral rights rather than neutral 
duties. 
64 
Even in France much 
opposition existed. Among the newspapers, those of the left opposed the 
settlement, while those which were pro-Italian and of the-right suppor- 
ted it. In the lobbies of the Chamberg Socialist and Radical deputies 
65 
voiced considerable criticism, and two left-wing leaders, 11m. Cot 
and Blum, called for a. debate the following week. 
66 Herriot himself 
unrestrainedly expressed his disapproval to all comers 
67 (although, 
as The Times pointedly noted, it apparently had not occurred to him 
before the terms had been submitted that, given his positiong a 
practical remedy had lain in his hands). 
68 
At Geneva, toot the prevalent feeling was an intense dislike of 
the Hoare-Laval Plan. Eden arrived there Thursday mormingg talked to 
the Secretary General and various delegates, and cabled that the 
'impression which [the] Paris proposals have. made upon opinion here 
is even worse than I had anticipated'. Vasconcellos warned of their 
devestatihg effect upon the Eighteen; and the Spanish, Dutch, Greek, 
and yugoslav representatives all expressed their dismay. 
69 
In this atmosphere, Eden followed his instincts and his flexible I 
instructions and avoided any hint of support for the Hoare-Laval Plan. 
The Eighteen met on Thursday and immediately dropped the idea of 
transferring, as had been intended in Paris, responsibility to the 
Committee of Five. Eden, as well as the Turkish and Polish delecates, 
(all members of the Five) had objected to this Procedure. Instead, 
the Eighteen continued to meet, and it was to them that Laval defended 
his actions. He claimed that the search for a compromise was perfectly 
legitimate, that the negotiations h. -A becn public knowledge and quite 
above boardl and that the League had at the beginning of November 
approved the Anglo-French discussions. These, he continued, had 
produced the Paris proposals; and it was now up to the League, to 
whom they. would shortly be communicated (this was actually done on 
FI riday)t to decide how to proceed. Eden spoke next and adopted a very 
different tone. He, too, mentioned the approval of the League for the 
Anglo-French endeavours, but he stressed that that approval was not an 
official mandate but only an expression of goodwill. Theng barely 
concealing his dislike of the terns, he practically invited the League 
to reject them. They 
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are neither definitive nor sacrosanct. They are 
suggestions which it is hoped may make possible 
the beginning of negotiations. If the League 
does not agree with these suggestions we shall 
make no complaint. Indeed, we cordially welcome 
any suggestions for their improvement. 
The Eighteen then decided, and confirmed at a second meeting on Friday, 
that they could do nothing further but wait upon the decision of the 
Councilt which would meet next Wednesday to consider the Anglo-French 
proposals. Vasconcellos stated that he would reconvene the Eighteen 
as soon as the situation warranted and in any case at an early date. 
70 
Anthony Eden had performed his task well. He had ably conducted 
the British retreat and managed to ensure that the procedures adopted 
at Geneva confome. d closely to the Cabinet's wishes. The Eighteen had 
adjourned without discussing the oil embargo, which in consequence 
could not be implemented for quite some time yet - if at all; 
70a 
and 
the onus for any decision on the Plan now fell onto the Council of the 
League, who were made aware that Britain would not object in the least 
to their turning it down. Eden had begun publically to disassociate the 
Government from the actions of their Foreign Secretary. 
Eden had alsop shortly after his arrival in Geneva on Thursday, 
rung up Hoare to inform him of the deteriorating political situation 
in London and to recommend that he return as soon as possible. Sir 
Samuel received the same advice from Rex Leeperv head of the news 
department at the Foreign Officet who telephoned to Zuoz, found Hoare 
surprised at the uproarv and suggested that in his own best interests 
he come home at once. 
71 However, the Foreign Secretary remained 
sanguine and Idid not appear to consider the need so urgent,. 
72 
Meanwhilev the Italian goverment began to consider their position, 
Wednesday afternoon, the British and French Ambassadors submitted the 
proposals to Mussolini. Drummond reported that, though he had been 
unable to extract either a definite date for a reply or an indication 
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of its probable nature, both he and Chambrun agreed that the Italian 
leaderv while still undecided, would accept in principle provided that 
the threat of an oil embargo could be overcome. 
73 Officially, a 
communiquS released after the presentation of the Plan said only that 
it was being considered. 
74 Unofficially, however, optimism prevailed. 
While informed opinion showed more caution than the general public, 
it appeared that, despite certain disappointment with the settlement, 
Italy would accept it. 
75 
In Addis Ababa, the Hoare-Laval Plan was not formally submitted 
to Ethiopia until Friday morningg two days later than to Italy. A 
Ifaulty wireless' at the French Embassy caused the delay: in this 
at least Laval had finally managed to have his way. No official response 
came$ and, neither Barton nor his French colleague were ? sanguine as to 
the Einperor's reaction'; Barton himself believed that Haile Selassie 
would not commit himself to an answer until after he knew the League's 
attitude. 
76 In fact, the Emperor was attempting to finesse the issue 
by shifting any responsibility for a rejection to Geneva - just as the 
]3ritish were doing. ýlready on Wednesdayg the'Ethiopian Minister in 
Paris had sent the Secretary General a letter interpretine the 
ýroposals 
(the leaked version of course) to mean that they asked the victim to 
cede to the aggressor one half 
[sic] 
of its national territory directly 
and the other half in a disguised form pending further annexation. 
Ethiopia, this, note said, had-always been willing to participate in 
peace negotiations under League auspices, but before making any reply 
she wished the Assembly to convene so that every state could express 
its opinion, because the survival of the League hung in the balance and 
the Ethiopian government did not want to set a harmful precedent whereby 
any member nation would not be able in the future to ask for and receive 
a full public hearing. On Friday evening, the Secretary General replied 
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that as the Council had jurisdiction no decision could be taken on 
the Ethiopian request until after it met next Wednesday. 
77 Despite 
this rebuff, theýEthiopian stratagem had accomplished one important 
purpose: Haile Selassie now possessed a very good excuse for declining 
to give an immediate answer to the Hoare-Laval Plan. He could wait 
upon the League of Nations. 
Within Britain, during these four days, an enormous wave of 
hostility threatened to engulf the Government. Public reaction was 
78 'first stupefaction, then shame and anger'. Attlee condemned the 
proposals and accused the Prime Minister of cynically campaigning on 
a platform of support for the League and then reverting to his former 
beliefs after having won the election. 
79 Friday evening, a delegation 
from the League of Nations Union (including Lord Robert Cecil and Sir 
Austen Chamberlain) presented Baldwin with a resolution urging the 
Government to continue sanctions and not to support any settlement 
which-failed to make-it ol--ar that aggression'did not pay. 
80 
The Dean 
of Manchester in a sermon on Sunday night compared the Government to 
the false prophets of the Old Testament. 
81 
The King himself was 
sufficiently concerned to send his-secretary to see the editor of 
The Times. The two men walked over to Downing Street, and Dawson 
82 
looked in on the House, 'which was in a ferment'. A letter to the 
Foreign Office described the City as unanimously opposed to the Hoare- 
Laval Plany and the Thursday afternoon markets were weak because of 
fears of a political crisis. The City felt that France should have been 
left to propose such terms alone, and even a number of anti-Ethiopian 
diehards believed 'better a war with Italy than the. loss of our leader- 
ship in Europe and of the Government's reputation at home'. 
83 
In his 
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editorial in The Times on Friday, Dawson wrote that 'from nearly every 
representative and independent newspaper throughout the country, as 
might be seen from the excerpts given in these columns yesterdayl, comes 
the same warming in various tones' about the depth and strength of 
feeling in Britain; and on Saturday Dawson added that the publication 
that morning of the full text of the piýoposals in the White Paper (see 
Appendix IV) only confirmed their unfairness. 
84 
Of course, opinion was not unanimous. On Sunday, the Observer 
applauded the Plan as the only possible alternative to a European war 
which would end with nazi domination of the continent and Japanese 
domination of Asia, but this support was an exception. The terms did 
not receive much approbation. 
Though the Cabinet did not meet during these four davs, Ministers 
saw each othor informally and come at least were apprehensive. 
J. H. Thomas, for one, thought that it was the worst thing that had 
happened in his experience. 
85 
Eden returned from Geneva late Saturday 
night to find opposition mounting steeply and even the Foreign Office 
40 -tri (IP-4,86 On Soinday, Baldwi. n corisl0tkri -with both Rder and Neville 
Chamberlaing 
87 
and the latter wrote to his sister: 
Nothing could be worse than our position. Our 
whole prestige in foreign affairs at home and 
abroad has tumbled to pieces like a house of 
cards. If we had to fight the election over 
again, we should probably be beaten. 88 
The Prime Ydnister himself thought developments so grave as to warrant 
his sending a firm summons to the Foreign Secretary ordering him to 
89 
return to London. 
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Of all the problems confronting the Government, the rising tide 
of discontent within the House of Commons posed the greatest threat. 
Members were receiving a flood of correspondence, and the publication 
of the White Paper neither allayed their anxieties nor alleviated 
their distaste for the proposals. 
go In response to Labour's request 
for a debate, Baldwin agreed to set aside the coming Thursday for 
that purpose, 
91 
and backbenchers were hoping that this debate would 
clear away some of the fog surrounding the situation. 
92 But the 
crucial development was the fact that the Government's own supporters 
were turning against them. There grew over the weekend a movement 
among Conservative M. P. s for the resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare and 
his replacement as Foreign Secretary by Sir Austen Chamberlaing as an 
93 
elder statesman who would restore foreign confidence in Britain. 
On Sunday, Sir Austen himself wrote: 
Laval has behaved treacherously, but I fear that 
Sam Hoare has blundered badly. I don't know what 
part I shall take in Thursday's debate nor even 
how I shall vote. Much will depend on the speeches 
of Hoare and S. B., but they will have an extra- 
ordinarily difficult task, for I have never known 
the political sky clolid ovor so suddenly nor-, have 
I seen blacker clouds on the horizon. Dismay is 
not too strong a word to use for the feeling 
among their supporters when the news leaked out, 
and nothing that has happened since has reassured 
them. Baldwin spoke very frankly to the four of us 
who went as a League of Nations Union deputation, 
and Vansittart gave me even more details, but there 
was nothing to comfort one in what they had to say. 
I am left with the feeling that when all-is 
said and done, and when they have told the House 
all that they must now tell it and the world, it 
is still impossible to regard Hoare's action in 
allowing himself to be associated with the French 
proposals and to recommend them as other than a 
bad blunder. If the elections were just about to 
begin, instead of being just over, the Government 
would not get half their present majority. It is 
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certain that the Cabinet themselves were wholly 
unprepared for such developments, and I can only 
explain Hoare's actions by the fact that he was 
absolutely worn out and that his mind did not 
take in their effect or consequences. It is a 
tragedy. 94 
I 
2,38. 
Monday 16 December 
By Monday, one week after the initial decision to accept the 
Hoare-Laval Plant the Cabinet found themselves besieged from all sides. 
At home and abroad, from left to right, and even within the ranks of the 
Conservative backbenchers, the feeling predominated that the Government 
had made a horrible mistake. The situation, wrote the Daily Herald, was 
going 'From Bad to Worset. The Dominions Secretary received a very 
strong letter of protest from the gove rnment ofýSouth Africa. 
95 Prom 
Moscow, the Ambassador cabled that he had spoken to Litvinov, who had 
vehemently objected to the proposals; 
96 
and from Washingtong. The Times 
reported that the past week had 'worked grave, if not irreparable, 
injury upon the cause of American co-operation?. In the City, the 
weekend brought no weakening of the unanimous dipapproval. 
97 And 
discontent continued to grow in the House of Commons, where the Labour 
Party was almost certain to conduct. Thursday's debate on a motion of 
censure. 
98 
None of this reaction was really unexpected. It merely continued 
the trend evident since last Tuesday. blondayl howeverp did bring one 
startling new development. 
In a report from Paris, The Times dropped a bombshell. Nothing in 
the published version of the, Hoare-Laval Plan dealt with the use to 
which Haile Selassie might want to put his promised outlet to the sea; 
but there was good reason to believe thatj had he agreed to negotiate 
on the proposed basis, he would have been told - certainly after he was 
too committed to withdraw his assent - that no railway would be 
permitted to this port. M. Laval, continued The Times, had looked after 
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French interests with his usual ability: no danger threatened the 
shareholders of the Addis Ababa-Djibuti railway. 
In light of this report, Geoffrey Dawson dropped his normal, 
measured tone for one of shocked incredulity. He wrote a scathing 
editorial about 'A Corridor for Camels'. He pointed out that Ethiopian 
access to the sea was the 
one serious make-weight in a singularly ill-balanced 
project. But the latest news from Paris makes it 
clear that there was an intentiont however far it' 
may have gone, to deprive even this concession of 
most of its value. The Rnperor, we are told, was 
to be informed 'at a convenient moment' (presumably 
when he had recovered from the first shock of 
dismemberment) that he was forbidden to build a 
railway along his corridor. It was apparently to 
remain no more than a strip of scrubp restricted 
Ao the sort of traffic which 
- 
had entered Ethiopia 
from the days of King Solomon, a corridor for 
camels.... The suggestion seems so incredible, 
so completely at variance even with the most 
ýcynical interpretation of a 'civilizing mission', 
that its origin should be investigated before 
there is any fresh attempt at peace terms. 
No one, certainly not the editor of The Times, asked publically where 
the Ethiopians would obtain the resources to build such a railway or 
why a cecond outlet to the coast. wac necessary. Nor did anyone inquire 
'as to why Haile Selassiel who just happened to be a large shareholder 
in the French line, would want to go into competition with himself. 
99 
And these points, though correct and unassailable, were irrelevant. 
The matter was one of principle: the inclusion in a secret deal, already 
smacking of deviousness and treacheryl of-a yet-more secret clause 
accompanied by a vex7 underhanded procedure. 
This latest news further incensed M. P. s. In the afternoong a 
crowded House bombarded Eden with questions. He would not go into any 
detail and simply reaffirmed that any settlement must be consistent 
with the Covenant. In a supplementary, Hugh Dalton asked whether the 
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Goverment still accepted 'responsibility for these shameful proposals"? 
Amidst cries of tanswerIg Eden remained silent and the Speaker ruled the 
question out of order., 
100 
MY Monday eveningg with the issue of the camel corridor acting as 
the last straw, the Government themselves decided to reverse their 
original decision. Their retreat was developing into a rout. Practically 
all Ministers, both in and out of the Cabinet, by this time agreed that 
the proposals were a mistake; 
101 
and four of the younger members, 
Elliot, Duff Cooper, Stanley, and O=sby-Gore, were actually pushing 
the Parliamentary correspondent of The Times against the Hoare-Laval 
Plan. 102 
In light of this furor, several Ministers held an informal meeting. 
at nine o'clock in the evening in the Prime Minister's room at the House 
of Commons*103 Present were Baldwin, Ramsay MacDonald, Neville 
Chamberlain, Simon, Duff Cooper, Swinton, Runcimant Monsell, and Eden. 
Tj.. ey intended to conduct a preliminary discussio n, prior to Tiiesdanylcc 
full Cabinetp of what line to follow Wednesday at Geneva. Firstj though, 
Eden gave an explanation, obtained from Vansittart, of the camel 
corridor (see Appendix III). Then, he handed round a draft of the 
statement he proposed to make at the opening of the Council. While 
he would defend the Government's actions in attempting to find a 
solution, he would invite the Council to reject the actual terms. 
After considerable discussiong those Ministers present approved this 
draft for submission to the entire Cabinet the following day. Thus, 
subject to ratification on the morrow -a pro forma matter given the 
attendance that evening - the Government had made the fourth crucial 
decision of the crisis: to reject the Hoare-Laval Plan. 
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No longer content to ask the League to alter the proposals, 
or even quietly to bury them, they now agreed with Eden's intention 
to -act as one of the pall bearers. Howeverg as they were soon to find 
out, they had delayed the funeral for too long. 
i 
. 
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Tuesday 17 December 
Tuesday marked the turning-point of the Hoare-Laval crisis, the 
watershed between its opening and closing stages. For the past week, 
both Parliament and public, had hurled condemnations at the peace 
proposals and the Goveimment's decision to support them. Already last 
Wednesday, the Cabinet had begun to retreat, and Monday evening they 
had finally decided to reverse their position and reject the Plan. ý- 
]3at they had waited too long. Too many unanswered questions existed, 
and the whole situationj as Halifax later wrotel smacked too much of 
'the off-the-stage arrangements of nineteenth century diplomacy'. 
104 
Harold Nicolson was to express the dominant sentiment when, during 
this coming Thursday's debate, he stated that British foreign policy 
deserved to be conducted honourably and openly, at Geneva and not in 
the Ifoetid saloons of the Quai d'Orsayl. The Paris proposals were 
dead, but the fate of the Foreign Secretary and the very survival of 
thn Govemment now hung in the balance. The Conservative Party was 
threatening to oust Stanley Baldwin and his Ministry from office. 
Starting Tuesday and continuing for the next two days, events abroad 
carried virtually no relevance for the Cabinet's decisions. Even 
opinion in Britain mattered little. All that really counted was the 
feeling among the Tory backbenchers. In their hands-lay the future of 
the Gove=ment. 
Early in the morning, Neville Chamberlain went to talk to the 
Foreign Secretary. Hoare had flown back to London Monday afternoon and 
gone directly home, ordered to stay there by his doctor who warned that 
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if he went to the Cabinet he might pick up a serious infection and n6t 
be able to speak in the House on Thursday. Consequently, Hoare being 
unable to defend himself in person, Chamberlain went to discuss the 
situation with his close friend in order to report back to the Cabinet. 
The Foreign Secretary admitted the drawbacks to the Plan but insisted 
upon attempting to vindicate himself in Parliament. He felt certain 
that the right course for his speech-required him first to explain 
fully to ýhe House the reasons behind the terms and second to add that 
Britain and France were acting on behalf of the League of Nations which 
had the responsibility for accepting or rejecting recommendations that 
appeared to himself and the French 'to contain the minimum proposals 
for stopping Mussolini short of the risk of going to war with him% 
The'Foreign Secretary then began to draft his speech, and the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer departed to report back to the rest of his colleagues. 
105 
The Cabinet met at ten o'clock in the morning. 
106 Baldwin 
explained the early hour as due to Eden's having to catch the two 
o'clock train for Geneva and wishing first to consult with the Cabinet 
and with the Forein- Secretary. Chamberlain was at the moment with the 
latter and would arrive later. The situation# the Prime Minister said, 
had to be considered from the point of view of the upcoming meeting of 
the League Council and of the debate in the House of Commons, 
Ministers first listened to Eden's explanation of the camel 
corridor and then to Chamberlaints report on Hoare's proposed speech 
to Parliament. In neither case were they satisfied with what they heard, 
and they authorized the Prime Ministert the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and the Minister for League of Nations Affairs to speak to the Foreign 
Secretar7 and to clear matters up as to the general line to be taken in 
the debate. They-also authorized Baldwin to summon, if necessar7, 
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another meeting in the evening, but he preferred in the excited state 
of public opinion to defer further discussion until their regular 
Weekly session scheduled for the following day. 
The Cabinet could not, however, postpone a decision on what to do 
at Geneva. Eden-handed round a draft of his speech to the Councill which 
effectively recommended that the League reject the peace proposals; and 
he askedp as he had'a week previouslyg that it be approved as a general 
guide and not a firm instruction. Chamberlain had already stated that 
the Foreign Secretary approved of this approach; and Ministersl after 
taking a short interval to read it, fully agreed with both it and Eden's 
request for latitude. Thus, they confirmed the decision tentatively made 
the previous night and completed their retreat on the Hoare-Laval Plan. 
As far as the Oil embargo was concerned, Eden proposed that if the 
matt_er. were raised at Geneva (my emphasis: the- implication being that 
FAQn would not himself raise the issue) he should state that the 
gttitude of the Government had not changed and though still approving 
in prinoiple they wished to be satisfied that in the existing circum- 
stances it would prove effective, Baldwin stressed tha importance of-, 
t1lip last consideration and repeated that, 'as he had again and again 
emphasizedt, before Britain could agree to this measurd the League must 
ite praQticability. To this was adde qx, gm A that the American attitude 
j: n particular must be looked intop though Eden thought it'preferable for 
@Qme QtliQr 3aatiQn to raise this point. As with the proposals, the 
C4binet fully agreed with Men's approach to the possibility of the oil 
qm'b4rgo. Finallyl just before the end of the meeting, they briefly 
q9j%QidQred the BVAQpian request for summoning the Assembly into session 
@Ad (IqQidQd th4t FAQz%* while not taking the. lead, ishould attempt to 
4yqid 
The Cabinet once again followed the advice given by Eden and 
Baldwin. They reversed their initial decision to approve the Hoare-Laval 
Plan. Both it and the oil embargo were dead, and Eden at Geneva was-to 
ensure that they were decently and quietly interred, without reflecting 
ill upon the honour or courage of Britain. However, the Government still 
planned to support their Foreign Secretary and energetically to defend 
at least the attempt to find a peaceful settlement. 
Such were Baldwin's intentions when at half past eleven he ended 
the meeting107, and accompanied Chamberlain and Eden to call upon Hoare. 
They found him looking miserable. 'I wish I were deadt' he replied when 
the Prime Minister asked him how he felt. Eden could only stay briefly, 
and as he, left to catch the train from Victoria the Foreign Secretary 
thanked him for his loyal help. 
108 Chamberlain and Baldwin stayed on 
for an hour and a half. The latter was uncommunicative but commented 
in parting, 'We all stand together'. 
109 
Howevert as A. J. P. Taylor rather. bitingly-remark-st Stanley Baldwin 
did not add that they would all fall together. 
110 And what marked this 
day as a watershed was the emergence of the threat of defeat for the 
Government and loss of office for the Prime'Rinister. In the, afternoon 
in the House of Commons, Attlee served notice that the Labour Party 
would put forward the following motion during Thursday's debate: 
. -That the terms put forward b3r His Majestyfs Government as a basis for an Italo-Abyssinian 
settlement reward the declared aggressor at the 
' 
expense of the victim, destroy collective security, 
and conflict with the expressed will of the country 
and with the Covenant of the League of Nations, to 
the support of which. the honour of Great Britain is 
pledged; this House, thereforej demands that these 
terms be immediately repudiated. 
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Bat the real drama of the day occurred behind the scenes in the House 
of Commons. ýThe challenge came not from the Labour Party's overt 
opposition, which was expected and merely an annoyance, but from the 
extraordinar7 and still rising discontent within Conservative ranks. 
From leftl'right, and centre, and not merely from a few radical Tories, 
came-this overwhelming thundering of disapproval. David Margesson, 
the Conservative Chief Whip, feared that unless the Goverment 
jettisoned both Hoare and his proposals they would lose the vote, and 
he for one wanted the Foreign Secretar7 to resign. 
112 So did Duff 
Cooper, who approached Neville Chamberlain to report a strong and 
growing feeling in this direction even within the Cabinet - especially 
among Elliot, Stanley, Ormsby-Gore, and himself. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer replied that it would be unprecedented and improper to demand 
a Minister's resignation in his absence: the entire Cabinet had accepted. 
responsibility for the proposals, and the House would condemn them for 
making a scapegoat of the Foreign Secretax7.113 Chamberlain, though 
undoubtedly correct, was struggling against the tide. As the day wore 
oni the pressure mouni: od. 
The precise turning-point of the Hoare-Laval crisis occurred 
Tuesday evening at-a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Conservative Party - in effect a gathering of all the backbenchers. 
Hostility ran high. 
114 Almost all those who spoke opposed and condemned 
the proposals and favoured instead a policy based on the League of 
Nations. 
115 Sir Austen Chamberlain, 'the most respected Conservative 
back-bench'membert, was the key figure. 
116 'Aged, cadaverous, correct 
and politej, 
117 he expressed the general sentiment when he said that 
118 tgentlemen do not behave in such a way. 1 On his recommendation, 
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the Committee resolved not to decide how to vote until they had heard 
119 
Hoare's speech on Thursday. Instead of assuring the Government of 
their support, the Tory rank and file were threatening to defeat their 
own Ministers on a vote of censure. 
The day ended with the crisis at its peak. The survival-of the 
Government lay in doubt. 
0 
Wednesday-18 December 
The second stage of the crisis continued Wednesday at a fevered 
248. 
pitch. As the Government struggled to save themselves from impending 
disaster, $tanley Baldwin, master politiciang set to work. 
Outside of Westminster, there were only two new developments of 
any note. From Washingtong the Ambassador cabled that American 
co-operation with any future oil embargo now appeared highly unlikely, 
11 
and he expected that the policy of limiting exports would be allowed 
to lapse. 
120 From Paris came full descriptions of the previous day's 
debate in the Chambpr. It reflected the unsettled and divided, state of, 
French opinion. While the left bitterly attacked the suggested termst 
the right defended them; and Laval turned the issue into a matter of 
confidencep surviving by a margin of only fifty-two, his lowest 
majority of the session. Fear of provoking a crisis and the reluctance 
of all the possible successors to Laval to replace him at this rather 
critical momant, influenced the result and saved him fro. -. 1 probable - 
defeat. In the country, the division of opinion continued, and even 
those-who sympathized with Laval's contention that an oil embargo meant 
war failed to see why this belief should have led him to the presenta- 
tion of such proposals. Those who opposed him were asking whether a 
success for Massolini would be a dress rehearsal for a far more 
effective performance by Hitler. 
121 
At eleven o'clock in the momingg the Cabinet held their sixth and 
final session of the-crisis. 
122 Ironically, only Hoare and Eden, the 
two Ministers at the Foreign Office were absent. After some preliminary 
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matters, Halifax suggested that, though the Cabinet could not draft 
any resolutionsl'it might prove useful to resume the previous day's 
discussionýon'how to'approach the upcoming Parliamentary debate. 
What followed constituted one of the most unusual and dramatic Cabinet 
meetings of modern times. Hankey considered the proceedings so important 
that he'identified each speaker separately and so sensitive that he 
wrote the most critical passages in longhand rather than typing them. 
He went so far as to make no copies of the minutes and to place the 
original under seal with the Cabinet archivesp where it remained 
unopened until 1946. Hankey adopted all these precautions because 
Ministers took theýextraordinary step of doing what Neville Chamberlain 
had told Duff Cooper they must not do: they turned on one of their own. 
I The discussion begant howeverl on a rather different and much more 
innocuous note. Baldwin opened the proceedings with an expression of 
support for the Foreign Secretary. He probably felt 'on trial' and must 
be allowed to make his speech in his own way. The Prime Minister added 
only that Hoare should and undoubtedly would raise the all-important 
issue, of whatýother nations would do in-the event of wav ;,; zr3.. nf ý-Ow far 
Laval was prepared to go in the event of a sudden Italian attack. 
Neville Chamberlain agreed that the Foreign Secretary most likely 
felt on trial, 'though, of course, the Cabinet were with him'. He still 
thought that his actions had been absolutely correct and intended to 
defend himself in the House of Commons, but he was now prepared to admit 
that in view of public opinion the Government could no longer support 
his proposals. Chamberlain himself thought that he had been misled by 
his staff (in other words by Vansittart) and might easily in his 
exhausted physical condition have committed an error of judgement* 
The, Chancellor of the Exchequer then addedl in agreement with the 
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Prime Minister, that Hoare would have to make clear the conditions 
which had weighed with him. 
Chamberlain went on to present the Cabinet with an outline of the 
Foreign Secretary's proposed speech. While it would be improper, he 
said, to repeat it word for word, he would try to convey the general 
approach. (Tuesday evening he had received a draft from Hoare and had 
stayed up, late making an abstract of it. 
123) As he explained it, the 
Foreign Secretax7lsýargument would rest on four major points. He would 
begin by emphasizing the-terrible danger of a European war. He had 
wished to avoid this happening and had gathered during the election 
that the British people shared this desire; but the proposed oil embargo 
had brought the situation into the danger zonel. and, as the'atmosphere 
in Paris had been full of the-talk of war, he had felt that the risk was 
so-great that he ought'to consider the possibility of-a peaceful settle- 
ment. Second, the Foreign Secretary would defend the terms on the 
grounds of their similarity 
[sic] to those of the Committee of Five, 
which'the Emperor had aoceptedg and of their comparing favourably with 
Mussolini's demands. of laat Juno. Dospita containine much that 111c .ý-, 21 . 
disliked, they were the best that could be obtained with a reasonable 
chance of success. Hoare's third point would be that only two methods 
of achieving peace existed: negotiation or dictation. A negotiated 
peace'would be impossible at the present time without giving something 
to the aggressor. If# as he was now prepared to admitj the proposals 
were dead, the only alternative was to turn back to sanctions. However, 
and this would-be the fourth and final aspect of the Foreign Secretar7ts 
defence, sanctions were extremely dangerous, They might very well lead 
to hostilities, especially given their cumulative effect; and, though 
he did not fear the results of a conflict, it might pit Britain single- 
handedly against Italy. No other country, he would emphasize, had 
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prepared for war, and he would speak with the utmost frankness about 
Laval's position. Britain did not want to fight alone, and the actual 
situation was that no shipp no plane and no gun had been moved by any 
other nation. 
The onslaught began immediately. Ministers refused to agree to 
Hoare's proposed speech. Most of them insisted he could not make it 
as Foreign Secretary; many of them objected to his making it at alll 
even from the backbenches. 
The initial reaction came from two junior Ministers. Kingsley 
Wood felt very apprehensive of a defence on the suggested lines. Oliver 
Stanley feared that it wouli have a devestating effect in Parliament 
because, as the press had so ably rubbed in, arguments which might 
suffice for not imposing new sanctions hardly justified such an 
unsatisfactory peace. The criticism would be-made-that at-the dlection 
the public had not been informed of the true positiong and it would be 
recalled that only two days before he went to Paris Hoare had reaffirmed 
that a settlement must be acceptable to both Ethiopia and Italy. Stanley 
., 'thought that the Foreign Secretar7ls approachandangered the futuro of 
the Goverment. In reply to a cruestion from Baldwin as to what arguments 
he would uses he responded that while he was willing to agree to the 
early parts of the speech explaining the difficulties of the situation 
he felt that with respect to French unpreparedness all that could be. 
done was to mention Laval's expressions of good will. Hoare could not 
say that ships and planes'were not ready. 
Swinton continued the criticism. He, too, agreed with the first 
part of the speech and, unlike Stanley, felt that French unreadiness 
to implement Lavalts undertakings ought not to be concealed, but his 
assent hinged on the understanding that Hoare spoke only on his own 
behalf. The Government would never in advance have approved negotiations 
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on these lines, nor could they ever agree with the satisfaction 
expressed for the terms in the Paris communiqu6. They must admit 
that the proposals were dead. 
J. H. Thomas then carried Swinton's argument to its logical 
conclusion. After that speech, the Foreign Secretary would be 
discredited at Geneva and mistrusted e-ýerywhere in Europe, and 
his policies would always be suspect. Thomas could consent to the 
first part of the speech as background; but ifq as suggested, Hoare 
made the latter part about other nations' unpreparedness on his own 
behalf, then he should resign and free the Government of responsibility. 
In that. wayl if it was clear that Hoare was making only a personal 
defence, the Government could successfully ride out the storm. 
The Cabinet found themselves divided over the very important issue 
of international support for Britain. Duff Cooper and the Marquess of 
Zetland challenged the assertion that Britain would have to stand alone; 
both thought other countries would co-operate, and the former even said 
that the French army was better prepared than the British. On the other 
hard, Baldwing Swinton, and 'i'Sotanley doubtGd that France would provide 
support. The point, stated the Air Secretaryl was not a matter of 
preparedness but rather of willingness. 
The reality of the situationg however, was largely irrelevant. 
What counted was what the Foreign Secretary could say during the debate. 
()nly Swintong and initially Baldwin and Chamberl'ain in what they said 
before the latter's outline of Hoare's defence, thought that British 
fears about being caught alone ought to be expressed. Stanley, Thomas, 
Elliot, Ramsay MacDonald, Kingsley Wood, Hailsham, and certainly Duff 
Cooper and Zetland disagreed. tIt might, ' said Walter Elliott $be a 
speech for a Member of Parliament to remember, but it would have a 
shattering effect in Europe. ' The Cabinet must consider, he went on, 
A 
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whether Hoare ought to resign. Ramsay MacDonald agreed that this aspect 
of Hoare's argument would make Britain's position impossible at Geneva 
and with the United States. Moreovert Hailsham pointed out, it would 
be a hopeless line to follow in Parliament, for 'the one thing to nail 
the lid on the coffin would be to say that we were not going on with 
sanctions on the ground that other nations had made no preparations'; 
and Kingsley Wood added that no one had yet said publically that other 
countries were not prepared to play their parts. Though their reasons 
differed, a very significant proportion of Ministers refused to assent 
to Hoare's stating that Britain's allies would leave her to fight Italy 
by herself. 
In fact, most of the Cabinet were no longer willing to stand by 
the Foreign Secretary at all. Other than Baldwin and Chamberlain, only 
Zetland spoke in his defence. He recalled that they had initially agreed 
to, the proposals because otherwise they would have had to repudiate Sir 
Samuel Hoare and that consequently they had accepted a responsibility 
of which they could not now rid themselves even if certain Ministers 
,, did Zetland addedthat-he-too had no. objection to the first 
part of the argument and that Hoare could make a very plausible case for 
his actions by saying that the, proposals had only been put to the League 
as a possible basis for discussion and nothing more. However, even the 
India Secretary refused to accept the latter part of the speech: not 
onlyýdid'he think that Mussolini was bluffing, but he also believed that 
in the unlikely event that war did break out aid for Britain would 
certainly be forthcoming. 
Even this qualified support for the Foreign Secretar7 was an 
exception. Lord Eustace Percy continued the attack. He felt that the 
political situation was 'tragic', and he insisted that the Government 
must avoid any hint of fearing Italy and any justification of the 
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suggested terms. If Hoare wanted to proceed with his proposed speech, 
he should resign. Ormsby-Gore agreed with this conclusion. He thought 
that the main criticism in the House would come on the method of the 
Plants presentation to Ethiopia and that the only chance of getting 
away successfully required the admission of a mistake. Recalling his 
election pledge that he was prepared to resist the triumph of force,, 
he also stated that the Foreign Secretary must-resign. 
Sir John Simon joined the rising chorus of opposition. The line 
put forward by the Marquess of Zetland - that the proposals only 
constituted a tentative suggestion - would not stand the test of a 
debate in the House, because the telegram instructing Barton to urge 
Haile Selassie to take a favourable attitude contradicted this defence. 
(Chamberlain here interpolated that he had not had the slightest idea 
thatý'this telegram would be made public in -the-. White Paper. -)-Moreover, 
continued Simon, he disagreed with Hoare's unrepentant belief that the 
-proposals were correct, and he could not defend them either in the-_ 
House or elsewhere. What made matters worse was the argument that in 
__ .. ti-, a atmosphcre of war -prevail 
ing-, in Paris -the-Foreign S. Foretary had. 
decided that a negotiated peace provided the only alternative; the 
House believed that no connection existed between going slowly on 
sanctions'and pressing the terms upon the Emperor. Hoare had not acted 
consistently with his speech to the Assembly in September when he had 
pledged British support for the collective maintenance of the Covenant. 
Simon refused to acquiesce in the Cabinet's calling the proposals 
acceptable and thought, in factl that Labour's motion of censure very 
'nearly expressed what Ministers felt. 
Halifax pushed the attack home. He wished to base the Govermment's 
defence on a plain statement of what had happened: the difficulties 
facing the Cabinet-in view of the Foreign Secretary's absence and ill 
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health. But they had to admit their mistake, and Hoare must resign. 
At stake lay the whole moral position of the Government before the 
world; and Halifax added what no one had yet said: 'If the Prime 
Minister were to lose his personal position, one of our national 
anchors would have drageed'. 
Baldwin himself, after his initial defence of Hoare, had little 
to add. He noted only that he had yet to make up his mind and that 
he had never known a worse situation in the House. The Goverment's 
majority might fall to one hundred. 
With the discussion almost over, Chamberlain said that after the 
meeting he intended to return to the Foreign Secretary as it was only 
fair to give him some account of the proceedings. Hoare, he believed, 
would undoubtedly give careful consideration to the views expressed. 
The Chancellor had been defending his friend all through the above 
attackog and he continued to do so. Though the Foreign Secretary was 
bound to present his own reasons for his dotions, he (Hoare) did not 
think that, as the proposals were admittedly dead, he was committing 
thn Cove-r-rimont. 
Sir John Simon refused to let Chamberlain get away with this. 
If 'Hoare as Foreign Secretary stated that he had not changed his mind 
in considering the proposals rightl the Goverment were all exposed to 
a challenge'. ' 
On this note, the Prime Minister closed the discussion. 
As Halifax had said at the beginningr the Cabinet could draft no 
resolutions. Little doubt existed, howeverg as to the sense of the 
meeting. Of twenty Ministers present, fifteen participated in the 
discussion, and twelve clearly opposed Hoare's speech. His refusal to 
recant ensured that, if he stayedg the Government would be distrusted 
throughout the world and defeated - or at least suffer a crushing 
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diminution of their majority - in the House of Commons. Even Zetland, 
who thought that, in view of the Cabinet's earlier decision to support 
the Foreign Secretary, they could not now renege on their responsibi- 
lity, disagreed with much of Hoare's argument. Only Neville Chamberlain 
stood fully by his friend, refusing to make a scapegoat of him. Though 
nine days ago he had led the opposition to accepting the Plan, he at 
least of the Cabinet was willing to honour his commitment. Throughout 
the disciissiont'he had been attempting to defend the Foreign Secretar7 
and to interpret his speech as favourably as possible, pointing out, 
for example, that his conclusion was not that war must be avoided at 
the cost of a negotiated peace but rather that #the risks of war were 
so great that a vigorous effort must be made to avert it'. Chamberlain 
also said - astonishingly enough that he had gathered from a 
telephone message that Hoare might actually accept the Labou. r motion 
of censure (? j). The Chancellor even wrote a note to Halifax asking 
whether the Foreign Secretary might not say that he had offered his 
resignation but was leaving it to be accepted or rejected according to 
124 - the result of the debate. This sugge--tion, of course, wras unaccept- 
able; and, as Chamberlain entered in his diary:. 'Generally it was felt 
that we must own up to a mistake and Halifax carried most weight when 
he said thatj unless Sam went, the-whole moral force of the Government 
would be gone'. 
125 The only other Minister who said anything in favour 
of the Foreign Secretary was Stanley Baldwin in his opening remarks; 
but during the discussion, he added little except that he thought the 
situation extremely serious. By the end of the meeting, thb Prime 
Minister realized that he could no longer support. an unrepentant Foreign 
Secretary. Something had to give: the tone of the meeting had indicated 
to Baldwin that the Cabinet would not allow him to brazen it out. This 
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overwhelming opposition meant that Hoare must either resign or make 
a humiliating admission that he had grievously erred. 
In effect, the Cabinet had made the fifth crucial decision of- 
the Hoare-Laval crisis. They sacrificed the Foreign Secretary to 
ensure, their own survival. 
After the meeting,, Neville Chamberlain went to acquaint Hoare 
with the Cabinet's views. In the latter's words: 
-He had been asked to tell me that my proposed 
statement did not go far enough, and that it 
, waslnecessary for me to say that the plan was bad, that I had been mistaken in accepting it, 
and that in view of the general opposition I 
withdrew my support of it. I told him at once 
that I was not prepared to make any such recan- 
tation. I was convinced that nothing short of 
the proposals would save Abyssinia and prevent 
Mussolini from joining the Hitler front. This 
being sog resignation, not recantation, was 
the only course open to me. Chamberlain took 
my message back to Downing Street. 126 
The Foreign Secretary's account of this conversation is somewhat less 
, han* complell -1e. After 
leftl Lord Deavarbýook cwiie Lu to .0 
visit, and Hoare told him that a compromise had been reached. He would 
resigno but in his speech to the House he would be very careful not to 
jeopardize the position of Baldwin'or the Government in any way. In 
ret urn, the Prime Minister had promised that he would be brought back 
into the Cabinet at the earliest possible moment. 
127 
Some time later, Baldwin came by in person. According to the 
Foreign Secretary: 
he found me determined to defend the plan, and 
in consequence to resign. He himself never 
suggested resignation to me. In fact, he would 
much have preferred that I should have fallen 
in with the Cabinet's wish for a recantation 
and have remained in the Government. My decision 
wasp however, final. 128 
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Again Sir Samuel is too modest. Undoubtedly, Baldwin would have 
preferred recantation to resignation, for a contrite Foreign Secretar7 
would have gotten'the Government off the hook more easily, but Hoare 
neglects to add that the Prime Minister gave him a letter either at 
this-meeting or else sometime during the following three or four days 
(the Foreign Secretary showed this letter to Beaverbrook on Sunday 
22 December 1935) in which he confirmed his promise to give Hoare 
another Portfolio in due course provided the latter resigned without 
compromising the Government. 
129 
Apparently Baldwin decided to excise two dangers in one shot. 
on the one hand, he did not want Hoare's resignation speech either to 
imperil his own position or to bring down the Goverment. Therefore, 
he bought the Poreign Secretary's loyalty. At the same time, Baldwin 
used Neville Chamberlain, one of Hoare's closest frienda, as inter- 
mediary and-thereby safeguarded himself from any threat to his position 
from the man who was heir apparent and his greatest rival for the 
leadership of the Conservative Party. Stanley Baldwin was demonstrating 
why men like Beaverbrook 4. nd Mirchill regarded him as -the shrewdest 
political manipulator of the day. 
Whatever conditions adhered to the Foreign Secretary's resignationg 
the morning's Cabinet had made it virtually inevitable, and it was 
announced officially at half past nine in the evening. 
It came as no surprise to the House of Commons. Members beffan to 
speculate as to who would succeed him. Eden and Halifax were mentioned. 
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so was Sir Austen Chamberlain. 
131 He was a former Foreign Secretar7t 
the elder statesman in the Conservative Party, a figure of respect, and 
a man of rectitude and honour whose. reputation remained unsullied by the 
Hoare-Laval crisis. His opposition to the Plan and his undoubted ability 
to lead the backbenchers in rebellion posed the greatest danger to the 
259. 
Government. In his hands lay their fate. Somewhat ironically, it was 
1922 all over again, only in reverse. Then, at the Carlton Club meeting, 
Baldwin had destroyed the Coalition and deprived Austen Chamberlain of 
office. On this, Wednesdav in 1935, the tables were turned, and Sir 
Austen had the power to oust the Prime Minister, and exile him into 
the political wilderness. 
Baldwin-decided to take out insurance. Having bought off Hoare 
and, Neville Chamberlain, he now moved to ensure the support of the 
latterts much more dangerous half-brother. He sent for him and said: 
: Austen, when Sam has gone, I shall want to 
talk to you about the Foreign Office. 
To Chamberlaing the meaning of this statement was perfectly clear. 
Baldwin had just promised to-return him to his beloved Foreign 
Office. 132 
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Thursday 19 December 
IV Thursday, eleven days after the release of the fatal Paris 
communiqu6 and ten days after the initial Cabinet decision to accept 
the peace proposalsp the d6noument of the crisis had arrived. The play 
neared its end. With the Hoare-Laval-Plan a dead letter, the oil 
embargo indefinitely postponedo and Sir Samuel Hoare out of office, 
only one scene remained. It was to be acted out in the afternoon and 
evening in the House of Commons. Despite the Goverment's great 
majority of almost 2501 their survival lay in peril. 
In the morning, news arrived from Paris of a resignation almost 
rivalling that of Sir Samuel Hoare. At a stormy meeting on Wednesday 
night of the executive committee of the Radical Party, Herriot had 
come under severe criticism: surely, one of the most important Ministers 
in the government ought to have been able to do more about tho proposal--,. 
than ineffectually protest after the event. In the face of accusations 
of 'sheer tricker7l, he had resigned the Presidency of the Party. In 
general, opinion in the French capital still divided on predictable 
lines# and Thursday's debate in London aroused a great deal of interest. 
Many quarters felt intense indignation over the British fearg apparently 
encouraged by Laval, that France would not come to Britain's aid in the 
event of a mad dog act by Italy. 
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From Geneva came reports of Wednesday's meeting of the Council. 
Though it had postponed for a day the final decisiont the general 
impression was that the Hoare-Laval Plan was dead. It was expected that 
the Eighteen would meet on Thursday (today) to discuss further action 
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on sanctions; but doubts existed as to the attitude of the United 
States towards the oil embargo, and it was by no means certain that 
this measure would even be raised let alone applied. (In fact, the 
Council met Thursday evening and passed a resolution which buried 
the proposals and ended any Anglo-French mandate for finding a' 
solution to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. A meeting of the Eighteen 
followed and resulted in a decision to continue the application of 
existing sanctions. Nothing was said or done about the oil embargo. 
134 
Both it and the Plan thus died. So too, though this-was perhaps not 
quite so obvious, did the League of Nations. ) 
No official response had yet come from either of the two 
combattants. Haile Selassie was hoping that the League would reject 
the proposals for himt and Mussolini was waiting for the results of 
the debate in the House of Commons. 
135 The Italian leader wanted, 
if possible to accept the proferred terms. From London, Grandi had 
urged this courseýas it would place Britain and France in a difficult 
position, and the'Italian foreign ministry was also pushing for 
a!: reenment. On Wednesdayl-the pressure-from, the-Palazzo Chigi had 
mountedt and two high-ranking officials had drawn up a communiqu6 
. 
ki stating that the Fascist Grand Council greatly appre . ated the amicable 
spirit of the Anglo-French approach and had decided to consider the 
proposals as a-possible basis for negotiation. 
136 A peaceful solution 
had been imminentl and Mussolini had phoned Grandi and instructed him 
to go at once to Downing Street and inform Baldwin that Italy agreed 
to the terms. The Ambassador had first asked for an hour to make 
certain that there was no truth to the rumour that Hoare had just 
resigned. 
137 When this latest development had been confirmedq' 
Mussolini had changed his mind about accepting the suggested 
settlement. 
138 In any case, neither his nor Haile Selassie's 
attitudes mattered any longer - now that the Foreign Secretary had 
gone and the Government had killed his proposals. 
In London, on Thursday morning, the newspapers applauded the 
demise of the Plan and the resignation of its draftsman. Despite a 
good deal of sympathy for Hoaret they agreed that in leaving office 
he had followed the proper course. In the day's debate, said 
The Times, the Goverment must not attempt to justify the Paris 
proposals'but rathert after explaining their actions and reassuring 
a deeply disquieted British public, must admit their mistake and 
pledge a return to a policy of steady and collective resistance to 
aggression. 
At a quarter to three in the afternoon, the House of Co=on-- 
convened for the finalq tension-filled scene of the drama. The floor 
was so crowded that members crammed even the side galleries from 
where they could barely see or hear. Excited onlookers, including 
the Americany French, Italian, and German Ambassador3l jarx-ned Vin 
Distinguished Strangers' Galleryl and the Soviet Ambassador found 
himself seated next to the Prince of Wales*139 
In a House packed as it had not been for years, 
140 Sir Samuel 
Hoare rose from a backbench to give his personal explanation. He made 
substantially the same speech that Neville Chamberlain had outlined 
to the Cabinet yesterday morning. He pointed out the danger of a 
general European warl the importance of preserving solid Anglo-French 
relations, and the strong possibility of the oil embargots resulting 
in hostilities between Italy and Britain. In these circumstances, 
he had gone to Paris and agreed with Laval on a set of peace proposals. 
Hoare then defended the actual terms on the grounds that they were 
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based on the principles of the Committee of ý Five, which Haile Selassie 
had acceptedl and that they were not intended to be imposed on the 
belligerents but rather to get them to negotiate. Finallyl he stressed 
that the continuation of pressure on Italy increasedýthe likelihood of 
war and therefore that it was essential for Britain to have actual 
proof by action of other nations' willingness to assume their responsi- 
bilities. He emphasized that he didnot fear a British defeat, but that 
unless there was collective action either the League would break up or 
there would be a most unsatisfactory peace. 'Not a ship, not a machine, 
not a man has been moved by any other member state. ' 
As for himself, while he still believed that he had been correct 
and could not honestly recant, nevertheless it was essential for the 
Foreign Secretary to have the support of the country behind him. 
Therefore, he hadýto resign. He-only wanted to add that he hoped his 
successor had better luck. 
Hoare had kept his part of the bargain with Stanley Baldwin. 
He had accepted fulll personal responsibility for the proposals and 
not implicated the., Goverment. Durine his speech, in response to, an 
interjection from some members, he had actually made a parenthetical 
comment in order to ensure týat this point was clear. He had also 
stated that 'without any prompting, without any suggestion from anyone, 
I asked the Prime Minister to accept my resignation'. He had resignedt 
he said, 'for this reason alone': because he had not got the confidence 
and the support of the British public behind him and thus would 'not 
carry weight and influence in the councils of the world'. While the 
former Foreign Secretary had ably defended himself, he had not 
embarrassed-the Government. 
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The reaction from M. P. s to Hoare's speech was that he had made the 
141 
effort'of his life. He had put his case with 'a dignity, lucidity 
and firmness that compelled admiration all round'e142 Nevertheless, 
though the House heard him courteously and received his speech warmly, 
a convincing arg=ent_, p roved difficult-, 
143 
and the quality of his 
defence failed to alter the general belief that his usually cool 
judgement had for once been sadly at fault. 
144 
After Sir Samuel had finished his personal explanation, the 
Leader of the Opposition rose to propose the Labour Partyts motion 
of censure. He expressed his sympathy for the former Foreign Secretary 
and wished him a speedy recovery, but he added that if Hoare had been 
correct in resigning - and indeed he had - then the Government as a 
whole should go: as they had taken collective responsibility, Hoare 
should not be turned into a scapegoat. The proposals themselves, 
continued Attlee, were grossly unfair and had outraged opinion everYý- 
where. Not only were they incompatible with Hoarets speech to the 
Assembly in September, but they were a violation of the Covenant and 
'They. can be. put-into a r., Itnhall: it in the would destroy the League. 
surrender to an aggressor of half an empire iri exchange for a corridor 
for camels. ' As for the alleged failure of any countx7 to support 
Britain, Attlee quoted Hoare's own words to the House on 22 October: 
The French answer is the answer we felt sure it 
would be.... In the event of an isolated attack, 
inconceivable though such madness might be, we 
and they and the rest of the League stand together 
and resist it with our full and united force. 
The Leader of the Opposition wanted to know why the situation had 
apparently changed. He wanted to know whether the Prime Minister would 
unseal his lips and make such a case that not one man would go into the 
lobby against the Government. All told the situation was a betrayal Of 
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Ethiopia, of the Leaguel and of the people who had voted for the 
Prime Minister in the last election. The debateg said Attlee, raised 
two issues: 
There is the question of the honour of this 
country, and there is the question of the 
honour of the Prime Minister. If, as is 
suggested in some quarters, the Prime 
Minister won an election on one policy 
and immediately after victory was prepared 
to carry out another, it has an extremely 
ugly look. (my emphasis) 
Stanley Baldwin's reply to Attleets attack was weak and ineffec- 
145 146 tive. He seemed embarrassed, spoke very lamely, and generally 
failed to answer the charges levelled against the Govermment. After 
deeply regretting the loss of an old and wise colleague, he attempted 
to deal not with the details but'with the major points. He sketched 
out the position in which the Cabinet had found themselves on Monday 
morning when they had received the proposals. In the absence of 
liaison on Sunday, they had come as a complete surprise. Ministers 
had known of the leak in Paris; they had known that a storm of 
questions would follow and that the matter would be raised in the 
House. They had had to make a quick decision. While none of the Cabinet 
had liked the termst they had decided that they had to support a 
colleague not present to defend himself. That decisiont Baldwin now 
admitted# had been a mistake, perhaps a weakness, certainly an error 
of judgement - one for which he was chiefly to blame. The lesson to be 
learned was that liaisont even if it meant delay, was essential. The 
Cabinet mustj beyond any doubtv bear full responsibility for the 
proposalsq but 'never throughout the week had I or any of my colleagues 
any idea in our minds that we were not being true to every pledge we had 
given in the election'. However, he had not expected that deep swell of 
feeling which arose in the country on what he called the ground of 
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conscience and honour. When that happened, it became perfectly obvious 
that the proposals did not command the necessary support. They were now 
completely and utterly dead, and there could be no attempt to ressurect 
them. For the future, the Government stood where they had always stood 
(which was on the fence and hanging back - though Baldwin did not say 
that) and were prepared in every way to live up to their collective 
responsibility and to support the League of Nations; but, he emphasized, 
any action must indeed be collective: as the ultimate sanction behind 
the League was an immensely superior forcel members would have to face 
up to this problem and be willing to do their share. The Prime Minister 
concluded his speech with a plea for confidence from all who would call 
themselves his supporters. 
Baldwin had done little more than admit his mistake, bow to the 
storm, and ask for forgiveness. He had done what he was so good at and 
thrown himself upon the mercy of the House. 
147 He had failed to deal 
adequately with Attleets criticisms and had made no effort to unseal 
his lips. He did not 'explain why what he himself considered an 
148 
unanswerablc cace was now indefenziblal. Indeed, after tho daba-Wal 
Sir iusten Chamberlain wrote: 
Had I thought it compatible with the public 
interest I believe that after Stanley Baldwin's 
miserably inadequate speech and the initial 
blunder, I could have so reduced his majority 
as to force his resignation. 149 
In practice, however, Sir Austen did the very opposite. Speaking 
immediately after the Prime Minister, he made the most important speech 
of the day. ' After applauding the demise of the Plan and agreeing with 
Baldwin and Hoare that Britain should not have to stand alone against 
Italyj he said flatly that he would vote for the Govexmment and against 
Labour's motion of censure. The Leader of the Opposition, he continued, 
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by challenging the personal honour of the Prime Minister had ensured 
that the Government's supporters would stand by them: 
Whatever opinion we may hold about what is past, 
whatever differences of opinion there may be 
among us as to what ought to be done now, that 
is a challenge which every Member of the National 
party will resent and resist. 
The debate went on, but Chamberlain's intervention proved decisive. 
After more-than seven hours, the House divided, and. the Government 
survived .1 by, a very healthy majority of close to 230-150 Attlee, had made 
the great blunder of the day. 
151 His demand for Baldwints resignation 
was undoubtedly justified# but he erred tactically in attacking the 
152 
Prime Minister's personal honour. Sir Austen Chamberlain made use 
of this mistake to ensure the survival of the Government and, so he 
feltj his own return to the Foreign Office. 
153 
. 
on that note, the Hoare-Laval crisis ended, but the shattered 
pieces of British foreign Policy and the Goverment's own prestige 
remained to be put back together. 
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PART 
ANALY31S 
Chapter Nine 
Testing the Propositions 
This thesishas been divided into three broad sections. The first 
established a theory of crisis decision-making and then deriVed from it 
a number of empirically testable propositions. The second presented the 
case study: a detailed description and explanation of the process of 
decision-making as conducted by the Iritish Government during the 
initial twelve months of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. The third 
section, beginning here, uses the historical evidence of the case 
study to test the propositions and the theory. 
A Evaluating the Evidence 
In order to test the propositions satisfactorily, the historical 
evidence must meet two requirements. 
First, it must consist of both a crisis and a non-crisis situation. 
One of the propositions, for 
ýxampleg 
ass'erto that group cohesion will 
be much higher in crisis situations than in non-crisis ones. The 
evidence required to test this must be comparative; by itself, the 
degree of cohesion in a crisis tells one nothing. Only by comparing 
cohesion in crisis situations with that in non-crisis ones can the 
evidence properly test the proposition. 
281. 
However, the fact that group cohesion was higher in a crisis 
situation than in a non-crisis one does not necessarily mean that 
a causal relationship exists between crisis and group cohesion. 
As noted in Chapter One, several factors can potentially influence 
the nature of the decision-making process. The three characteristics 
which distinguish crises from non-crises form only one of those 
factors. To continue with the previous example, an increase in group 
cohesionfrom a non-crisis to a crisis situation can result'from 
differences in any of these factors and not just from differences in 
those three characteristics-used to define crisis. Consequently, the 
second requirement necessary for testing the propositions is a 
sufficient degree of similarity between the two decision situations 
such that the exact factor which led to differences in the process of 
decision-making'can be confidently identified. 
The case study satisfies both of these requirements. In the first 
place, it provides the opportunity to compare decision-making processes 
in both, crisis and non-crisis situations. In fact, the entire twelve 
month period covered by t1he historical evidence - from Decembar of 1934 
to December of 1935 - divides into three decision situationst of which 
only one was a crisis. 
The first decision situation lasted from the Wal Wal incident of 
5 December 1934 up to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia on 3 October 
1935-. While great power interference in Ethiopia was not a new problem, 
the issue had been quiescent for some years until the Wal Wal incident 
rekindled old flames. This skirmish between a small Ethiopian force 
and an Italian native levy led to an immediate exchange of protests. 
An Ethiopian note of 9 December invoked the 1928 Treaty of Friendship 
between Italy and Ethiopia and asked for arbitration, a request which 
Italy rejected five days later on the grounds that Ethiopian 
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responsibility was perfectly obvious. Instead, Rome-demanded apologies, 
reparations, and a salute by an Ethiopian delegation to the Italian 
flag at Wal Wall in effect recognition of Italian sovereignty. In 
response, Addis Ababa appealed on 14 December to the League of Nations. 
*For the British Government, the following ten months formed one coherent 
decision situation; what unified this, period were the Government's 
attempts to forestall anything happening that might threaten to destroy 
either the League of Nations or the Stresa Front. This first decision 
situation was one of possible conflict, It ended at the beginning of 
October when the Italian invasion of Ethiopia turned this possibility 
into a reality. 
The occasion for decision that began this situation was the Wal Wal 
incident and the subsequent exchange of notes and demands between Italy 
and Ethiopia. From the point of view of the British decision-makers, 
this occasion for decision-possessed the following structural 
characteristics: 
anticipation: nil. Such skirmishes were relatively common in this 
part of the world with its nomadic tribes and unmarked 
bordvrst but the Wal Wal incident had immediate reper- 
cussions, in terms of the exchange of notes between 
Rome and Addis Ababa, that came as a surprise to a 
Foreign Office which did not even have an Ethiopian 
Department. 1 
reaction time: lengthy and adequate. Not until the summer of 1935 did the Government begin to feel any constraints of time. 
In itselfj the occasion for decision did not carry with 
it any inhere; it time limits or pense of urgency. Even 
in the worst possible caseq anticipated by Sir John 
Simon but not by the Cabinet as a whole or by the 
Ambassador in Romep hostilities could not begin until 
the end of the rainy season ten months in the future. 
Italyj needing first to build up her war machine in 
East Africal could not launch an invasion before the 
rains started and would have to wait for them to stop. 
Ten months were adequate for avoiding or defusing any 
problems. 
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threat: low. As of Wal Wal, it was by no means obvious that 
there was any threat to Ethiopia. Certainlyq the wider 
and much more critical threats to British foreign 
policy and to the European and world balance of power 
did not emerge until several months later. 
In terms of this analysist the occasion for decision was not a crisis 
probleml and the entire period was not a crisis situation. 
On 3 October, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia presented the 
British Government with the start of a second decision situation, which 
lasted until the Hoare-Laval Plan produced a further transformation. 
The intervening two months can be divided into three clear stages: 
pre-election, election, and post-election. Nonetheless, this span of 
time forms one coherent whole: unified by the Governmentfs continued 
pursual of the dual line of policy in order to end the war while 
simultaneously supporting and preserving Stresa and the League. 
publicallyt at home and in Geneva, they supported Ethiopia and the 
cause of justice and collective security; andt. in the person. of Anthony 
Eden, they took the lead, at the League of Nations in implementing 
sanctions. Privately, however, they were reluctant to take any step 
against Italy.. that. might alienate-the Frenchl, lead to a 'mad dog' act 
in the Mediterranean, and shatter the Stresa Front; thus, in Parisy 
Peterson continued to search for'that elusive comp romise solution 
satisfactory to Italy, Ethiopia, and the League, 
The occasion for decision which began this second decision situa- 
tion was the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. Structurally, it displayed 
the following characteristics: 
-anticipation: considerable. 
As early as January of 1935, Sir John 
Simon had foreseen the invasiont and in May he had 
warned the Cabinet that it would probably happen 
around the beginning of October. Initially, Ministers 
had discounted Simon's warning. However, as the summer 
came and went, expectations of war rose. By the time 
the Committee of Five failed in September to find an 
acceptable compromisel the probability had become a 
certainty. 
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reaction time: lengthy and adequate. As an occasion for decision, 
the invasion neither carried any inherent time limits 
nor suggested that task complexity would render reac- 
tion time for the British Government inadequate. Ample 
time existed for a solution to the problem to emerge 
from the measures adopted either in Paris or in Geneva. 
ýThe expert consensus held that the Italians would 
require at least two dry seasons of campaigning to 
conquer and subdue Ethiopia: sufficient time for 
sanctions to bite or for a compromise to be found. 
As late as 27 November, the British military attach6 
in Addis Ababa was speculating that 'the ultimate end 
of the war will turn more on the collapse of adminis- 
trative organization than upon the defeat of the field 
army. At some periodt the Italians may well find them- 
selves in a situation similar as Esic] that of Napoleon 
before Moscow; or of the Prench armies in Spain during 
our Peninsular Campaign'. 2 
threat: high. The invasion posed a severe thieat to the goals 
of the British Government. This had nothing to do with 
the fate of Ethiopiav the importance of which to Britain 
had already been discounted by the Maffey Report. 
Rather, the invasion threatened to destroy either the 
League of Nations or the Stresa Front - both of which, 
for different reasons, the Government felt were crucial 
to preserve. 
3)espite its significancet the invasion was not a crisis problem. 
Surprise was'low and reaction time lengthZ(. Thus, the post-invasion 
period was equally not a crisis 
. 
situation. It was characterized by 
continued attempts'on the part of -the Government to pursue their policy 
of dualism, and it lasted until the Hoare-Laval Plan threatened to 
force them to choose one line or the other. 
The final decision situation of the case study covered the period 
of the Hoare-Laval crisis: from Sunday 8 December to Thursday 
19 Decembery 1935. The occasion for decision which began this situation 
was the initialling of the Hoare-Laval Plan and the release of the 
communiqu6 at the end of the Paris talks which publically announced to 
the world that terms had been arrived at and that the British Foreign 
Secretary was committed to them. The situation ended eleven days later 
when the Foreign Secretary made his resignation speecht the Government 
survived the vote of censure in the House of Commonsq and the peace 
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proposals were interred as a dead issue. This period had two major 
stages: the first being concerned merely with the fate of the Plan; 
the second, following the meeting on Tuesday 17 December of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Conservative Party, broadened the 
scope of the problem to include the fate of the Government. Nonetheless, 
these twelve days-of crisis form one overall decision situation. The 
initialling of the Plan transformed the old situation into a new one. 
Not only were the Government now presented with the first set of peace 
proposals since the abortive attempt of the Committee of Five before 
the invasion, but also they now faced a possibly fatal threat to their 
dualism: the Plan threatened to make them decide between Stresa and the 
League - and possibly to destroy both. The unity of the subsequent 
twelve days lay in the fact that they covered the lifespan of the Hoare- 
Laval plan andits immediate consequences for the British Government. 
The structural characteristics of the occasion for decision were 
anticipation: nil. With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent 
that enough signals were given in advance that the 
-Cabinet ought to have expected firm proposal- to have 
emerged from the Paris talks. In fact, however, they 
did not. And they certainly did not expect Hoare's 
public commitment. The Hoare-Laval Plan and the 
subsequent communiqu6 took-them by surprise. As Neville 
'Chamberlain wrote to his sister on 15 December 19351 
'when Sam left for Paris on Saturday the 7th, we had no 
idea that h2 would be invited to consider detailed peace 
proposalst. Similarlyq on 7 January 1936t Stanley 
Baldwin told his close friend Tom Jones that 'Hoare told 
me that he would take the opportunity of seeing Laval on 
his way to Switzerlandp that there was nothing to settle, 
and he had told Anthony [Eden] not to worry: "I am not 
going to commit you to anything". ' 4 
reaction time: closed-ended, shortt and inadequate for task complexity. 
The Cabinet had to make an immediate decision, before 
they could consult with the Poreign Secretary and in 
advance of knowing the reaction to the proposals of the 
Leaguet the United States, the Italian and Ethiopian 
governmentst and British domestic opinion. As the India 
Secretary wrote at the time: 'We were given no time for 
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thought, since we were told týat Paris must be informed 
immediately of our decision'. The severe constraints 
on reaction time stemmed from three factors: first, the 
inherent nature of the Hoare-Laval Plan required speed 
for its success; secondt the upcoming meeting of the 
Committee of Eighteen in Geneva on Thursday 12 December 
to. decide upon, inter alial the oil sanction imposed an 
absolute and very near deadline for making some sort of 
decision; and third, any failure to have reacted 
immediately would have been tantamount to disowning 
Sir Samuel Hoare - raining his reputation and his future 
effectiveness; in the words of Neville Chamberlain: 
'a set of proposals was agreed to, and enough was 
allowed by the French to leak out to the press to make 
it impossible for us to amend the proposals, or even to 
defer accepting themg without throwing over our Foreign 
Secretary'. 
threat: high. From at least as early as 22 August, the 
Government had been pursuing a policy of dualism. 
Their entire strategy hinged upon their ability 
successfully to balance the elements of this double 
line. The public nature of the Hoare-Laval Plan 
threatened to push them one way or the other. 
Either Stresa or the League might well have to go. 
Neither alternative was felt to be acceptable. 
As they realizdd at their first-Cabinet meeting 
of the peri9d, while no problem would result if 
Italy, Ethiopia and the League all accepted the 
terms, it was highly unlikely that the latter two 
would. Thusq if Britain approved the terms and the 
Italians accepted them while the League and the 
Emperor rejected them, the results could be very 
unfortunate. The war would continue; the French 
would likoly'not consent to further-c-anctionc azd 
might refuse to proceed further with present ones; 
the sanctions front would be broken and the League 
at best weakened and at worst exposed as an empty 
. sham; and 
if Britain still attempted to pursue 
effective anti-Italian measures she would have to 
face a Mediterranean war without French support. 
On the other hand, if the Goverment rejected the 
proposalsv the consequences, it was felt, would be 
no more attractive. The reputation of the Foreign 
Secretary would be shattered; the French would refuse 
to continue with sanctions and thereby split the League; 
the French would similarly refuse to co-operate with 
Britain in the Mediterranean; the excuse for postponing 
the oil embargo would disappear; and the Italians would 
be enraged and the Stresa Front destroyed. The Hoare- 
Laval Plan threatened to undermine the entire basis of 
British foreign policy: to shatter at least one if not 
both of the two strands of'the Government's policy of 
dualism. 
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As an occasion for decision, the Hoare-Laval Plan bore all the hallmarks 
of a crisis: it surprised the Government; it threatened highly important 
national goals; and it required a quick reaction with inadequate time to 
make it. The problem was a crisis, and the subsequent decision situation 
was a crisis situation. 
The following chart summarizes the nature of the three decision 
situations against which the empirical propositions will shortly be 
tested: - 
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From the point of view of the British Government, the twelve months 
of-the case study divide naturally into týree decision situations. 
Of these, one was a crisis and two were not. The first requirement for 
testing the propositions is satisfied. A basis of comparison exists for 
judgind differences between crisis and non-crisis decision-making 
processes. 
The second requirement necessary for testing the propositýons is a 
high degree of similarity between the crisis and non-crisis situations. 
As noted above in Chapter Onet five factors directly influence the 
process of deoision-making. The first two of these form the decision- 
making systemt including on the one hand its organizational structure 
and on the other the-personalities and beliefs of the'individual 
decision-makers. The third is the substantive nature of the occasion 
for'decision. The fourth consists of the structural characteristics of 
the-occasion for decision:, anticipationt reaction time, and threat. 
Finally, conditions in the internal and external environments are the 
fifth determining factor. While exerting no direct influence, they will 
affect the perceptions, and, beliefs of the decision-makers an(I thus 
indirectly influence the decision-making process. Any differences in 
the decision-making process between two situations could reflect 
differences in aU of these factors. Thus, if one is testing, as in 
this work, the effects on the decision-making process of alterations 
only in threatl, anticipation and reaction time the three characteris- 
tics which distinguish crises from non-crises then differences in the 
other possible causal factors ought to be minimal: or at least 
sufficiently few that they can be identified and their potential 
influence discounted. In other words, between the crisis and non-crisis 
situations to be used for testing the propositions, differences should 
be small in: 
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1. the nature of the decieion-making system; 
2. the substance of the occasion for decision; and 
3. conditions in the internal and external environments. 
: Because of these requirements, the primary evidence for testing the 
propositions will come from the post-invasion and crisis situations. 
Ietween these two, similarities are great and differences as limited 
as can reasonably be expected in the real world. 
1. the decision-making system 
After the November electiong Baldwin's new Government remained 
very similar to the old one. Only one old face, Londonderx7j left the 
Cabinet, and only one new one, Duff Cooper, entered it. In terms of 
officep J. H. Thomas and Malcolm MacDonald switched roles, the former 
becoming Colonial Secretax7 and the latter Dominions Secretax7; and 
Halifax replaced Londonderx7 as Lord Privy Seal and leader of the House 
of Lords, in turn to be succeeded at the War Office by Duff Cooper. 
Otherwiseq the decisio n-making system after the election was identical 
to what it had been J)efore. Vansittart continued to dominate. the. Foreig. n. 
Office; Hoare and Eden still maintained their unfortunate duality of 
office; the Admiralty and the Air Ministry remaine d in the hands of 
Monsell and Swinton; and Stanley Baldwin was still Prime Minister. 
The only significant difference between the two decision situations was 
a flukel an accident of histor7: the Foreign Secretax7, having fallen 
while ice skating the day after his arrival in Switzerland and broken 
his nose, was absent from London for the first eight days of the crisis 
and did not attend a single Cabinet meeting even after his return. 
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the substance of the occasion for decision 
Substantively, the two occasions for decision in question 
possessed an underlying similarity. Both marked turnina-points in 
the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, and both were concerned with the very 
fundamental issue of war and peace. Thus, apples are being compared 
with apples and not with oranges. As both the invasion and the Hoare- 
Laval Plan were important events in-the same basic issue, the consequent 
decision-making processes may be compared. Howeverg despite their funda- 
mental similarity, these occasions for decision did have two distinct 
differences. Firstg the invasion was a transition from peace, however 
fragile, to war, whereas the peace proposals were intended to end that 
war and restore peace (though not the status quo ante). Second, the 
invasion was an Italian action directed towards Ethiopial but the Hoare- 
Laval Plan was an Anglo-French project. It was Mussolini who presented 
the British Government with the problem of war; but it was M. Laval and 
Sir Samuel Hoare, their own Foreign Secretary, who presented them with 
the problem of the Paris peace proposals. 
environmental conditions 
Conditions in the internal and external environments can be 
compared in two slightly different'ways. On the one handl one can look 
for, differences at the time of the two occasions for decision; on the 
other handl one can look to see what alterations in the environment 
occurred between the invasion and the end of the Hoare-Laval crisis. 
In the first sense, those differences that might have exerted'some 
influence on the decision-making process can be easily identified. 
Internally, the invasion took place-prior to the election, whereas the 
plan was initialled only after the Government had been safely returned 
to office for another tem. Externally, the so-called 'moral mandatel 
0 
was granted by the League to the British and French goveimments at the 
beginning of November; sanctions, only a future probability at the time 
of the invasiong had become an operating reality by the time of the 
peace proposals; andt by. the eve of the Foreign Secretary's departure 
for Paris, the oil sanction had developed into the most immediately 
crucial issue of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. In the second sense - 
differences from the invasion to the end of the crisis - two further 
environmental differences can be identified. First, the Cabinet's 
initial aoceptance of the Hoare-Laval Plan led to the indefinite 
postponement of the oil embargo; for the last few days of the crisis, 
this issue - and hence the threat of a Mediterranean war - declined 
greatly in importance in the calculations of the British decision-makers. 
Second, ýhe last-half of the crisis was characterized by the backbench 
revolt among the Tory Party and the threat to the Government of defeat 
in the vote of censure in the House of Commons. Throughout the post- 
invasion and the first half of the crisis situationst the Government 
had been vitally concerned with public opinion in general; by the end of 
T 
the crisis, however, they were also concerned, indeed petrifiedl nlzut 
opinion among their own supporters in Parliament. Unlike opposition from 
the Labour Party orl except during the general election, from the 
general publict opposition among the rank and file of Conservative 
M. p. s could have immediate repercussions: the latter group had the 
power to force the Government out of office. 
In totol then, there were seven significant differences between 
the post-invasion and post-Plan situations which might vex7 well have 
had a substantial effect upon the Ocision-making process: 
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the fact that the invasion marked the beginning of 
war whereas the Plan was an attempt to end it; 
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2. the fact that the invasion was an Italian action 
whereas the Plan came from Hoare and Laval; 
the occurrence, of the igeneral election between 
the invasion and the peace proposals; 
the coming to fruition of the Plan after the 
'moral mandate' and after sanctions had been 
in operation for some time; 
the shifting importanoe and likelihood of the 
oil embargo; 
the emergence. of the possibility of a backbench 
revolt during the final stage of the crisis 
period; and 
the absence of the Foreign Secretary. 
In evaluating the results of testing the propositions (a task postponed 
until the next chapter), these seven factors must be taken into account. 
It may be they and not the transition from non-crisis to crisis which 
account for observed differences in the decision-making processes during 
the post-invasion and post-Plan situations. 
Despite these differences, the similarities between the two 
situations are sufficiently great to provide a clear basis for 
comparison. The differences, while potentially significant, are few 
enough that they may be taken into account and their probable influences 
identified. Therefore, the second requirement necessax7 for testing the 
propositions is satisfied. 
Unfortunately, the decision-making process during the first 
decision situation is not so directly comparable with that during the 
crisis. A few differences between the two situations could be noted and 
compensated for. However, there are three fundamental reasons which make 
comparisons very difficult. First, for the initial six months of the 
post-Wal Wal period, the decision-making system differed considerably 
from the form it took during the crisis. Until the Cabinet reshuffle 
of 7 June, not only did the dualism at the Foreign Office not exist but 
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also the identities of some of the crucial role holdersq including the 
Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, differed. Secondl the Wal Wal 
incidentt the occasion for decision which began this situation, did not 
signify a choice between war and peace in East Africa and certainly did 
not threaten to produce Anglo-Italian fighting in the Mediterranean. 
Third$ environmental conditionsl and thus attitudes both of decision- 
makers and of the public, were very dissimilar. Internally, as of the 
Wal Wal incident, public opinion had not yet seen the importance of the 
problem or formed an attitude towards it; the results of the peace 
ballot were still in the future; and the Government were not bound by 
any electoral promises or public pronouncements on the matter. Only in 
the summer of 1935 did public opinion become mobilized and highly vocal 
in support of Ethiopia. Externally, it was only post-Wal Wal that the 
Franco-Italian understanding and militar7 agreements as well as the 
Stresa Front (under that name) came into existence, that the British 
Government published the White Paper on Defence, that Germany denounced 
the Treaty of Versaillest and that Italy began to build up her military 
streng-th in Eant Africa. In general, this first-decision situation was 
characterized by the possibility of war rather than by war itselft and 
only during the summer was the policy of dualism firmly established and 
the first attempt at a compromise solution made. 
The historical evidence fulfils the two necessary requirements. 
The propositions may confidently be tested against the non-crisis 
situation following the invasion and the crisis situation following 
the Hoare-Laval Plan. The first decision situationg however, is not 
quite so useful- It can be used impressionistically, and it can be 
used against the validity of any of the propositions. It cannot 
reliably be used in support of them, because differences between it 
294- 
and the crisis are a) so great as to ensure that differences should 
exist in the process of decision-making, and b) too fundamental to 
be reliably takenýinto account and compensated for. 
Testing the Propositions 
i- Cognitive 
Proposition 1. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the decision-maker narrows his focus of attention in terms 
of space: the boundaries of relevance he places upon his 
situation are much more restrictive, and he concentrates 
on a smaller section of the environment. 
Mixed resultsl. During the crisis situation as opposed-to the post- 
invasion situation, the decision-makers devoted a much higher proportion 
of their time and energy to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. It dominated 
their thoughts and actions. In this sense, they narrowed their focus of 
attention. However, the boundaries of relevance they placed on, the Italo- 
than pr'6vi6uS! y, Ethiopian conflict iýs6lf were no more resir"i 
Following the invasion, the Government concerned themselves with six 
considerations: the acti. ons of the League in imposing sanctions and 
bringing pressure to bear upon Italy; the probable success and likely 
effects of an oil embargo 
(including the chances of American 
co-operation); the consequent possibility of an Italian 'mad dogs act 
in the Mediterranean against the British fleet; the willingness of. the 
French to provide military support in the event of such hostilities; 
the Paris discussions aimed at negotiating a compromise solýtion to end 
the fighting; and last but certainly not least the pressure of domestic 
opinion. During the crisis, Ministers focused on the same issues. They 
were apprehensive about an unpleasant reaction at Geneva and the break 
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up of the League; they worried about the oil sanction, tended to doubt 
that the United States government would support itg and were not unhappy 
to see it postponed indefinitely; they continued to fear a Mediterranean 
war and felt that the French government would not provide any support; 
they discussed the peace proposals which were the outcome of the Paris 
talks; and they were vitally concerned with domestic opinion and their 
own survival. Not all Ministers worried equally about every one of 
these problems; however, each occupied himself with the same ones during 
both decision situations. Thusp in response to a problem which they 
defined as a crisis, the decision-makers narrowed their focus of 
attention to concentrate on the issues involved in that problem, but 
within that problem they did not further restrict their boundaries of 
relevance. 
Proposition 2. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the decision-maker narrows his focus of attention in terms 
of time: he concentrates much more on the short run and 
places a higher discount on the future., 
Kot supported. At first glance, the evidence may seem to support this 
proposition. After all, by the final few days of the crisis, the 
Cabinet's behaviour reflected their fears about their immediate 
survival. However, a closer look at the evidence indicates a) that 
during the post-invasion situation the Cabinet were also vitally 
concerned with certain short-ran factors and b) that during the crisis 
long-term influences were far from negligible. Following the invasion, 
there were several examples of how the short term decisively influenced 
the Cabinet's decisions and actions. During the campaigning for the 
general electiong Ministers were too busy to pay attention to the 
Ethiopian affair and concentrated on the immediate task of re-election; 
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purely as an electoral safeguard, Peterson was withdrawn from Paris; 
and Stanley Baldwin, whose real feelings towards the League of Nations 
were lukewarm at best, pledged himself and his Government to support 
both it and the principles for which it stood. Similarly basing their 
behaviour on the short term, the Cabinet's attitude towards sanctions 
at their meetings in October after the invasion and before the 
dissolution of Parliament varied directly and immediately - as the 
minutes clearly indicate - with their latest beliefs concerning the 
likelihood of French military support for Britain. 
7 Finally, the 
impetus behind the timing of the Hoare-Laval Plan owed much to short- 
run factors. As early as the last week of Octoberq outlines of similar 
proposals - the outcome of the Peterson-Saint Quentin talks in Paris - 
had appeared in the British press. What produced the actual Plan only 
at the beginning of December was not that it had taken all that extra 
time to iron out the details but rather the imminence of the oil 
embargo combined with the safe return of-the Government to office. 
Short-term factors exercised an important influence during both the 
post-invasion and crisis cituations. On the other hand, lcng-tc= 
considerations proved crucial during the crisis period. It is likely 
that the initial support for the peace proposals from Monsell stemmed 
from his continuing long-ran interest of not weakening British 
defenoes so vital for the future against Germany and Japan - in a 
Mediterranean war with Italy. At the Cabinet meeting of Wednesday 
11 December 19351 Ministers discussed 'the long range aspects of the 
questiong namelyo as to the effect of what happened now on deterring 
aggression'. 
8 
Even at the crucial final meeting of the crinint when 
Ministers were concerned primarily ifith their own survivaig their 
demand for Hoare's resignation had an important long-run basis. 
9 
I 
()ne of the principal reasons behind this demand was the Foreign 
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Secretary's insistence on still supporting the Plan as correct and on 
publically making the point that no other nation had moved any military 
forces or was prepared to oppose Italy and come to the aid of Britain. 
Ministers were in accord with Ramsay MacDonald's remark that such a 
speech-would make Britain's position impossible at Geneva and with the 
United States. It would have 'a shattering effect in Europe', said 
Walter Elliot; and Halifax emphasized that the whole moral position of 
the Government before the world lay at stake. Similarlyq the Foreign 
Secretaryp as he later wrote in his memoirs, continued to believe even 
at the very end that the Plan was absolutely necessary in view of the 
most critical of long-term factors: the German threat. 
10 Indeed, 
Baldwin himself later told a friend that it was this very consideration 
which he had had in mind when he had said that his lips were sealed. 
11 
The terms 'long run' and 'short run$ are relative and vague. In any 
given set of circumstances, it can be extremely difficult to distinguish 
the two and discern which is more important - especially as decision- 
makers take certain assumptions as so basic and obvious as not to be 
worth mentioning. Nevertheless# the evidence from the case ctudy 
clearly fails to support the hypothesis that the short run ought to be 
more prominent in crises. 
Proposition 3. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decioion-makingt 
the decision-maker is much more likely to rely upon his 
experience, his theories, and his kndwledge of historical 
parallels. 
Not supported. During the crisis, Stanley Baldwin probablyt though 
there is no conclusive evidence, interpreted the possibility of 
Sir Austen Chamberlain's leading a iackbench revolt in terms of his 
own actions at the Carlton Club thirteen years previously when he and 
Bonar Law had destroyed Lloyd George's coalition. Howevert during the 
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post-invasion situationg Baldwin's attitude to the League, sanctionst 
and the oil embargo similarly. hinged upon his belief in American power 
and the importance of Britain's always maintaining friendly relations 
with that countz7. As he publically stated on 23 November$ 'never as an 
individual will I sanction the British navy being used for an armed 
blockade of any country in the world until I know what the United 
States of America is going to do'. 
12 This attitude can be traced back 
virtually as far as Baldwin's Carlton Club experience: to 1923 and hie 
settlement of the American debt on terms that almost caused Law to 
resign. Furthermore, as early as the beginning of June, even before the 
failure of peace attempts and the outbreak of war, the Cabinet divided 
into three groups, based not on different information but on different 
images of reality: 
Some, Chamberlaint Eden and Eustace Percy (Baldwinle 
intended Ambassador to the United States) amonf; them# 
were strongly in favour of action against Italy 
through the League; othersq including MacDonald, 
spoke more cautiously and emphasized the Stresa 
Front; on the other hand, Runciman and Eyres-Monsell 
were opposed to anything which might lead to the 
imposition of sanctions against Italy. Eýyres-Monsell 
indcod, poncerned ac much for the sea route to the... - East as with the Italian presence on the Brennert 
was among the foremost advocates of Vansittartio 
type of 'realism'. Eden's advocacy of the League 
wasq he claimed, pandering to illusion. 13 
There is no doubt that the experiences, the theoriesp and the 
historical parallels available to decision-makers crucially influence 
their behaviour. Hoare and Eden, both at*the Foreign Office and privy 
to the same information, held ver7 different attitudes on the relative 
merits of Stresa and the League. For all their importancel however, 
these factors do not seem to weigh more heavily with decision-makers 
during crisis than during non-crisis situations. 
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Proposition 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-makine, 
the decision-maker is more likely to misperceive and 
misinterpret his environment in order to reconcile 
conflicting goals. 
Not supported. Following the invasion, the Government made at least two 
serious errors of judgement. They believed that both Stresa and the 
League could be preserved and thus continued to pursue their double 
line; and they felt that at least two dry seasons of campaigning would 
be necessary for the conquest of Ethiopia. In response to the peace 
proposals, Ministers hoped to avoid a confrontation with public opinion 
while using the Plan to get face-to-face negotiations started at Geneva 
between Italy and Ethiopia. No doubt they were much too optimistic about 
the likely consequences of their behaviour, but they did not delude 
themselves any more than they had aiter the invasion. Similarly, the 
indirect evidence of testing the first two propositions indicates that 
after the invasion decision-makers did not narrow their foci of atten- 
"I tion either in space or in time. In sum, the evidence. does not suggest 11 
that misperceptions and misinterpretations were-any-greater following 
the Plan than they had been following the invasion. 
Proposition 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
-the decision-maker is much more likely to alter the 
salience of'his goals: by thereby reducing value 
conflicts, he provides himself with psychological 
reassurance and minimizes stress. 
Supported. Instead of compensating for conflicting goals and values by 
altering his view of the environment, a decision-maker may achieve the 
same result by changing the importance he places upon one or more of 
his Coals. With one very cruoial exception, the evidence fails to 
support this hypothesis. The exception, however, definitely supports 
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this proposition. Following the Hoare-Laval Plan, the Cabinet based 
their initial decision to support these proposals upon a goal which 
had never before during the Italo-Ethiopian conflict been particularly 
prominent: Cabinet solidarity. They supported the Foreign Secretary 
and his terms because they felt that they could not condemn a Minister 
and force his resignation without giving him a chance to defend himself. 
Proposition 6. 
In, crisis as opposed to non-crisis deoision-making, 
the decision-maker is much more likely to try to find an 
alternative which satisfies all his goals even if it is 
not optimal for any particular one. 
Not supported. It can be argued that the response of the Goverment to 
the Hoare-Laval Plan was a satisficing one. At the first Cabinet meeting 
of the crisis, while some Ministers like the absent First Lord supported 
the peace proposals completely and others in accord with the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer wanted to reject them out of hand, the majority agreed 
with the satisficing strategy proposed by Eden and backed by Baldwin. 
They compromised and approved of the substance of the Hoare-Laval Plan 
while drastically altering the procedures for handling it. Howeverp and 
this is the key pointq this satisficing behaviour did not differ in the 
least from the post-invasion strategy of the Government: the pursuit of 
the double line. Even Neville Chamberlaint basically a pro-Leaguer and 
the Minister who led the initial argument during the crisis for 
rejectin, g the proposals, agreed at an informal meeting of Ministers on 
Friday 29 November that Hoare might delay implementation of the oil 
embargo in order to allow the Paris talks to investigate further the 
possibility of a compromisel peaceful settlement. The Government did not 
adopt a satisficing strategy during the crisis to any greater extent 
than they had during the post-invasion situation. 
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Proposition 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the decision-maker is much more likely to rely upon 
emotional responses and 'gut reactions'. 
Supported. A final method decision-makers may use for dealing with 
cognitive complexity and multiple stakes is to resort to emotional 
responses - tgut reactions'. The Cabinet did precisely this at the 
'beginning of the Hoare-Laval crisis. Uncertain about exactly what 
had happened in Paris and torn by conflicting goals, Ministers were 
at a loss-as to what to do. They resorted to feelings of loyalty and 
Cabinet solidarity to make the crucial decision to support the peace 
proposals. This'was an emotional not a rational reaction. The critical 
factor was the feeling that a sickv absent, and highly regarded 
colleague ought not to be rejected without an opportunity to defend 
himself. As Baldwin saidv they had 'either to ratify or disown Saml. 
14 
No comparable reliance on emotion occurred at any other point from the 
Wal Wal incident to the end of the Hoare-Laval crisis. 
ii - Organizational 
Proposition 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
organizational routine will be disrupted and be replaced 
by extraordinary and ad hoc procedures. 
Supported. During the crisis, decision-making routine demonstrated 
three unusual characteristics. On Tuesday 10 Decemberg Peterson 
specially attended the Cabinet at Baldwin's request; the following 
Monday an informal meeting of several but not all Cabinet Ministers 
took place; and during the entire period the Cabinet formally met five 
times - an inordinate number for only twelve days. While all three 
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examples differ from a hypothetical norm, the first two have parallels 
in a previous deoision situation: Drummond attended a Cabinet meeting 
in Mayg and an equally important informal Ministerial get together was 
held just prior to the crucial Cabinet of 22 August. However, the 
frequency of meetings finds no parallel elsewhere and stands as an 
anomaly: a significant disruption of decision-making routine. 
Proposition .I 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the level of decision rises in the organizational 
hierarchy: authority becomes more centralized. 
Not supported. On this point, the dividing line was not the Hoare-Laval 
plan and the beginning of the crisis but rather Simon's memorandum of 
the previous May which turned the Italo-Ethiopian conflict into'a 
Cabinet matter. Before that, the problem had. been-primarily-. a-Foreign - 
office concern; subsequentlyt the level of decision remained unchanged 
by the onset of crisis. Eden and Hoaret together with Vansittartl 
decided upon Eden's mission to Rome al. the end of June with the Zeila 
propocale; the Cabinet authorized this attempt_at. a. colution, and then 
Eden actually went and dealt with Mussolini. Similarly, Eden initially 
recommended acceptance of the Hoare-Laval Plan and alterations in its 
procedures; the Cabinet approved; and then Eden handled the implementa- 
tion of policy. Another example: the 22 August meeting of the Cabinet 
formalized the dual line of policy created at the Foreign Office; Hoare 
then interpreted his mandate in such a manner as to bluff at Geneva in 
support of Ethiopia at the meeting of the League in Septembert to agree 
with Laval not to impose any measure that might lead to war with Italy, 
and to send a message of friendship to Mussolini. The 2 December 
meeting of the Cabinet likewise authorized Hoare's intention to proceed 
to Paris and 'Press the matter forward as rapidly as possible,; 
15 
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he then went to meet Laval and eventually initialled the Hoare-Laval 
Plan. Similarly, during the crisis, the Cabinet agreed with Eden's 
proposed line at Geneva and confirmed it in general instructions, which 
Eden then interpreted in such a manner as to virtually ask the League 
of Nations to reject the peace proposals. After Simonts memorandum of 
Mayl the level of decision stayed the same. 
Proposition 10. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
group processes rise in importance: the four analytical 
operations are conducted more by groups and less by 
departments or individuals, and the group is more likely 
to initiate policy. 
Supported. The results of the previous proposition indicate that the 
level of decision had reached the Cabinet during May and thereafter 
remained constant. During this period of time, with only-one exception, 
the Cabinet as a group-did not initiate major changes of policy; its 
role remained constant. Ministers primarily discussed and authorized' 
proposals Put to them by the Foreign Office and its two Ministers. 
Tj-, e one exceptiong, howeverl, furmishes, the evidence in mipport of-tbis 
proposition. The decision to force Hoare's resignation came from, the 
Cabinet as a group and was not put to them for approval. Baldwin and 
Chamberlain, who opened discussions at that crucial meeting of 
Wednesday 18 Decemberv both supported the Foreign Secretax7. Ministers 
refused to agree and insisted that Hoare had to go. Thus, though the 
crisis did not alter the level of decision, it did produce one 
important and significant rise in the importance of group processes. 
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Proposition 11. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
ad hoc groups are more likely to be formed. 
Not supported. An ad hoo group did meet during the crisis on the 
evening of Monday 16 December. However, comparable ad hoc groups 
also met just before the two important Cabinet sessions of 22 August 
and 2 December. Ad hoc groups are not in Britain, as they are in the 
United States, a normal feature of the decision-making process. The - 
evidence definitely fails to support this proposition. 
Proposition 12. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the frequency of interaction among members of the group 
increases: a much greater need is felt for face-to-face 
proximity. - 
Supported. Formally and informally during the. -crisis, the Cabinet met 
an inordinate number of times. 
Prop_osition 13. 
. In crisis as. opposed to non-crisic decision-makirq. 
group cohesion is much greater: with the result that 
dissent tends to be stifled and group goals andvalues 
take on a superordinate role. 
Supported. The decisive reason for the Cabinet's initial approval of 
the Hoare-Laval Plan was group solidarity. Ministers closed ranks 
around one of their own. Dissento however, did exist. Neville 
chamberlaint for one, disagreed with the majority and wanted to reject 
the peace proposals no matter the cost to the Foreign Secretary. 
Furthermore, the initial support for Hoare soon reversed itself, and 
some of the younger members of the Cabinet went so far as to push the 
lobby correspondent of The Times against the Paris terms. As the days 
of the crisis passedl dissent intensified and Ministers rebelled, 
demanding not only the rejection of the Plan but also the resignation 
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of the Foreign Secretary. However, this demand, at the final 
Cabinet meeting of the crisist can also be interpreted as a further, 
if different, indication of increased group cohesion: Ministers came 
to view group survival as a superordinate goal and united in insisting 
that the Foreign Secretary go that they might remain in office. In two 
ways (and especially the first), the evidence supports this proposition. 
Proposition 14- 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the group leader is more likely to accept responsibility, 
and followers are more likely to expect and accept this. 
Supported. The group in question wasg of course, the Cabinetp and there 
can be no doubt that Baldwin was its leader, by virtue both of his 
position and of his character. His leadership style was to pick his 
Ministers and then. to let them get on with the job with a minimum of 
interference; nevertheless, they knew that the Prime Minister's support 
was likely to prove decisive on any contentious issue. The evidence on 
this proposition is not conclusive - partly because-of the nature of 
B. -Idwin's --tyle - but it, tends-to support the-hypothesi--. During. the 
crisis, he played an immediately more important role than previously. 
He assumed responsibility for the Foreign Office during the few days 
when Hoarel Edeng and Vansittart were all absent from the country. 
He acted as chief Government spokesman and made the major speeches in 
the House of Commons. He summoned Hoare back to London. And, at the 
end of the crisis, he took the actions necessary to safeguard the 
Government's survival: persuading Hoare with the offer of an eventual 
return to the Cabinet not to embarrass the Government, and bribing 
Sir Austen Chamberlain into supporting them by promising him the 
Foreign office. Similarlyt other Ministers relied'very heavily upon 
Stanley Baldwin. Eden immediately consulted him when he first learned 
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of unexpected developments in Parist and he also tooi good care to 
secure the Prime Minister's authorization in advance of arranging 
changes in the procedures for handling the proposals. The Cabinet as 
a whole relied on Baldwin to be their spokesman as well as to deal with 
Hoare upon his return. And during the final meeting of the crisis, 
Halifax carried a lot of weight when he said that 'if the Prime Minister 
were to lose his personal position, one of our national anchors would 
have dragged'. On the other handl there does exist one telling piece of 
evidence against this proposition: Hoare's resignation was forced upon 
the Prime Minister by the overwhelming pressure of Cabinet opinion. 
Baldwin wanted the Foreign Secretary to stay; his followers forced him 
to kick Hoare out. This counter-example is quite strong. Combined with 
f 
the difficulties of guaging Baldwin's true influence, it weighs heavily 
against this proposition. Nevertheless, on balance, the evidence does 
tend to support it. 
Proposition 15. 
- In crisis as opposed to non-orisis decision-ma3cinS, 
departmental autonomy and bureaucratic politics are likely 
to decline in importance. 
Supported. The evidence in favour of this proposition is extremely 
weak. Bureaucratic politics never played a major role in British policy 
towards the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. In so far as Ministers' positions. 
reflected departmental interests 
(iýotably with Swinton at-the Air 
Ministry and Monsell at the Admiralty), no differences existed between 
the post-invasion and crisis situations. The major conflict was not 
inter-departmental but within the Foreign Office between Hoare and 
Eden. Their differences before the Plan, where Eden took the lead at 
Geneva, continued in the same vein after it, when he did his best to 
reduce the force of the peace proposals. There wast however, between 
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the two situations a slight decline in departmental autonomy. Eden 
still acted on his own to a large extent: on his own authority sending 
that telegram to Barton informing the latter about the ban on construc- 
tion of a railroad; taking the line he thought best at Geneva; and 
determining along with Foreign Office officials and without'consulting 
the Cabinet the contents of the White Paper. Nevertheless, as the 
previous proposition indicatest Baldwin did take more'of a direct hand 
in foreign policy than he normally did, and the Cabinet as-a whole kept 
themselves more au courant with matters than they had for the several 
weeks of the election campaign during the previous decision situation. 
This evidence is weak and far from conclusive, but it does provide some 
support for the proposition. 
iii - Analytical 
proposition-16. 
In crisis as -, opposed to non-crissis decicicn-making, 
the search for information will be greatly intgnsified. 
Supported. During the crisis, Ministers were quite concerned with 
gathering information. In the first few dayso Eden carried on several 
lengthy and detailed exchanges with Paris. On the morning of Monday 
.9 
Decemberp Baldwin specially went over to the Foreign Office to have 
Eden explain exactly what had transpired. The following dayt the Prime 
Minister asked Peterson to attend the Cabinet in order to fill in gaps 
in Ministers' knowledge. The Prime Minister also requested the Foreign 
Secretary to return to England from Switzerland; and the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer went several times to see him and find out his views upon 
his arrival home. Finally, towards the end of the crisis, the Cabinet 
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specifically asked Baldwin to visit Hoare and clarify certain matters 
with him. After the invasion, Ministers were also very concerned with 
amassing informationg particularly with respect to the Mediterranean 
situation and the likelihood of French military co-operation and 
support. There was, however, a lapse of several weeks, due to the 
exigencies of. the election, during which Ministers outside of the 
Foreign Office payed very little attention to the Italo-Ethiopian 
problem. Contrasted with this period, the crisis did witness an - 
intensification of the search for information. 
Proposition 17. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
decision-makers vill tend to simplify the complexity of 
the environment. 
Not c-upported. The definition of. the situation,. -held by the. decision- 
makers in response to the Hoare-Laval Plan was no simpler than that 
formulated by them after the invasion. Both the results of testing the 
cognitive propositions and the nature of the-empirical evidence itself 
. indicate 
that the onset of crisis-did not lead. the Cabinet to reduce 
their conception of the complexity of the environment. In fact, one can 
make an excellent case that the initial decision to approve the Paris 
proposals -a decision taken primarily on the emotional basis of 
loyalty to the Foreign Secretary - provides further proof that the 
decision-makers fully realized and could not deal with the complexity 
of the environment. 
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Proposition 18. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
information moves with greater speed to the top of the 
organizational hierarchy. 
Supported. During the crisis, information moved quickly and quite 
accurately to the Cabinet. Eden circulated copies of his telegrams 
to Paris and of Vansittart's replies. He also cabled from Geneva, 
. immediately and in some detail, his-findings at the League. Swinton 
reported 'on the progress of the air talks in Paris. Malcolm MacDonald 
presented the views of the Dominionst High Commissioners. British 
embassies around the world informed London of the impressions that 
the peace proposals had made abroad. And Neville Chamberlain reported 
in great detail to the Cabinet on the tone and content of Hoare's 
proposed speech to the House of Commons. This evidence, while I 
inconclusive in itself, is quite telling when combined with the fact 
that the Paris talks between Peterson and Saint Quentin were not even 
discussed in Cabinet during the election campaign and that the Maffey 
Report, commissioned in March and completed by 18 June, was not 
circulated to the Cabinet until-the end of August. 
Proposition lg. 
_ 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
the reliability of the source of information is of greater 
importance for judging the validity of its content. 
Supported. In their initial decision to support the Hoare-Laval Plan, 
Ministers' distaste for the proposals was greatly tempered by their 
faith in the Foreign Secretar7. They relied on his reputation. for good 
judgementt and they felt that something, as yet unknown to them, must 
have happened in Paris to have led Iloare to take the action that he did. 
4 
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Proposition 20. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
greater variance is likely between the operational and, 
psychological environments of the decision-makers. 
Not supported. The results of testing the cognitive propositions 
indicate the lack of empirical support for this one. The same is 
suggested by the testing of Proposition 171 the lack of simplification 
of the environment. A direct look at the evidence leads to the same 
conclusion. Ministers may not have anticipated the extent of adverse 
reaction to the peace proposals, but they were certainly aware that 
the terms would not receive the warmest of receptions. During the 
-P crisist their misperceptions were certainly no worse than they had 
been earlier with respect to their beliefs that the policy of dualism 
could succeed or-that Italy would require at least two dry seasons of 
campaignin, g in order fully to conquer Ethiopia* 
0% 
Proposition 21. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
even when substantive issues are similar, the goals and 
values which are definp. d as relevant-are likely-to differ 
considerably. 
Supported. Between the post-invasion and crisis situationsl the goals 
and values which the decision-makers defined as important and relevant a 
were very similar - with one exception: group cohesion. Initially, 
Ministers approved the'Hoare-Laval Plan out of Cabinet solidarity and 
support for a sick, absent, and highly respected colleague. 
Subsequently, Ministers demanded the sacrifice of the Foreign Secretary 
that, they as a group might survive., 
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Proposition 22. 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
decision-makers are likely to formulate fewer alternatives. 
Not supported.. In response to the invasion, the Government considered 
two broad alternatives: to press forward with a League-oriented policy, 
despite the risk of a Mediterranean war, and hope that the pressure of 
sanctions would-bite hard enough to cause the Italians to back down; 
or to go slowly on sanctions and try to arrange a compromise solution 
that would be satisfactory to Italy and acceptable to the League. 
In the end, the Government compromised between the two choices and 
continued with their dual line of policy. In the wake of the Hoare- 
Laval Plan, they initially also considered two broad alternatives: 
to approve or to reject the proposals. Again, they compromised: 
agreeing to the tez*ms but insisting upon major alterations in procedure. 
Subdividine the issue does not change the results. The evidence does not 
support this proposition* 
Proposition-23, 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-makingg 
the choice of alternatives is less likely to be based on 
a rational, objective, and dispassionate means-ends 
analysis and more likely to be, based on emotional and 
secondary considerations. 
Supported. During the entire period from Wal Wal to the end of the 
Hoare-Laval crisist one decision stands out as being predicated on 
emotional and secondary considerations: the initial decision to 
approve of the Paris peace proposals. 
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Proposition 24, 
In crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making, 
sensitivity to and learning from negative feedback are 
decreased: it tends either not to be noticed or to be 
discounted. 
Not supported. Indeed, the major theme of the Hoare-Laval crisis is the 
way in which the adverse response to the Governmentts initial decision 
to approve the Plan led to retreat-and*eventually to reversal and rout. 
Twenty-four of the twenty-five propositions have now been tested 
against the historical evidence. In the next chapter, these results 
will be evaluated. Conclusions will then be presented on a) the fiiial 
proposition, b) the validity of the theory of crisis decision-making 
sed'in t'is wo 
*, 
and c) the implications that the'resul; s of this u* h rk 
study hold for any general theory of crisis decision-making. 
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Chapter-Ten 
Evaluating the Bnpirical Results 
Of the first twentyý-four propositions, thirteen were supported; 
one yielded mixed results; and ten were not supported. 
These findings do not provide conclusive proof of the theory 
of crisis decision-making. On the other hand, decision-makers are 
self-aware individuals and can recognize and compensate for some 
of the potential pit-falls facing their behaviour. Because of this 
possibilityl there is good reason for not expecting the evidence 
to confirm all the propositions. Consequentlyt the results of testing 
the propositions are not necessarily unfavourable. Looking at them 
optimisticallyt one could conjecture that the supported propocitions 
are of general validity and that the unsupported ones might hold for 
certain specific circumstances not found in this case study. At the 
very worst, the success rate of better than fifty per cent at least 
leaves the relationship between international crises and the process 
of foreign policy decision-making as an open qudstion well worth 
a considerable amount. of future investigation. 
However, this conclusion changes dramatically when one tries 
to compensate for the probable effects of dissimilarities (other 
than those in threat, anticipationg and reaction time) between the 
post-invasion and crisis situations. Seven important differences 
I 
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between the two have been identified in the previous chapter: 
the fact that the invasion marked. the beginning 
of war whereas the Plan was an attempt to end it; 
2. the fact that the invasion was an Italian action 
whereas the Plan came from Hoare and Laval; 
the occurrence of the general election between 
the invasion and the peace proposals; 
the cominig to fruition of the Plan after the 
'moral mandate' and after sanctions had been 
in operation for some time; 
the shifting importance and likelihood of the 
oil embargo; 
the emergence of the possibility of a backbench 
revolt during the final stage of the crisis 
period; and 
the absence of the Foreign Secretax7. 
When these potential influences are discountedl the results of testing 
the propositions are considerably altered. In fact, the relationship 
between crisis and decision-making reduces to the point where it is 
virtually nil. 
Support for four of the propositions (numbers 5,7,19p and 23) 
-- rests upon one, piecwof evidence:, the Cabinetts, initial deciAnn to 
approve the Hoare-Laval Plan. They made this decision because rejecting 
the proposals would have been tantamount to disowning the Foreign 
Secretary, because they were deeply reluctant to abandon a sick and 
absent colleague without giving him a chance to defend himself, and 
because Hoare's high reputation led them to believe that he was 
probably privy to some new information as yet unknown in London. 
This reasoning was dependent upon two of the basic differences between 
the post-invasion and crisis situations: on the one hand the Foreign 
Secretary's absence from Londong and on the other the fact that he was 
partly responsible for the peace terms. These two factors and not the 
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occurrence of a crisis produced these differences in the decision- 
. 
making process. Thusl support for these four propositions evaporates. 
Prop9sition 10, the apparent rise in importance Of group processes 
during the crisis, -is also found suspect. The evidence supporting this 
proposition hinges upon the Cabinet's implicit demand ai their final 
meeting of the crisis for Hoare's removal from the Cabinet. This demand 
is also explicableAn terms of two of the differences between the 
post-invasion and crisis situations: a) the Foreign Secretary's being 
the source of the proposals and thus inseparable from their fatet and 
b) the backbench revolt and the challenge not to the electoral 
prospects of the Conservative Party but to Ministers# continued tenure 
of office. Again one need not appeal to the distinction between crisis 
and non-crisis to explain the results of testing this proposition. 
Proposition 131 the apparent increase in group cohesion, also 
moves-from the supported to the unsupported category. Group cohesion 
and solidarity during the crisis were of two kinds, In the first stage 
of the crisis, they revolved around support for the Foreign Secretary. 
Tjjs has already been explained, in terms of-Iis-absence and his public 
commitment to the peace proposals by virtue of his announced approval 
of and responsibility for them. In the second stage of the crisis, 
group cohesion worked-in the opposite direction: the Cabinet closed 
ranks against the Foreign Secretary and viewed their own survival as 
the paramount goal. This, of course, must be explained as due to the 
backbench revolt not the existence of a crisis.. 
proposition 149 dealing with the increased importance of the 
group leader, is also explicable more directly than through resort 
to-the difference in the combination of threat, anticipation, and 
reaction time. Baldwin's role during the crisis was more important 
and more immediate a) because in the absence of the Foreign Secretary 
I 
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he would automatically concern himself with the Foreign Office - 
especially when, as happened for part of the crisis period, neither 
Eden nor Vansittart was in the country; and b) because when the 
survival of the Government was called into question - as it was by 
the backbench revolt - then it is the Prime Minister's responsibility 
to become very involved. These two factorst combined with the somewhat 
tenuous nature of the evidence originally supporting this proposition, 
mean that it must be regarded as not supported. 
Support for Proposition 159 on the decreased importance of 
bureaucratic politics and departmental autonomy, is also no longer 
-tenable. The autonomy of the Foreign Office (the influence of 
bureaucratic politics was minimal in the first place and remained 
unaffected by the crisis) appeared to be marginally greater during 
the election campaign stage of the post-invasion situation than during 
the crisis. Howevert when one takes into account-the distractions of 
the election campaign and the absence of the Foreign Secretary support 
for this proposition disappears. 
For similar reasons, Proposition 16j on-the-intentdficativn of 
the search for information, loses its support. Again, virtually all 
the evidence in favour of it depends upon the election campaign in the 
post-invasion situation and the absence of the Foreign Secretary during 
-the crisis. 
Finallyq Proposition 219 the relevance of different goals and 
values, must also be taken as not supported. The one outstandingly 
different goal of the crisis period was group cohesion. As has already 
been indicatedt this was dependent upon the identification of the 
Foreign Secretary witli the proposals, his absence from the scene, and 
4 
the backbench revolt. 
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At this point, only three propositions remain as supported by the 
distinction between crisis and non-crisis. Of these, two (number 8 on 
the disruption of routine and number 12 on the increased frequency of 
group interaction) are supported by the same piece of evidence: the 
inordinate and unparalleled number of Cabinet meetings during the 
crisis. The other supported proposition (number 18) states that during 
crises information will move with greater speed to the top of the 
organizational hierarchy. Pinallyo the first propositiont which yielded 
mixed results, does indicate that in crises decision-makers will 
concentrate on the issues of the crisis at the expense of other matters. 
In sumv the evidence of the case study merely amounts to the claims 
that in crisis as opposed to non-crisis decision-making 
1. decision-makers will concentrate on the issues of 
the crisis to the temporar7 neglect of others; 
2. they are likely to meet more often than normally; and 
the processing of information will be faster. 
These results are hardly earth-shattering. 
Their immediate implication is to fail to support the one as yet 
untested proposition: Proposition 25 asserted that 'in 
. 
crisis as opposed 
to non-crisis decision-making, the overall quality of decision-making 
tends to be lower'. If anything, greater concentrationj higher frequency 
of interaction, and better information flow ought to improve the calibre 
of decision-making during crises. The direct evidence leads to the same 
conclusion. Certainly, the quality of British decision-making during 
the crisis was not especially outstanding. The Cabinet's first decision 
to approve and modify the Plan was probably a mistake; their final 
decision to reverse themselves and oust the Foreign Secretar7 might have 
been sensible at the. beginning of the crisis but was equally an error at 
the end. However, the calibre of decision-making, was no better during 
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the post-invasion situation. The fundamental policy of dualism was 
a disaster and brought about the crisis in the first place. The 
occurrence of the crisis cannot be said to have worsened the quality 
of 3ritish decision-makine. 
In tabular form, the results of testing the propositions can 
now be summarized as follows: 
i) before taking into account the seven differences between the 
post-invasion and crisis situations: 
supported mixed results - not supported 
cognitive 214 
organizational 6-2 
analytical 54 
TOTAL 13 10 
ii) afte; discounting the effects of differences other than the 
distinction between crisis and non-crisis: 
supported mixed r-m-tl tcý nl--, t 
cognitive -6 
organizational 2 
analytical 
quality 
TOTAL 21 
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These final results are extremely disappointing.. With a success 
rate in the propositions of only 12 per cent, only'one conclusion is 
possible: the theory of crisis decision-making as presented here is 
incorrect and untenable. 
1 
Either a different theory is needed or there is no relationship 
to speak of between the occurrence of inter-national crises and the 
process of foreign policy decision-making and therefore no theory 
is possible. Because the theory and propositions used herein are a 
synthesis and a representative and wide-ranging cross-section of the 
current work done on crisis decision-making and are based on the 
standard, commonly used definition of crisis, the first of these 
alternatives would require a radically different approach to the 
subject. Howeverv any such theory, even a totally novel one, would 
probably founder on the same problem as does-the one used in this 
-thesis: the attempt-to find causal relationships-between the structural 
characteristics of a problem and subsequent human behaviour smacks of 
mechanism. In the introduction to this work, I noted that efforts to 
., find 
direct correlations between-events. in-the intc=, ati. -. n:: -' Systcm 
and the foreign-policy actions of a state must come to grief on the 
fact that their inter-rela. tionship is mediated by the process of 
decision-making. It is not automatic or mechanical. In retrospect, 
exactly the same criticism can be levelled against attempts to find 
a causal relationship between the structural characteristics of crises 
and the decision-making process itself. Thus, the conclusion to which 
I am somewhat reluctantly but inevitably forced is that no general 
theory of crisis decision-making is in principle possible. As testing 
the propositions has indicatedl the nature of the process is too 
dependent upon very specific factors to be explained by a general 
theory. The accident of Sir Samuel Hoare's breaking his nose had a 
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more pronounced effect on the decision-making process than did the 
fact that the Hoare-Laval Plan came as a surprisel'posed a severe 
threatj and demanded an immediate response. No theory can possibly 
take into account the possibility that the Foreign Secretary might 
decide to go ice skating and then have a fainting spell while on 
the rink. 
A valid, formal theory of crisis decision-making would prove 
useful in many ways. Not only would it improve our explanatory 
capacitiesp but it would also be of considerable benefit for 
prediction and hence for the control of future crises. Such a theory, 
however, appears to be an impossibility. The concept of crisis has 
much more of a descriptive or an evocative use than an explanatory 
one. It signifies a turning-point. It does not contribute much to the 
explanation of the process of decision-making. The overall verdict 
on a theory of crisis decision-making must echo what Sir Karl Popper 
once wrote in a somewhat different context: 
It almost looks as if historicists were trying 
to compensate themselves for the loss of an 
unchangirg world by clinging to the faith that 
change can be foreseen because it is ruled by 
an unchanging law. 2 
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Notes to Chapter Ten 
Because the propositions were deductively derived from the 
theory of crisis decision-making, testing them also tests 
the theory itself. See Chapter one. 
2. Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, p. 161. 
EPILOGUE 
Historically, the Abyssinian crisis has often 
been presented as a side-show compared with the 
main drama of Germany's advance to world conquest. 
In fact, it was the turning-point of the 'thirties. 
6- Iain Macleod 
1 
What we did in this case is a remarkable ensemble 
in my judgment. We lost Abyssinia, we lost Austria, 
we formed the Axis, we made certain of Germany's 
next war in the speediest and least favourable 
circumstances; no single member of the League set 
seriously about rearmament. 
Sir Robert Vansittart 2 
0 
The Hoare-Laval crisis sealed the fate of Ethiopia. Neither 
Britain nor the League took any further steps of consequence against 
Italy, and the oil embargo receded into the oblivion of committee 
hearings. In the spring of 1936v contrary to the expectations and 
predictions of almost all military experts, 
3 Ethiopian resistance 
collapsed and the Italian army gained an easy victory in the field. 
in mayt Haile Selassie fled into exile in England, and Marshall 
Badoglio's troops marched triumphantly into Addis Ababa. The British 
Government soon decided that the continuation of sanctions was futile, 
and on the 10th of June Neville Chamberlain denounced them as 'the very 
midsummer of madnessi. 
4 A month thereafter, despite an impassioned 
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plea to the Assembly by the Emperor himself, the League of Nations 
formally voted to end all sanctions. Events closer to home quickly 
pushed Ethiopia into the background. Already in March, Hitler had 
remilitarized the Rhineland, and in July the Spanish civil war 
began. As one European crisis followed anotherp Italy's colonial 
adventure in Africa faded from memory. 
Within British politics, the affair had no lasting effects. 
The Goveimment easily defeated Labour's motion of censure, and 
]3aldwin regained his lost prestige with his handling of the 
Abdication. In return for his survivall he had two promises to 
honour. He reneged on the first. He told Sir Austen Chamberlain 
that he was too old for the Foreign Office and would collapse under 
the strain but that he could enter the Cabinet as Minister without 
Portfolio with the special task of advising on foreign affairs and 
defence. Chamberlain was incensed at being denied the post which 
he felt had been promised to him and which he thought he deserved 
for his decisive intervention during the debate. He turned down 
the offer, believing - probably correctly - that the Prime Minister 
wanted only 'the use of my name to help patch up the damaged 
prestige of his Governmente. 
5 To Anthony Eden, Sir Austen was 
rather more pithy about his conversation with Baldwin: tHe told me 
I was ga-gal. 
6 Instead, Eden himself went to the Foreign office. 
Stanley Baldwin did not break his second promise. In June-of 1936, 
he brought Sir Samuel Hoare back into the Cabinet as First Lord of 
the Admiralty. It was not a universally acclaimed appointment. 
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Internationally, the Hoare-Laval crisis was a disaster of the 
first magnitude. Without in any way benefitting Ethiopia or the 
Ethiopians, it destroyed both the League of Nations and the Stresa 
Front* It shattered British prestigel confirmed the United States in 
its isolation, drove Mussolini into alliance with Hitler, and served 
only to encourage the expansionist greed of Germany. 
In retrospect, it is easy to see what the British Government 
ought to have done. They should have acted with firmness. They should 
have chosen one half of their double line and then stuck with it. 
Of the two possibilities available to themp probably the better would 
have been to have opted for Geneva: not for the sake of the League of 
Nations, certainly not for the sake of the feudal, slavery-ridden 
Ethiopian empire, but because such a demonstration of resolution, 
despite the very limited concrete worth of the League, would have 
created a very favourable impression in Moscow and Washington and 
would ultimately have counted for far more against Germany than the 
Stresa Front and Mussolini's unreliability. However, firmness in 
either directiont even in-support of Italy at the-cost of the- 
destruction of the League, would have produced much better results 
than the indecisive dualism actually pursued. Even after the 
initialling Of the Plan, the Cabinet ought to have remained steadfast. 
Though they should have followed Neville Chamberlaints advice in the 
first place and rejected the proposals whatever'the cost to the 
Foreign Secretary$ nevertheless, once having accepted the terms, they 
ought to have stood by their commitment and ridden out the storm. 
Unfortunately, fortitude and. courage were not the foremost qualities 
of Stanley Baldwin's Cabinet. Instead, they wavered and waffled - 
with unhappy results for all, ultimately even the Italians. In the 
328. 
final analysis, the Hoare-Laval crisis and all its consequences 
stemmed from the Government's inability to act decisively. Throughout 
the thirties, this failure of will was the tragedy of British foreign 
policy. 
The last few words can be given to the Daily Herald. On the 23rd 
of December 1935P it said in an editorial that 
The basic cause of-the troubles of the past 
few weeks has been - as the Daily Herald has pointed 
out - that ever since the Aýy-ssinian trouble became 
acute, the 'National' Government have tried to follow 
two lines of policy at once.... Only one of those 
lines could have been followed with honour. Either 
might have been followed with success. 
The attempt to follow both simultaneously has 
brought nothing but failure and humiliation. 
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-APPENI)ICES 
Appendix I 
Biogrýýpýical Sketches 
After the general election of November of 19351 Stanley Baldwin's 
new Cabinet consisted of: 
Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin 
Lord President of the Council Ramsay MacDonald 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain 
Lord Chancellor Viscount Hailsham 
Home Secretary Sir John Simon 
Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare 
Lord Privy Seal Viscount Halifax 
Secretary for War -. Alfred Duff Cooper 
Dominions Secretary Malcolm MacDonald 
Secretary for Air Viscount Swinton 
Secretary for India Marquess of Zetland 
Secretary for Scotland Sir Godfrey Collins 
Colonial Secretary J. H. Thomas 
President of the Board of Trade Walter Ranciman 
First Lord of the Admiralty Viscount Monsell 
Minister for League of Nations Anthony Eden 
Affairs 
Minister without Portfolio Lord Eustace Percy 
Minister for Agriculture Walter Elliot 
and Fisheries 
President of the Board of Education 
Minister of Health 
Minister of Labour 
First Commissioner of Works 
Oliver Stanley 
Sir Kingsley Wood 
Ernest Brown 
William Ormsby-Gore 
33iographical details for Stanley Baldwint Sir Samuel Hoare, 
Anthony Eden, and Sir Robert Vansittart may be found above in the 
text (pages 126-136). This appendix provides capsule sketches of 
the rest of the Cabinet as well as of Sir Austen Chamberlain, 
Geoffrey Dawson, and Sir Maurice Hankey. In addition to the sources 
listed in the footnotes, I have used the Dictionary of National 
Biography (DNB) and, for those not covered therein, Who's Who and 
Who Was Who. 
Ernest Brown (1881-1 62) 
Born and educated in Torquay, he worked before the war as a 
political lecturer. Commissioned in 1916 in the Somerset Light 
Infantryt he was mentioned in despatches and awarded the military 
cross and the Italian silver star. He entered the House of Commons 
in 1923 as a Liberal and subsequently sat with the National Liberals 
on the Government benches. After serving as Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Ministry of Health from 1931 to 1932 and as Secretary to the 
Mines Department from 1932 to 1935, he joined the Cabinet as Minister 
of Labour. Brown was a Baptist lay preacher and Brotherhood worker, 
and the Honourary Treasurer of the Baptist Missionary Society. 
333. 
f 
Sir Austen Chamberlain (1863-1937) 
The elder son of JosePh and half-brother of Neville Chamberlain, 
he was educated at Rugby and Trinity College Cambridge. 
1 After taking 
his degreeg he spent nine months studying in France and twelve in 
Germany, an experience which left him with a decided preference for 
things French. He entered Parliament in 1892 and rose quickly to. serve 
as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1903 to 1905. From 1915 to 19179 
he was India Secretaryl and the following year he became a member 
F without portfolio of the War Cabinet. In 1919, he returned to the 
Exchequer. Two years later, he replaced Bonar Law as Lord Privy Beal 
and Leader of the Conservative Party. He remained in that position 
until the autumn of 1922 when Law and Baldwin destroyed the Coalition 
and split the Tories at the famous Carlton Club meetine. However, 
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Chamberlain soon became reconciled and in 1924 re-entered the: Cabinet 
as Foreign Secretary in Baldwin's second Government. The Foreign 
office was probably his favourite portfolio and certainly the one for 
which he was best known. His approach was that of a realistf and he 
bad a decidedly limited opinion-of the value, of-the LeaGuc of Nation--* 
He was a Francophilet pro-Italian, and had amicable personal relations 
with Mussolini. After the defeat of the Conservatives in 1929, he held 
office only once more, very briefly$ as First Lord of the Admiralty in 
September of 1931 during the initial days-of the National Government. 
Cosmopolitan and very sociablel Austen Chamberlain in his later years 
wore the mantel of elder statesman of the Conservative Party. His age, 
-his experiencet and his reputation for generosity and honour gave him - 
as was demonstrated during the Hoare-Laval crisis - great influence 
within the House of Commons. Birkenhead aptly said of himo 'Austen 
always played the game and always lost it'. 
2 
335- 
Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940) 
The second son of Joseph Chamberlains he was educated at Ragby 
and Mason Colleget Birminghamp where he studied science, metallurgy, 
and engineering. 
3 After apprenticing with a firm of chartered 
accountants, he spent the years from 1890 to 1897, from the ages of 
21 to 28, in virtual seclusion in the Bahamas trying to make a success 
of a sisal plantation his father had bought. Soil conditions doomed 
this attempt to failure, but it turned him into a strong, self-reliant 
individual - although it also reinforced his natural shyness. 
Warm-hearted in private with family and friendsq his public image was 
austere and forbidding. In 1897, he returned to Birmingham to become 
a prosperous businessman and to take a very active interest in local 
politics, finally becoming Lord Mayor in 1915- In November of ttie 
f ollowing yearjý - he- had his f irst tast6 of national off ice as Minister 
of National Service. However, he and Lloyd George immediately developed 
an intense mutual antipathyt and Chamberlain resigned. in August of 1917, 
not having done well. He entered Parliament a year later and became 
close friends--with-Hoare, Halifax, and Swintci-,. Out of the country 
during the Carlton Club rebellion, he joined the Cabinet in 1922 as 
Postmaster Generall moved to the Ministry of Health in 1923, and to the 
Exchequer that August., He returned-to Health in Baldwin's second Govern- 
ment and became Chancellor again in the National Government. In these 
two officest he was efficient, hard-working (Churchill called him the 
'pack horse of the government, 
4), 
and - within the limits of his 
financial orthodoxy - did a good job. IV 1935v he had fimly established 
himself as the successor to Stanley Baldwin. In the thirtiest 
Chamberlain was well aware of the necessity for rearmament, and he wrote 
to his sister: 'On the whole, I loathe Germanst. 
5 However, he was not 
highly knowledgeable in foreign affairs and was decidedly lacking in 
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flair for them. Domestio matters were his strength. As one of his 
friends and colleagues put it: 
If the world had only allowed him to concentrate 
his remarkable energy on financet housingt health, 
slums, maternal and child welfaret business and 
industry, local government - and in all of these 
fields he was a Tory Radical reformer in the 
tradition of his illustrious father - he would have 
gone down to history as a successful Prime Minister. 
These were his first loves; the subjects he really 
understood, and as Minister of Health and later as 
Chancellor he was a realistic reformer, competent 
and efficient. 
Robert Boothby, Churchillts crony, despite his extreme antagonism 
towards the Chamberlain of Munich and appeasementp has nothing but 
praise for the Chamberlain of the Exchequer*7 
Sir C; odfrey Collins (1875-1936) 
Born in Glasgow and educated at H. M. S. Britannia, he joined the 
Royal Navy in 1888 and served as a midshipman in the East Indian Station 
from 1890 to his retirement three years later. He became a Liberal M. P. 
in 1910 and a National Liberal in 1931. He was PPS to the War Secretary 
from 1910 to 1914 ancl to the Chief Liberal Whip in 1915- For the next 
two yearsq he served in Egypt, Gallipoliq and Mesopotamia, rising to the 
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Returning to politics, he became a Junior 
Lord of the Treasury (1919-1920) and then Chief Liberal Whip (1924-1926). 
In 1932, he entered the Cabinet as Secretar7 of State for Scotland. 
He was also a managing director of the family publishing house, 
W, Collins of London and Glasgow. * 
Alfred Duff Cooper (1890-1954) 
Born into an old, established Norwich family (his father was a 
successful London surgeon, his mother the daughter of the Duke of Pife), 
he was educated at Eton and New College Oxford, where he obtained 
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second in history. After two years spent mainly in Paris and Hanover, 
he entered the Foreign Office in 1913. He joined the Grenadier Guards 
in 1917 and saw action the following yearl being mentioned in despatches. 
In 1919, having returned to the Foreign Office, he married Lady Diana 
Manners, daughter of the Duke of Rutland and one of the most beautiful 
women of her day (and supposedly the model for Mrs. Stitch in Evelyn 
Waugh's Scoop). Elected as a Conservative M. P. in 1924, he lost his 
seat in 1929 and over the next two years wrote his highly acclaimed 
biography of Talleyrand. In March of 1931, he ran in the notorious 
St. George's by-election as Baldwin's surrogate in his clash with the 
press Lordsp Beaverbrook and Rothermere. He won easily and was 
reappointed to his former position of Financial Secretary to the War 
office. Three years later, he was promoted to Financial Secretary to 
the Treasury, and he entered the Cabinet in November of 1935 as War 
Secretary. Duff Cooperts political sympathies were very much pro-French 
8 
and anti-German. 
Geoffrey,, Dawson (18 4-1944) 
The eldest child of a banker named George Robinson, he changed his 
name to Dawson in 1917 in order to come into an inheritance on his 
mother's side of the family. 
9 He received his education at Eton and 
Magdalen College Oxford, getting a double first and becoming a fellow 
of All Souls in 1898. After working in the Post and Colonial Offices, 
he went to South Africa in 1901 to serve in Milner's famous 'kinder- 
garden' of Tory imperialism. From 1905 to 1910, he edited the 
Johannesburg Star. He then returned to Englandl joined The Times, and 
edited it from 1912 to 1919 and from 1923 to 1941. An intimate of Hoare, 
quite friendly with Neville Chamberlain, and a confidant of Stanley 
Baldwin (who valued his advice on foreigm affairslo)t Dawson beloneed 
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to the Cliveden Set and was later closely associated with the policy of 
appeasement. His opinion, and consequently that of his newspaper, was 
pro-German. In their memoirs, Hoare, Vansittart, and Macmillan, all 
complain about this slant, and in the spring of 1935 Eden wrote a 
memorandum to the Cabinet blasting The Times' defeatist attitude 
towards Berlin. 
11 During the Hoare-Laval crisis, Dawson was all the 
more incensed because Baldwin, in refusing to see the press, made no 
exception for him. 
12 
Walter Elliot (1888-1958) 
Born in Lanark, the son of a prominent agriculturist and livestock 
auctioneer, he was educated at Glasgow Academy and University and took 
firsts in both science and-medicine. During the war, he served in France 
as a medical officer, winning the military cross and bar. He entered 
Parliament as a Conservative in 1918 andl though he voted-for the 
Coalition at the Carlton Club, held a number of junior appointments 
before becoming Financial Secretar7 to the Treasur7 in 1931- In 1932, 
I.,; lliot joinE-d the Cabinet as minister for Agriculture and Fisheries. v 
Viscount Hailsham (1872-1950) 
Douglas Hogg, the eldest son of the philanthropist Quinton Hoggt 
was educated at Eton and then joined his father's firm of sugar 
merchants. 
13 After serving ab a trooper in the'Boer Wart he was 
called to the bar in 1902 and succeeded in building a very substantial 
practice, becoming a bencher in 1920. Two years laterv Bonar Law invited 
him to enter the Government as Attorney General, and he immediately won 
a byý-election to Parliament. He retained this office under Baldwin, who 
appointed him Lord Chancellor in 1928. That year he became Baron 
Hailsham, and the following he received his Viscountcy. Upon the 
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formation of the National Government, he became Secretary of State for 
War and began to organize and lay the plans for rearmament. Intensely 
hostile to Germanyq he firmly believed that the Berlin government 
intended war. In 1935, Hailsham once more became Lord Chancellor. 
A man of sound and-careful judgement, he was in Baldwin's inner circle 
and always ready to help him. 
Viscount Halifax (1881-1959) 
Born Edward Wood, fourth son of the second Viscount Halifax, 
he was heir (his three older brothers all dying before he was nine) 
to great estates in Yorkshire. 
14 He was educated at Eton and Christ 
Church Oxfordg where he took a first in modern history and went on to 
become a fellow of All Souls. From 1904 to 1905t he travelled around 
the world. In 1910, he entered Parliament as a Conservative. After 
serving during the war as a Captain of Dragoons, he returned to politics, 
took an active part in the Carlton Club conspiracy, and joined Bonar 
Law's Government as President of the Board of Education. He served under 
13.7.1dwin both th. cre =d as Minicter for Agg-riculture and Ficheries. 
In neither office was he particularly successful, but in 1925 he became 
Baron Irwin and went to India as Viceroy. He remained there until 1931 
and performed creditably. On his return, he declined MacDonald's offer 
of the'Foreign Office but did in 1932 go back to the Board of Education 
in order to give the Cabinet and Hoare the benefit of his Indian 
experience. In June of 19352 Halifax (he succeeded to the title in 1934 
and became the first Earl in 1944) went to the War Officet and after the 
general election in November he became Lord Privy Beal and Leader of the 
House of Lords. He wa s one of Baldwin's closest personal friends and one 
of the few men of Cabinet rank to whom he could unburden himself. 
15 
As War Secretary, he learned of Britain's weak defences but did not feel 
0 
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the need for rearmament urgent. His knowledge of foreign affairs was not 
profound, and he failed to understand, until very late in the day, the. 
intentions and the wickedness of the nazis. Uncompromising in his 
principlesl Halifax's personality and behaviour were dominated by his 
very staunch and moralistic Anglo-Catholicism. He believed in*immorta- 
lity and had been brought up by his father to consider racing immoral 
and ballet indecent. 
Sir Maurice Hankey (1877-1963) 
Hankey (created first Baron in 1939) was educated at Rugby and 
then joined the Royal Marines, retiring in 1929 with the rank of 
Colonel. He was appointed Assistant Secretary to the Committee of 
Imperial Defence in 1908 and subsequently served as Secretary both to 
the CID (1912-1938) and to the Cabinet (1916-1938). From 1923 to 1938, 
he was also Clerk to the Privy Council. With his-experience, his 
intellectual ability, and his position, Hankey exerted enormous 
influence in Whitehall; in fact, he carried 'a degree of weight in the 
privato councils of the Cabinet greater than that of all but the mont 
determined Cabinet Ministers'. 
16 He was Stanley Baldwin's closest 
adviser on defence, 
17 
and during'the Hoare-Laval crisis his diar7 
1 18 records daily meetings with senior Ministers. Ile opposed sanctions 
in general, on the grounds that either their success or their failure 
would antagonize Italy, 
19 
and on 25 November he sent Baldwin a secret 
memorandum arguing strongly against the speoific imposition of the oil 
embargo. 
20 He agreed with Vansittart's belief that this measure risked 
war with Italy and consequently endaneered both the sea route to the 
East and Anglo-French relations. Hankey also felt certain that France 
would I not support Britain in the eVent Of a Mediterranean war. 
21 
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Malcolm MacDonald-(b. 1901) 
The son of Ramsay MacDonald, he was born at Lossiemouth in 
Morayshire and educated at Bedales School, Petersfield, and Queen's 
College Oxford. A member of London County Council from 1927 to 1930t 
he was elected as a Labour M. P. in 1929. Two years later, he followed 
his father into the National Government and became Parliamentary 
Undersecretary to the Dominions Office. MacDonald entered the Cabinet 
in June of 1935 as Colonial Secretary. The following November, he 
moved to the Dominions Office. 
22 
Ramsay MacDonald-(1866-1937) 
The illegitimate son of a farmworkerv Anne Ramsay, and a ploughman, 
Hugh MacDonaldp he was born and raised in his maternal grandmother's 
two-room cottage in the village-of Lossiemoutht Mora, yshire. Self- 
educated after the age-of fifteen, his early-years were ones of s-truggle 
and poverty. He joined the Fabian Society in 1886 and the Independent 
Labour Party in 1894. Two years laterg he married into the upper middle 
1ý class and fc-. the firot time 
knew financial independence, managing to "I... 
travel considerably and to enjoy a very happy family life. In 19061 
he was finally elected to Parliament and five years later became 
chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party. He resigned this position 
at the beginning of the war over opposition to British entry, but he was 
not a pacifist and supported the war effort. In 1922 after re-election 
(he had lost his seat in 1918)9 he was again chosen chairman of the PLP, 
and in 1924 he headed Britain's first Labour Government. Prime Minister 
again in 1929, he continued in that position after 1931 in the Tory- 
dominated National Uovernment. In June of 1935, his health badly 
impaired by overwork and overstrain, he switched offices with Baldwin 
and moved to the sinecure of Lord President of the Council. Though a 
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supporter of general disarmament and the League of Nationsq MacDonald 
realized the threat to Britain in the thirties and played a significant 
role in drafting the 1935 White Paper on Defence calling'for major 
rearmament. He had been his own Foreign Secretary in his first' 
Goverment and possessed a distinct flair for foreign affairs. Lord 
Eustace Percyt for example, felt that he was probably the only Cabinet 
member who, in June of 1935, understood the full complexities of the 
Ethiopian situation. 
23 At that time, despite his support for the 
Leaguet he was concerned with preserving Stresa and took a position 
intermediate to those of Eden and Hoare. 
24 
Viscount Monsell (1881-1969) 
Born Bolton Monsell (Eyres being his wife's maiden name), he was 
educated at H. M. S. Britannia and went to sea as a midshipman in 1896. 
Though retired to the emergency list in 1906, he returned to active 
duty in 1914 and finished the war with the rank of Commander. He entered 
the House in 1910 and sat as a Conservative M. P. for 25 years until his 
eievaticu Lv' the peerage in 1935. He servedý as Civil Lord to -the 
Admiralty (1921), Financial Secretary to the Admiralty (1921-1923), 
Chief Conservative Whip (1923-1931), and Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Treasury (1923-1924,1924-1929, and 1931). He joined the Cabinet in 1931 
as First Lord of the Admiralty. In that office, his major concern was 
not foreign policy but gettint more m oney-from the Treasury. 
25 In the 
summer of 1935P worried about the security of the sea route to the East 
and the importance of the Italian presence on the Brenner, Monsell 
objected to the imposition of sanctions. He sided with Vansittart's 
'realism' and against Eden and the League. 
26 
343. 
William Ormsby-Gore (1885-1964) 
The eldest son of the third Lord Harlech (whom he succeeded in 
1938), Ormsby-Gore was educated at Eton and New College Oxford and was 
elected to Parliament in 1910 as a Conservative. 
27 For the first part 
of the war, he served as an intelligence officer in the Middle East. 
From 1917 to 1918, he was back in the 4ouse acting as PPS to Milner, 
but in 1918 he returned to Egypt as Assistant Political Officer for 
Palestine. From 1922 to 1929, with a break for the Labour Government, 
he held the post of Parliamentary Undersecretary for the Colonies, and 
in 1931 he was briefly Postmaster General. Later that same year, he 
entered the Cabinet as First Commissioner of Works. In the summer of 
1935, Ormsby-Gore wrote to Baldwin 
. 
in favour of opposing Mussolini 
completely. 
28 
Lord Eustace Percy (1887-1958) 
Lord Eustace Percy (created Baron in 1953), the seventh son of the 
seventh Duke of Northumberland, was raised in an old-fashioned household 
clominated by Dvangr. lical Christfanity and a tradition Of - public -, service. - 
He was educated at Eton and Christ Church Oxford, where he took a first 
in modern history. Entering the diplomatic service in 1909, he served in 
Washington from 1910 to 1914t at the Foreign Office during the warl and 
at the Paris peace conference in 1919. That year he resigned and in 1921 
secured election as a Conservative M. P. From 1924 to 1929, he was in the 
Cabinet as President of the Board of Education; and in 1935 he re-entered 
that body as Minister without Portfolio, In later years, he came to 
regret that the Government had not stuck with the Hoare-Laval Plan and 
ridden out the storm - which he felt was possible - but at the time he 
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demanded Hoare's resignation. 
29 In fa*ctl . he was one of the Cabinet 
members in Eden's camp, pushing for support of the League of Nations 
even before the Italian invasion. 
30 
Walter Runciman (1870-1949) 
Brought up a Methodist, Runciman (created first Viscount in 1937) 
throughout his life held strong convictions both about his religion and 
about temperance. After gaining a third in history at Trinity College 
Cambridge, he joined his father's shipping business -and over the 
years won considerable respect in the City for his economic acumen. 
Elected to the House as a Liberal in 18990 he entered the Cabinet in 
1908 as President of the Board of Education. Three years later he went 
to Agriculture and Fisheries and in 1914 to the Board of Trade. 
e resigned from the Government along with Asquith in 1916. From 1931 
to 1937, he was back at the 33oard of Trade, this time, as-a National 
Liberal. In foreign affairs, Runciman wanted British participation in 
Europe limited to air and sea, 
31 
and in 1935 he sided with Monsell in 
.. Opposition 
to any measures possibly leading to the imposition of 
32 
sanctions against Italy@ 
Sir John Simon (1873-1954) 
Born in Manchester, the only son of a Congregational Ministerl 
he went to Wadham College Oxfordl where he was President of the Union 
in 1896 and 1897 and was elected a fellow of All Souls. In 1899l he was 
called to the bar and began a legal career of the utmost brilliance, 
culminating with his becoming Lord Chancellor in 1940 (as the first 
Viscount Simon). -He entered Parliament as a Liberal in 1906 and. joined 
the Cabinet as Attorney General in 1913. He almost resigned over the 
Government's decision to go to war and eventually did do so eighteen 
months later because of conscription. In 1931, he formed and led the 
National Liberals and re-entered the Cabinet as Foreign Secretary. 
Home * 
In June of 1935, Baldwin moved him to the Pereien Office. Simon was 
highly intelligent and a superb barrister, but he was personally cold 
and distant. His great flaw was an inability to make decisions. His 
tenure at the Foreign Office was, to put it charitablyp not a success. 
He was, as Eden wrote, 'miscast by temperment and training.... too 
penetrating a discernment and too frail a conviction encouraged 
confusion-where there should have been a fixed intenti. 
33 For the 
Poreign Office, Britain needed an old testament prophet, a righteous 
crusader, a Churchill - not, for all his intellectuzil gifts, the 
equivocal Sir John Simon. 
I 
Oliver Stanley (1896-1950) 
The younger son of the seventeenth Earl of Derby, he was educated 
at Eton and only prevented by the war from going up to Oxford. He served 
in France as an officer, winning both the militar7 cross and the croix 
_.. da guerre. 
Ile was called to the--bar in-1919 .. and, elpe-ItAet to Parlin-ment 
as a Conservative five years later. He then joined his uncle's firm 
of stockbrokers in the City. Appointed Minister of Transport in 1933t 
he entered the Cabinet as Minister of Labour in 1934 and moved to the 
Board of Education the following year. 'Stanley was liked, respected, 
and trusted by all sides of the House. 
Viscount Swinton (1884-1972) 
The son of Colonel Y. G. Lloyd-Greames he was educated at Winchester 
and University College Oxford. Called to the bar in 1908t he served in 
the army from 1914 to 1917 and wad elected as a Conservative M. P. the 
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following year. In 1924f he changed his name to Cunliffe-Lister and in 
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1935 was created Viscount Swinton (first Earl in 1955). He was one of 
the principal Carlton Club conspirators and entered Bonar Law's Govern- 
ment as President of the Board of Trade. He held the same office from 
1924 to 1929 under Baldwin and in 1931 during MacDonald's first National 
Government. In November of that year, he went to the Colonial Office and 
in June of 1935 became Air Secretary, where he played a crucial role in 
rearming the RAF. Swinton was an excellent administrator and, apart from 
Baldwin and Chamberlaint the ablest Minister in the Government. 
34 
During the Cabinet debates on defence in the spring-of 1934, he totally 
rejected the validity of economic sanctions. 
35 
J. H. Thomas (1874-1949) 
Born at Newport, the illegitimate son of Elizabeth Thomas, 
a domestic servant, he was brought up in poverty by his grandmother. 
He left school at twelve and three years later found a job on the Great 
Western Railway as an engine cleaner. From these beginningst'he embarked 
on--a successful twin career in trade unionism and politics. Thomas was 
el ected to, twhe House of -Commons in. 1910 -and became Cenci.;; Il See%retAL)-y to 
the National Union of Railwaýmen in 1917. He entered the Cabinet in 1924 
as Colonial Secretary in MacDonald's first Labour Government. He returned 
to office in 1929 as Lord Privy Seal and became Dominions Secretary the 
following yeary staying there - having accompanied MacDonald int .o the 
National Government - until November of 1935 when Baldwin moved him back 
to the Colonial Office. 36 
Sir Kingsle Wood-(1881-1943) 
Born in Hull, the eldest child of a Wesleyan minister, and educated 
at the Central Foundation Boys' Sohool'in Londong he was articled to a 
solicitor and admitted in 1903. He then set up practice in the City and 
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from 1911 to 1919 served on London County Council, involving himself in 
all aspects of welfare policy. Elected as a Conservative M. P. in 1918, 
he became PPS the following year to the first Minister of Health. From 
1924 to 1929, he was Parliamentary Secretary to Neville Chamberlain in 
the same Ministry. Appointed Postmaster General in 1931, he entered the 
Cabinet in that capacity two years later. In 1935t Baldwin chose him as 
Minister of Health. In October of 1935P Kingsley Wood agreed with Grandi 
that too much emphasis had been placed on opposition to fascism merely 
37 for political purposes* 
The Marquess of Zetland (1876-19 1) 
Lawrence John Dundas, second Marquess of Zetland, was educated at 
Harrow and Trinity College Cambridge. He then travelled extensively 
throughout the East for a number of years and published several 
accounts of his experiences and observations. After sitting as a 
Conservative M. P* from 1907 to 1916, he served as Governor of Bengal 
from 1917 to 1922 and Secretax7 of State for India from 1935 to 1940- 
I! c ruc-cacded his father in 1929. 
ýP- 
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Appendix II 
The Hoare-Laval Plan 
Appendix III 
A Corridor for Camels 
On Monday 9 December, the British Government accepted the 
Hoare-Laval Plan as set out in Cabinet Paper 235(35)- In this form, 
the proposals were presented to Italy and Ethiopia, submitted to the 
League of Nations, and published in the White Paper. 
Howeverl the actual document drawn up in Paris contained one 
additional olause. Hoare and Laval had agreed to obtain from the 
Ethiopian goverment 
an indertaking not to construct from the 
Ethiopian [sic] port which it acquires a 
railway communicating with the interior 
and also an undertaking to conclude with 
the French government all the necessary 
arrangements to safeguard the interests 
of the port of Djibuti and of the Franco- 
Ethiopian railwav., 
This paragraph had been included both in the copy of the Plan brought 
by Peterson to Eden on Monday morning and in the original version of 
Cabinet Paper 235(35) circulated early in the day; butj after having 
spoken to Vansittartl Eden had deleted it from a subsequent draft 
handed out in the afternoon. The Cabinet examined and approved this 
second version. Thus# though aware of the prohibitiong they never 
agreed to it. 
0, 
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On the other hand, they never specifically rejected it. While 
they probably assumed that the clause was a dead letter, it was not. 
Following some further telephone calls to Parisv Eden added it, on his 
own authority, to the telegram sent to Barton on the night of Tuesday 
10 December. Eden did not reintroduce this ban into the actual'text, 
but he did advise the British Minister, that it would eventually be 
imposed on Haile Selassie. As a Foreign Office memorandum dated 
Thursday 12 December noted, 
the position is therefore that the paragraph does 
represent the point agreed to in Paris but that it 
was not included in the document which the Cabinet 
had under consideration. 2 
This ambiguity and the problems likely to have been caused by it would 
undoubtedly have died along with the proposals themselves but for the 
fact that the Paris correspondent of The Times somehow dug out the 
details. On Monday 16 December, he reported the existence of this 
secret agreement, and Dawson accompanied the news story with his biting 
editorial about a corridor for camels. 
This latest development aggravated the Govexmment's already unhappy 
position. At the Cabinet meetings on Monday night and Tuesday morning 
(16 and 17 December)O, Eden explained the situation in detail to his 
perturbed colleagues: though the ban did appear in the original French 
draftl Vansittart had later insisted to Uger that it be deleted as it 
did not form part of the agreement proper.; it referred not to Assab but 
only to Zeila in British Somaliland which the Emperor might prefer. 
Despite this explanation, Ministers were very upset. Fearing that an 
already incensed Parliament and public would grow even more angry, 
-they supported the idea of telling both the French government and the 
House of Commons that no prohibition of any sort had ever been approved. 
At that moment in Tuesdayts discussion, infomed that a question would 
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be asked the following day in the House, they realized that they would 
have to adopt a policy by then. Feeling, however, that this could not be 
done without first ensuring that Eden's explanation of the situation was 
correct. and that no documents existed which included Assab in the prohi- 
bition, they instructed Baldwin to clarify this point with the Foreign 
Secretary. The Cabinet felt concerned enough to authorize the Prime 
Minister to summon another meeting later in the day if necessary. 
Baldwin, thoughl wished to avoid inflaming public opinion any further 
and said that he preferred to deal with the issue at the meeting 
already scheduled-for Wednesday. 
After Baldwin had spoken to Hoare, two telegrams were sent from 
the Foreign office. The first instructed Barton to disregard the ban 
on the construction of a railway as it did not 'accurately reproduce 
the substance of the discussions in Paris .3 The second telej; ram went 
4 
at two in the afternoon to Clerk. 
It said that# as the matter was 
likely to cause great trouble in Britain and as a question was already 
put down for answer on Wednesday in the House of Commons, he was to 
iy, for; r, Laval at once of the British attitude: 
The Paris proposals are based on the idea of an 
exchange of territory, which can only be brought 
about by an Italian cession of Assab. In regard 
to. that, we have agreed to no restriction of 
Abyssinia's rights to construct such communica- 
tions as she sees fit.... [The alternative of 
Zeila] is hypothetical and does not arise. Only 
Assab is initially in the picture and there we 
have... agreed to no untenable restriction. 
5 
Accompanying this telegram was a detailed memorandum from Vansittarte 
He stressed thaty while the actual text failed to make it quite clear 
that only Zeila was covered by the prohibitiong there could be no doubt 
that such was the correct interpretation. He added that at Paris, 
because all the participants had assumed that both Massolini and Haile 
Selassie would reject Assab in fav our of Zeila, 
6 
the British and French 
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had concentrated on discussing the latter alternative. They had agreed 
that a connecting railway could be constructed to Djibuti and that a 
road for lorry traffic could be built directly to Addis Ababa. This 
road, Vansittart noted, would probably also ruin the French railway, 
but no one had objected to it. Vansittart emphasized, howeverl that 
the ban did not in any way apply to Asýabl and he marshalled numerous 
arguments supporting this contention. 
Tuesday evening, Clerk went to see Laval and L6ger. The results 
I 
of this conversation being-satisfactoryt he returned to the 1hbassy 
and began to draw up a telegram to London. However, L6ger later rang 
up with a very different story, and the Ambassador went once more to 
the Quai d'Orsay for further discussions with him and Saint Quentin 
(Laval having already left for Geneva). The'French--now insisted-thatj 
while the British could use whatever interpretation'they felt was most 
palatable for Parliamentary consumption, the ban must stand and apply 
to both Assab and Zeila. Clerk reported (in his despatch finally sent. 
at three o'clock Wednesday mornin 
7) that he had used every argument 
in vansittart's memorandum as well as others he had thought-of but had 
eventually been forced to state that there existed a clear miSunder- 
standing of fact. 'The restrictionghe had insistedt referred only to 
Zeila. Clerk ended his telegram with the warning that the French might 
cause trouble, because none of the documents actually made the point 
that only Zeila was involved. ' 
When the Cabinet met on Wednesday, they were so preoccupied with 
their own survival that they virtually ignored the camel corridor. 
()nly at the vex7 end of the meeting did one Minister ask what had 
i happened since the previous day. Baldwin replied that Barton had been 
told to cancel the infomation given to him and that Clerk had been 
instructed to clear the matter up with the French covernment, 
II"-, :T 369. i, 
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That afternoon during question time in the House of Commons, 
a Labour member asked whether it had been intended to prohibit the 
construction of a railway and if so whether this was done with the 
knowledge of the Foreign Secretary or the consent of the Government. 
The Prime Minister answered that Sir Samuel Hoare would deal with the 
matter in his speech on the morrow and asked his questioner to wait 
until then. 
Hoarets explanation, at the beginning of Thursday's debate, war, 
brief. He merely noted that Ethiopia was to have full sovereignty over 
the port of Assab. There were to be no restrictions. Zeila, he stated, 
war, only included as an alternative if both sides preferred it 
(of course, he had been sure in Paris that they would, but he refrained 
from mentioning- this). Neither, Stanley Baldwin-nor Neville Chamberlain, 
who wound up for the Goverment, had anything further to say. There was 
little they could have added, and they undoubtedly felt that the less 
said the better. 
The uproar surrounding the camel corridor died along with the 
Hoare-Laval Plan itself. The rr-pnrt in "Me. Times had come at a delicate 
moment: the Government were trying to conduct an orderly retreat in the 
face of public outrage and backbench rebellion. Revelation of this 
secret clause served as the last straw. It badly aggravated the 
Government's position. Its effect, however, was largely catalytic. 
It speeded up the process but made little difference to the ultimate 
results. 
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Notes to Appendix III 
1. An unsigned Foreign Office minutel dated Thursday 12 December 1935- 
1 9106/1/1, P. O. 371/19168. 
2. -Ibid. 
3. Quoted from the minutes of Cabinet meeting 56(35)t Wednesday 
18 December 1935- 
4- J 9521/1/11 F. O. 371/19171* 
5- Ibid. 
6. The assumption was that Mussolini would prefer Zeila to Assab in 
order to avoid having to cede any Italian territory. Haile Selassie, 
it was felt, would also choose Zeila so that his outlet to the sea 
would be bounded by British and French and not Italian possessions; 
he would be unwilling to put his head into a noose (ibid. ). 
7. J 9526/1/1, F. O. 371/19171. 
6 
Appendix IV 
The White Paper on Ethiopia 
Baldwin first promised the White Paper during question time in 
the House of Commons on Tuesday 10 December in an attempt to delay a 
debate on the Hoare-Laval Plan. Later in the week, when it was settled 
that the terms would be formally presented to the Secretary General of 
the League of Nations on the evening of Friday 13 December, it was 
felt in London that Parliamentq publicq and press must receive an 
authoritative version as soon thereafter as possible. Therefore, 
it was decided to release the White Paper on Saturday morning. 
The actual contents were determined during Friday. From Geneva, 
Eden recommonded that they consist of t. hc tolegrams-to Rome and 
Addis Ababa giving the proposals, the extra telegram to Barton' 
instructing him to ask Haile Selassie not to reject them, and the 
speeches made by Laval and Eden to the Committee of Eighteen. 
Peterson passed on these suggestions in a phone call to the Foreign 
office; and he agreedl in a second conversation, that tho-White Paper 
should begin with the report of the Committee of Five. 
1 The Cabinet 
neither discussed nor approved the White Paper, and they were not 
consulted on its contents. Baldwin promised it in the first place; 
then Eden and Foreign Office officials arranged for its contents and 
its publication. 
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Note to Appendix IV 
The details are given in a Foreign Office minute dated 
13 December 1935. J 9483/1/1, F. 0- 371/19171. 
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